NEWGOV
New Modes of Governance

Integrated Project
Priority 7 – Citizens and Governance in the Knowledge-based Society

Academic Articles on the Project Findings
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Summary

As a result of the project, two articles have been published by David Coen and Mark Thatcher in the year 2008: “Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies” (*Journal of Public Policy*, 28:1, pp. 49-71), and “Reshaping European Regulatory Space: An Evolutionary Analysis” (*West European Politics*, 31:5)

Abstract for “Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies”: European networks of regulators in industries such as telecommunications, securities, energy and transport have been cited as important examples of the growth of network governance in Europe. Using a principal-agent perspective as a starting point, the article examines why a double delegation to networks of regulators has taken place. It looks at how and why the European Commission, national governments and independent regulatory agencies have driven the creation of networks, their institutional character and their implications for regulatory governance in Europe. It argues that problems of co-ordination were the main factor advanced to justify establishing networks of regulators. The new networks have been given a wide range of tasks and broad membership, but enjoy few formal powers or resources. They are highly dependent on the European Commission and face rivals for the task of coordinating European regulators. Thus in institutional terms the spread of network governance has in fact been limited.

Abstract for “Reshaping European Regulatory Space: An Evolutionary Analysis”: The article examines European institutions for implementing EU regulation. It sets out seven different models that have been used or discussed for organising those institutions. It argues that the development of European regulatory space has followed an evolutionary development involving gradual reshaping through a series of steps, with previous stages influencing later stages and institutions being built on existing structures. Despite pressures and frequent discussions of comprehensive change, existing organisations have managed to limit and shape reforms. The result has been institutional ‘layering’ and ‘conversion’ instead of streamlining, and a gradual strengthening of networks of national independent regulatory agencies. The analysis therefore suggests that evolutionary analysis based on historical institutionalist approaches seems highly appropriate to the EU. Equally, it shows how even if there are strong demand-side pressures for centralisation of regulation, existing institutional arrangements and organisations limit and shape the supply of new institutions, so that debates about radical change coexist with a fragmented, cluttered and complex European regulatory space.