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University of Bremen, Susanne K. Schmidt

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Summary
The discussion of the Services Directive from 2004 onwards showed an unprecedented extent of politicization of a single-market issue. Coinciding with the 2004 Eastern enlargement round, the easing of the services freedom through the directive raised significant redistributive issues, given the differences in labour costs. The article analyzes why mutual recognition is so controversial in services, arguing that the relationship among Member states, between governments and their citizens, and among differently regulated EU-citizens matters. Partly, the directive lessens the risk of redistribution through the institutionalization of administrative cooperation between the home and the host Member state. Partly, the directive fails as Member states may be forced to discriminate against their population in the name of the internal market.

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I. Introduction

The discussion of the Services Directive from 2004 onwards showed an unprecedented extent of politicization of an internal-market issue. Until then internal-market policies had gone mainly unnoticed, but this time protest soared. In the course of it, the French and the Dutch even voted down the Constitutional Treaty (Howarth, 2007: 94). With the Services Directive, politicization hit the internal market.

With its proposal, the Commission wanted to strengthen the internal market for services, which does not reflect the importance of services in national GDP. Though services had been included in the internal market programme of 1992, only some sector-specific directives resulted (such as for insurance services) in a very long and cumbersome process. As a horizontal directive, the draft targeted all services, realizing the internal market by following strictly the home-country responsibility for regulation. While home-country regulation, implying the mutual recognition among Member states of each others’ regulations, never roused such widespread fears for goods markets, for services the Commission was told differently.

By integrating segmented national markets, internal-market legislation significantly enhances efficiency. Companies no longer need to adapt their goods or services to different domestic regulations of Member states. Instead, there are either common, harmonized rules, or there is mutual recognition. This lifting of market segmentation allows companies to exploit economies of scale while customers may enjoy greater product variety. Internal-market policies are thus classic examples of measures increasing Pareto-efficiency (Majone, 1989: 166-168, Majone, 1992).

This article analyzes why the realization of the internal market for services was nevertheless perceived as a highly redistributive exercise. The explanation builds on the difference of services against goods trade, the specifics of governance through mutual recognition, and the increased heterogeneity among Member states after enlargement. Integrating markets via mutual recognition has implications for three relationships, I argue: For the relationship among EU governments, who implicitly delegate regulatory authority among each other; for the relationship of governments, being politically responsible for market regulation to their citizens; and finally among different EU citizens being subject to the different regulations of their home countries while engaging in the same activities.

For mutual recognition to work in services Member states have to perceive themselves as cooperating but not as competing entities. Integration becomes acceptable only if rules are being set and controlled according to domestic criteria, and not simply with view to outcompeting other Member states. If integrating markets via mutual recognition invites forum-shopping, redistributive issues are in the forefront. The Member state gains most which manages to adapt its rules in the most market-friendly sense. For redistributive issues, the Union has insufficient input-legitimation (Scharpf, 2004). Even if liberalizing services markets strengthens general welfare, given that it has highly redistributive effects, this is unlikely to be perceived as legitimate, due to the lack of a common demos showing sufficient solidarity for significant redistribution.

The article starts by analyzing the original proposal of the directive, and the redistributive issues it raised. Then it approaches the issue of why mutual recognition proved so contentious with services by focusing on the regulation of services trade in the EU, and on the German experience with mutual recognition in services, analyzing subsequently the limits of mutual recognition in services. Finally, it shows how Member states have tried to contain redistributive issues in services trade, focusing on the uni- and bilateral German responses as well as the compromise on the Services Directive. Paradoxically, in services the lack of harmoniza-
tion of rules in favour of mutual recognition seems to imply that Member states are much more likely to follow common administrative procedures in implementation, which allows partly to contain redistributive consequences. Thus, the case of the Services Directive is an example where the conflict of interest in policy-making is absorbed by shifting it to another venue – that of implementation (Héritier, 1999: 23). However, the inequality effects that mutual recognition in services imposes on citizens cannot be contained in this way and imply clear limits to its application.

II. The Bolkestein directive

Launched in early 2004, the draft directive aimed to realize the internal market for services in all those areas where specific legislative measures had not yet been taken (as happened for financial services, for instance). Due to the importance of services, the Commission targeted about 50% of all economic activities of member states with this single directive. The directive aimed at realizing both the freedom of establishment and the freedom of services, exempting only lotteries and all genuinely public services with no profit interest (e.g. education, cultural activities). Health and social services were included. In order to achieve its ambitious goal, the draft directive relied on the principle of home-country control. Member states were required to mutually recognize services regulated in other Member states as equivalent to domestically regulated services and to abolish excessive regulatory requirements. In order to support the necessary cooperation between home- and host-country authorities, the directive obliged national authorities to cooperate with each other. Thus, the possibilities of host-country authorities to obtain information from home-country authorities as to the legality of companies posting workers would be greatly improved.

Given the highly regulated nature of most services, the deregulatory potential of the directive was considerable, as was aptly described by the former Commissioner Bolkestein:

> We cannot expect European businesses to set the global competitiveness standard or to give their customers the quality and choice they deserve while they still have their hands tied behind their backs by national red tape, eleven years after the 1993 deadline for creating a real Internal Market. Some of the national restrictions are archaic, overly burdensome and break EU law. Those have simply got to go. A much longer list of differing national rules needs sweeping regulatory reform.

Since sector-specific attempts at building the internal market for services had proven so cumbersome, the directive was bound to be controversial. With its broad scope, it was hardly possible to assess all the implications of the directive. Moreover, the Services Directive explicitly complemented existing services law, with uncertain implications resulting from the interaction. This overlap concerned in particular the posted-workers directive (96/71/EC) of 1996 for which the services draft foresaw the easing of some restrictions on posted workers, like the need to carry papers for local controls in the host country and the obligation to appoint a national representative, making controls of the host country more difficult.

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2 Davies (2007a: 241f) critically discusses the fact that the directive combines transborder and domestic administrative reforms, even though the Treaty does not give the competence to regulate purely internal matters. This problem remains with the adopted directive but its discussion is outside the scope of this article.
While the Commission tried to advertise the services proposal as a measure simply enhancing efficiency in a Pareto-optimizing sense, the reactions to the draft emphasized its redistributive consequences. Why the liberalization of services trade more closely connects to redistribution than to Pareto-efficiency will be discussed below.

III. The puzzle: Why do services pose different problems than goods?

Why, then, was the transfer of a principle, well established in goods trade, to services so controversial? To approach this question, it is necessary to discuss both the nature of mutual recognition and of services regulation and trade. I will then turn to the German experience with mutual recognition in services which illustrates the problems of redistribution. The section closes with a discussion of the limits of mutual recognition in services.

III.1. Mutual recognition and the regulation of services trade in the EU

While mutual recognition was already considered by the Commission in the 1960s as a way to integrate tax policy (Genschel, 2007), noticeably it entered the scene only in 1979, with the Cassis ruling (C-120/78) of the European Court of Justice. Drawing on Dassonville (C-8/74), the ECJ gave a broad meaning to the freedom of goods (Art. 28), implying that goods legally marketed in one Member state, can also be marketed in all other Member states. This is the obligation to mutually recognize goods from other Member states, if they conform to the rules of their home country. However, by broadening the reach of the market freedoms under the Cassis-de-Dijon case law, the ECJ simultaneously enhanced the possibilities of Member states to claim exceptions, beyond those already foreseen in the Treaty by Art. 30. Member states remain free to regulate their domestic markets in sensitive areas, by invoking mandatory requirements goods have to adhere to (this is called the “rule of reason”) (Hatzopoulos and Do, 2006: 965f).

As is well-known, the Commission readily took up the idea of mutual recognition and launched the internal-market initiative around it (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia, 1994). Jörges makes the important argument that by having to honour the regulations of the other Member states, mutual recognition manages to lessen the legitimatory deficits of national policy-making. These deficits arise as national legislation focuses only on the domestic situation despite having significant externalities for other Member states in an integrated market (Jörges, 2006: 790).

Integrating markets with mutual recognition evades the difficulty of agreeing on harmonization. However, compared to harmonized rules, mutual recognition is much more difficult to implement. Companies may believe that their goods and services are regulated in an equivalent way and therefore qualify for mutual recognition – it may always be, however, that national authorities are of a different opinion (Pelkmans, 2007). As the local authorities responsible for the control of market regulations have to decide whether the rules of the 26 other Member states are equivalent or not, mutual recognition entails significant transaction costs. The solution of conflicts is thus shifted from the decision-making to the implementation stage (Héritier, 1999: 16-19, 23).

Following a similar logic to the one of the internal market, the European Council in Tampere decided in the late 1990s to transfer mutual recognition to the area of justice and home affairs (JHA). Again, there was a perceived need for cooperation, but an inability to agree on harmonization (Lavenex, 2007). Thus, even for rules which normally fall under parliamentary prerogative, mutual recognition may be acceptable. If mutual recognition in services appears
to be more difficult than for goods it is therefore unlikely to be simply due to the fact that services regulation is politically too sensitive to be mutually recognized.

To sum up, mutual recognition can act as an alternative to harmonization if Member states differ in their – equivalent – regulations. Then they could accept each others’ rules instead of bothering to agree on common ones. But in the case of the Services Directive, the prospect of such an acceptance raised significant fears. To further the understanding of this conflict it is necessary to proceed by looking at the specifics of services trade, regulation, and the legal provisions for the freedom of services.

Different to goods, only few services can travel borders independent of their production. It is only for these correspondence services (for instance financial services, telecommunications) that services trade resembles largely goods trade. For most services, the delivery coincides with consumption, meaning that either the service provider (active freedom of services) or the service consumer (passive freedom of services) has to move for services trade (Hailbronner and Nachbaur, 1992: 108). It is on the problems of the active freedom of services that this article focuses.

Services are in a certain sense invisible, which is why it is often difficult to separate their production from their consumption. This makes regulation much more constitutive for services than for goods. It can concern market access (e.g. certain training requirements), operation (e.g. certain solvency requirements, speed limits), the products themselves, and their distribution (cf. Roth, 2002: 16). Different to goods, the regulation of services relies heavily on what one can compare to process standards (cf. Troberg, 1997: 1472f). “… there is a closer connection between services regulation and labour market regulation than in the case of goods” (Pelkmans and Kessel, 2007: 7).

In goods trade, product and process standards are subject to different kinds of competitive pressures (Scharpf, 1999). While consumer demand for high-quality products may keep product standards up, process standards are much more subject to competition, as cost-intensive versus cheap production processes determine competitiveness, often without having an impact on product quality. Since process standards are more relevant for trade in services than for trade in goods, a strategic choice of the home country simply for ease of regulation, so-called forum shopping, is therefore much more likely. While for goods, production implies some longer-term investment and commitment to a location, for services this is not necessarily the case.

In how far does EC law prescribe the home-country rule to services provision? The services freedom aims at the remunerated, temporary services delivery across borders (Roth, 1988: 41). It has to be distinguished from the free movement of labour and of establishment. If someone occasionally works in another country, she will probably profit from the freedom of services; if he does it on a continuous basis with some sort of establishment, it is the freedom of establishment that matters. If an EU-foreigner is part of the national labour market, it will be the free movement of labour. Important is the difference in regulation: With the freedom of establishment and of labour, companies resp. persons are regulated on a par with nationals in the country were services are being provided. But if the services freedom is being evoked, regulations of the country of establishment (i.e. the home country), and not so much of service provision (i.e. the host country) are applicable. However, host countries can apply rules that are covered by the general interest– if such rules have not been observed already in the home country (Hailbronner and Nachbaur, 1992: 112).

Different to the freedom of goods, the ECJ interpreted the freedom of services for a long time in a quite restrictive way, not covering continuous, regular activities (Hatzopoulos, 2000: 63f,
Roth, 2002: 20, Davies, 2007b: 14). Article 50 even clearly prescribes the host-country rule for services trade and restricts it to temporary activities as exemplified by the case law on the posting of workers, where the ECJ allowed France in the Rush Portuguesa Case (C-113/89) to apply its minimum wages also to workers temporarily posted from Portugal. This ruling led to the posted workers directive. More recently, however, the ECJ pursues a more liberal approach with regard to services, emphasizing the need to eliminate hindrances to services trade more than the right of the host country to impose its regulations. At the same time, the number of Court cases concerning the freedom of services is increasing, showing its growing relevance (Hatzopoulos and Do, 2006: 923). Thus, in 2003 the ECJ did not stress the temporary nature of services in the case Schnitzer (C-215/01), loosening the relationship with the freedom of establishment. In a later case, the ECJ went so far as to state that “all services that are not offered on a stable and continuous basis from an established professional base in the Member State of destination constitute provision of services within the meaning of Article 49 EC” (Hatzopoulos and Do, 2006: 929, original emphasis). This interpretation increases the scope for mutual recognition by emphasizing the right of companies to forum-shopping, thereby increasing competitive pressure based on services regulation. The proposal for a Services Directive took up this incipient change of the case law, seeking to codify it in a radical way (Witte, 2007: 9f). The resulting redistributive consequences can be illustrated well with the German case.

III.2. Redistributive Concerns: the Contention about the Draft Directive illustrated with the German case

Given that services were part of the internal-market initiative of the late 1980s, the Services Directive was long overdue. With services’ growing relevance, the failure to establish the internal market implied significant efficiency losses. At the same time the Treaty’s text and its interpretation meant that Member states had a good legal basis to object to the radicalized home-country principle of the directive. Why did redistributive worries largely manage to overshadow efficiency concerns? Important was the particular timing of the draft directive in early 2004. Within a few months of the proposal, Eastern enlargement increased significantly the heterogeneity in the EU. This fundamentally altered the basis of a regime build on home-country rule. Governance based on mutual recognition requires equivalent rules and a functioning administrative cooperation. While already in the EU-15 mutual recognition was ridden with prerequisites (Pelkmans, 2007), in the EU-25 (27 to be) it could not be easier. Distributive effects arise on the one hand due to the labour-intensive nature of most services. Eastern enlargement implied that the lower wages of these countries immediately exert pressures – most of all in those countries relying on collective wage agreements instead of minimum wages as these are not automatically binding for service providers from other Member states.

The German case illustrates well how redistributive issues overshadowed the promise of efficiency gains. Germany had joined most other member states (with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Sweden) in using the transitory arrangement (2+3+2) restricting the freedom of labour for the East European new Member states. In addition, Germany negotiated a transitory regime for the freedom of services for some sectors. The German public was therefore surprised when some months after enlargement East Europeans nevertheless put significant pressure on the national job market – simply by using the services freedom. Important is that

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4 Several economic studies make the point, see the webpage of the Commission: [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/services-dir/studies_en.htm][1] [accessed June 2nd, 2008].
Germany does not have a generalized minimum wage it can impose (Christen, 2004, Temming, 2005).\(^5\) Under the services freedom, workers can come in temporarily – which is interpreted as up to one year – and replace German workers for the wages of their home country.

Most noted in the press was the case of the slaughterhouses, where Germans were laid off on a large scale as East European service providers were brought in, working for little money under deplorable working conditions. As a result of this experience, it was feared that the Services Directive would bring similar pressure to other sectors.\(^6\)

The situation was complicated as East Europeans could work in Germany under different legal provisions, either relying on the freedom of establishment or of services, added to which were illegal activities.\(^7\) Under the freedom of establishment East Europeans face no restrictions but they have to comply with German laws. No specific wage and social security obligations exist for establishments, inviting social security fraud, for instance through mock self-employment.

Under the freedom of services, East Europeans can be posted from an Eastern European company for temporary service deliveries in Germany, except in the exempted sectors (construction, cleaning, and internal decoration) (Temming, 2005: 188). Following the posted-workers directive German labour conditions apply for all branches, but with no general minimum wage, there are no restrictions on what posted workers have to be paid. The posting company has to discharge social security expenses in the home country, where it also has to be active – mere mailbox companies are illegal as are posted workers that are fully integrated in the German company’s work process (Fleischwirtschaft 12.5.2005, p. 10). A host of different possibilities result for illegal activities from these requirements. But violations are difficult to detect by the host country, whose authorities have to trust the controls of the home country. Moreover, there are tricky legal questions: It is probably insufficient if a company employs one person for recruitment and control purposes in, say, Poland, and posts 99 workers into Germany. But how many persons have to be employed in Poland? Which part of the annual turnover has to be achieved in the home country in order to be seen as a company active in the home country (FR 23.7.2005, p. 12)? A Commission “practical guide” for the posting of workers suggests that companies should achieve a minimum of 25% of total turnover in the posting state, where they should have been established for at least four months, with other cases requiring “individual attention”.\(^8\) With high unemployment rates in many new Member states, old Member states distrust whether new Member states abide by the rules.

The German situation was difficult due to the mixture of not having a minimum wage, and of having little chance of reacting towards illegal activities. Only few other Member states (Denmark, Finland, Italy and Sweden) do not have a minimum wage. Nevertheless, the lesson told by the German case is a more general one. It shows the problems of applying home-country control to services trade, of which the ample opportunities for illegal activities are only one part. With the significant wage differentials in the EU after enlargement, a greater emphasis on home-country regulations for services has a significant deregulatory potential –

\(^5\) At the time, a minimum wage existed only for the construction industry and sea transport.


\(^7\) I omit the freedom of labour given the transitory regime.


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which, after all, was partly wanted, as is evident in the citation from Commission Bolkestein, noted above. The contentious ECJ decisions in Laval and Viking, at the end of 2007, have also shown this deregulatory potential (Joerges and Rödl, 2008).

III.3. The limits of mutual recognition in services

Why, then, is mutual recognition for goods regarded as efficiency enhancing while for services it is perceived as a redistributive issue? After all, the rationale for trading both goods and services lies in exploiting comparative advantages. This section analyzes why mutual recognition is more difficult to accept for services than for goods. Most services differ from goods, we saw, in that provision and consumption coincides, making it necessary that the service provider travels along. If the service provider has to become active in the host country, what does it imply for mutual recognition and home-country control?

Mutual recognition relies on the assumption that Member states regulate markets differently, but in functionally equivalent ways. It implies that Member states’ governments accept regulations on their territory for their population that were decided and legitimated in other Member states (Schmidt, 2007). Mutual recognition thus fundamentally concerns three interdependent relationships: The relationship among Member states’ governments, the relationship of governments to their population, and the relationship between EU citizens being subject to different regulations. If mutual recognition becomes problematic, as happens with services, we have to enquire into these three relationships.

Governments only accept regulations that are equivalent because they remain politically responsible to their population for the regulation of their markets. If rules are not equivalent, host-country rules apply, fragmenting the market, so that harmonization is needed. Given their political responsibility, when agreeing to mutual recognition governments therefore have to trust each other as to their equivalence of setting and controlling regulations. It is here that the difference in the trading of services compared to goods becomes relevant. For goods, in general, governments only have to trust each other in maintaining sufficient regulation for the well-being of their own population, as goods are being regulated, controlled, and then partly exported and partly consumed domestically. In the case of services, however, the host state has to trust that the home state controls services sufficiently despite the fact that they are exclusively being exported. Clearly, this requires a higher degree of trust: Governments have to trust that their counterparts behave altruistically and control service providers simply for the sake of other Member states (cf. Scharpf, 1997: Ch. 4). By contrast, with respect to goods it is sufficient to rely on governments behaving egotistically, given their self-interest in protecting their population through sufficient controls. The amount of fraud occurring with services trade shows how demanding controls are, and that governments have good reasons to be sceptical towards mutual recognition in services.

Secondly, for the relationship of the government to its citizens it is relevant that while service providers enjoy increased legal certainty under home-country control, for the host countries significant legal uncertainty results. For them, mutual recognition would mean that they would not be aware anymore under which rules services are provided temporarily in their country. Related were fears of downward pressures on domestic regulations as well as insecurity for end consumers not knowing which rules service providers would have to abide by and which rights they would have themselves as consumers (Nicolaidis and Schmidt, 2007). More important yet, governments cannot guarantee equal treatment any longer to their citizens:

As service providers travel along with the traded services, thirdly, it implies that very differently regulated service providers might work side-by-side simultaneously, raising important issues of equality. Davies puts the problems succinctly:
The presumption is that service providers are exempt, above the law of the territory where they operate, and the rebuttal of that presumption is hard. The situation where competing service providers on a territory are subject to different legal regimes – that they essentially bring their own legal regime with them – becomes the usual one, with all the associated challenges to equality and competition norms (…) (Davies, 2007b: 8).

Davies therefore argues that home-country control for services violates the prohibition of nationality discrimination of Art. 12 of the Treaty as nationals of the host state are being discriminated against. Host-country control, in contrast, would generally lead to less inequality (Davies, 2007b: 8).

An individual who is present in the jurisdiction but not subject to its regulation, and operating under a more beneficial regime, is a direct challenge to the content of citizenship – national or European – and its associated guarantees of equality and privilege. His domestic competitor sees his most privileged position as a national citizen undermined, while the two competitors, working side by side, operate under different legal regimes with different rights, despite a shared EU citizenship (Davies, 2007b: 7).

To sum up: Services are particularly rule-dependent, and normally cannot be traded without their providers. If mutual recognition is applied, this can give much greater scope for forum shopping, as the necessary commitment to the home country is much lower than for establishments in goods production. Because rules travel along the service provider, mutual recognition in services is problematic with view to three relationships. Among governments, it requires trust in an altruistic orientation, as service providers are controlled by a different jurisdiction than the one where they operate, facilitating illegal activities. In the relationship of governments to their population, governments might have to discriminate against their own citizens. Among EU-citizens, mutual recognition raises issues of equality as EU citizens in the same situation are simultaneously subject to different rules.

Mutual recognition for services, we can conclude, cannot be treated merely in parallel to goods. For mutual recognition to work in services, Member states need specific assurances: Among themselves as to the fact that the delegation of competence inherent in mutual recognition is taken up responsibly, in the relationship of Member states to their own citizens in the sense that the duty to take into account the interests of other Member states cannot imply to demand of member states to discriminate against their own nationals which is the case when differently regulated EU citizens work side-by-side.

IV. Containing redistributive conflicts in services trade

Member states reacted to the redistributive effects of applying mutual recognition to service trade. At the level of the EU, the Services Directive compromise constrains home-country control. Being particularly vulnerable, Germany has also responded autonomously.

IV.1. German reactions

Next to the multi-lateral negotiations on the Services Directive, Germany could, and did, react uni- and bilaterally. One notable result of the services freedom has been the heightened discussion on minimum wages in Germany, which started with the red-green coalition’s agreement in May 2005 on extending the German posted workers law to all sectors of the econ-
This discussion has been continuing ever since. Since the state traditionally leaves wage agreements to the unions and employers’ associations, a state-set minimum wage implies a significant institutional rupture. But it would be the easiest way to handle some of the redistributive issues arising from the services freedom. The discussion on minimum wages, which is ongoing, is therefore an interesting example of an Europeanization effect (Schmidt et al. 2008).

Moreover, Germany has attempted to fight illegal activities and engaged in bilateral talks with its neighbours about the interpretation of the freedom of services. Both reactions have been part of the mandate of the ‘Task Force zur Bekämpfung des Missbrauchs der Dienstleistungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit’, which was created in March 2005 to combat the adverse effects of the freedom of services and establishment after enlargement. Germany requires a postal address of the posting company as well as a translation of relevant documents concerning working contract, working times and pay into German (TAZ 14.06.2007). The facilitations foreseen in the draft Services Directive for the posted-workers directive clearly ran counter to these control efforts. In its attempt to ease the posting of workers, the Commission started an infringement procedure in late 2004 against Germany for restricting the services freedom disproportionate. In its recent judgement of July 2007, the ECJ, however, assessed the German interest in workable controls by requiring translated documents as not interfering with the services freedom (C-490/04). It remains to be seen whether this will lead the European Commission to back down from its criticism on how Germany, and other member states, have implemented the posted workers directive, and to refrain from further liberalization. Only in June 2007 the Commission had published a communication on the directive, criticising Member states for overly controlling the use of the services freedom.

Moreover, since April 2006 Germany compels other Member states to send a copy of all E 101-forms (documenting social-security contributions in the home country) of workers posted to Germany to the Deutsche Rentenversicherung in Würzburg. Previously, Germany suffered a serious set-back in its activities to combat fraud when the ECJ ruled in early 2006 that Member states have to accept existing E 101-forms, even when they are obviously fake (C-2/05, 26.1.2006). In cases of suspicion, Member states have to contact the issuing authority of the concerned Member state or start an infringement procedure (Art. 227 EC Treaty) against each other. National courts are not allowed to decide whether forms have been forged. Consequently, Germany could not do anything in a case where Germans had employed Portuguese workers on a permanent basis, pretending that they were being posted from Portugal, thus evading social security payments in Germany.

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10 In the following, I partly draw on unpublished work and interviews done by Wendelmoet van den Nouland in the context of our NewGov project “The Domestic Impact of European Law”.
11 Task Force to fight the abuse of the freedom of services and of establishment.
14 Bundesgerichtshof, Pressestelle, N. 143/2006; Keine Strafbarkeit wegen Nichtabführung von Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen bei Vorlage einer durch einen Mitgliedstaat ausgestellten „E 101-Bescheinigung“. Urteil vom 24.10.2006, 1 StR 44/06.
As Member states have to accept each others’ administrative acts according to the ECJ, Germany conducted bilateral talks with other Member states, both old (e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria) and new. Talks are being held regularly (with Poland and Hungary once every three months (BMF/BMAS 2006: 4-6). With these meetings Germany wants to reach a ‘common understanding’ of the freedom of services. At issue are the criteria of according the status ‘posted worker’ and the conditions of giving out E 101-certificates, including the required economic activity in the country of origin (combating mailbox companies), and the distinction between real and mock self-employment.\textsuperscript{15} Moreover, the bilateral talks allow investigating specific problems, such as the situation in German slaughterhouses.\textsuperscript{16} The talks explicitly aim to strengthen of mutual trust (BMF/BMAS 2006: 4) and seek the signing of administrative cooperation agreements between Germany and the new Member states (which exist already between Germany and France, between France and Belgium, and between Britain and the Netherlands) in order to improve cross-border controls and cooperation between the respective authorities.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{IV.2. The fate of the Bolkestein directive}

Redistributive issues rather than the gains of Pareto-efficiency also dominated the negotiations of the Services Directive. The compromise which was reached in the European Parliament between the Social democrats and Christian democrats abolished the contentious home-country principle speaking only of the obligation to enable the freedom of services.\textsuperscript{18} Officially, the directive does not speak of mutual recognition (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt, 2007). However, a list of measures is included which Member states may not impose. Among these are special duties to register in the host country or to acquire ex-ante certification as well as prescriptions as to materials and tools used. So in all these cases, home-country rules apply, albeit the directive refrained from saying so openly. Importantly, the list of justifications for host-country requirements in Art. 16 III is much more narrow than the ones the ECJ has accepted in its case law, implying a “deregulatory shift” (Witte 2007: 12; Davies 2007b: 12, 18).

The final directive is more restricted in scope than the draft, exempting health services, utilities, public transport, social, and security services, temporary workers, gambling and lotteries, waste, audiovisual services, electronic communication, financial and legal services. With regard to consumer protection, the directive applies host-country rules (Art. 3 II). Also, the facilitations foreseen for the posted-workers directive were deleted, much to the displeasure of the East European Member states. Here, the Commission promised a separate follow-up on the workings of the posted-workers directive. It remains to be seen whether the recent ECJ judgment concerning the German controls stops the Commission’s attempts to liberalize the posted workers regime.

\textsuperscript{15} Interview BMAS 29.3.2006; Interview BMWi 29.3.2006. Die Welt, 12 April 2005, ‘Lohndumping: Regierung verhandelt mit Polen’; Financial Times Deutschland, 26 April 2005, ‘Rüge aus Polen; Dienstleistungen’

\textsuperscript{16} Interview BMWi 29.3.2006.


Other provisions remained more or less untouched. Thus, Member states have to establish points of single contact for service providers in their administration, to abolish disproportionate regulatory burdens, and to allow service providers to do all formalities electronically. Importantly, the directive includes far-reaching provisions on administrative co-operation (Chapter VI; Articles 28-36), detailing the responsibilities of the administrations in the home and the host country. In contrast to the original version, host-country authorities will now be responsible for controlling those rules which they impose themselves (Art. 31). But generally, home-country authorities are the ones legally responsible for oversight. Both authorities cooperate closely, since home-country authorities cannot become active in the host country, having to request the host authorities to act. Notably, the directive establishes a duty to cooperate among the Member states’ administrations. This has not existed before to such an extent.\footnote{Interview European Commission, DG Internal Market 27.9.2005.} Thus, Art. 28 (8) foresees that the Commission will start an infringement procedure if Member states fail to comply with their duties of “mutual assistance”. In order to facilitate cooperation across the language barriers, the Commission is promoting an information system providing for automatic translation of specific standardized paragraphs.

Thus, the Services Directive lays the root for transnationally operating administrations. Instead of simply following the instructions given in their national hierarchy of command, with the Minister on top being ultimately politically responsible (Döhler, 2001), administrations now also have to comply with horizontal demands, originating in other Member states’ administrations.

In the negotiations on the directive, the administrative changes required by the directive received relatively little attention. The political conflict about the extent of liberalization overshadowed everything else. They impose, however, major institutional changes. “… the real importance of the Directive is elsewhere. Its proper title should perhaps be “the Directive on harmonisation and modernisation of public administration’”’ (Davies, 2007a: 239). Yet the requirement to provide for points of single contact implies a “paradigmatic” change for administrations, as these now have to be thought of from the point of the citizen accessing the administration rather than from the point of state organization and lines of inner-administrative accountability and responsibility (Schliesky, 2005: 891). The obligation of administrative assistance among Member states intensifies these changes, and raises questions as to which administration acts under what kind of law. Thus, if the host-country administration acts on behalf of the home-country administration, it would have to do so on the legal basis of the home country. But how would legal protection against these acts be organized, which court would subject the administration under what kind of law? Would the home-country court, say in Estonia, order the administration, say in the UK, to postpone or alter its acts? How would different data protection laws be handled? It is likely, that the duty to cooperate will lead to further harmonization of administrative laws of Member states. Thus, the directive presents a significant break from the past principle that Member states are free to implement European directives with the European Union not interfering with Member states’ administrative organization (Schliesky, 2005: 893f).

To sum up, redistributive concerns were contained by reducing the scope of the directive and by abolishing the home-country principle, at least officially. By the back door, however, mutual recognition and home-country control remain present. The directive does not find an answer to the resulting issues of equality of service providers working side-by-side under different regulations and the obligation of Member states to possibly discriminate against their own population. For the problem of home-country control of service providers active in another
Member state the directive introduces an obligation of cooperation. The centrality of administrative cooperation becomes also apparent in the bilateral attempts of the German government. This makes the services internal market an interesting example for changes of institutional venues in view of conflicts of interests. First, the mutual recognition of rules is pursued instead of harmonization, shifting conflict of interest from the decision-making to the implementation stage. But in the case of services, regulation matters so much for competitive performance, that incentives are high to engage in regulatory arbitrage or even fraud. The harmonization of administrative procedures to contain these redistributive issues would be the next step.

V. Conclusions

Mutual recognition is an alternative to integrating markets via harmonization. For services markets it poses particular challenges. While integrated markets can further Pareto-efficiency, the specific rule dependence of services, whose production generally cannot be separated from consumption, implies significant redistributive consequences. Often little investment and long-term commitment is needed for services trade, making forum-shopping quite easy. I have argued that to understand why mutual recognition in services proves so contentious, three interdependent relationships have to be taken into account: among Member states, between governments and their citizens, and among differently regulated EU citizens.

With mutual recognition, governments effectively delegate the regulation of services among each other. For services, Member states have to trust each other to control sufficiently just for the sake of customers abroad. Different to goods, in the control of services it is possible to distinguish whether the beneficiaries of controls are domestic customers or those of another Member state. Particularly in view of high unemployment figures in new Member states, old Member states are sceptical whether the administrations of new Member states act altruistically to take decisions favouring old Member states at the expense of their own population. Because of the difficulty of controlling service providers under home-country rule, mutual recognition in services favours illegal activities.

In order to ameliorate such concerns of not playing by the rules, and thereby raising redistributive issues, the Services Directive strengthens administrative cooperation. As we saw, this is also what Germany has been initiating by itself in bilateral talks. Interestingly, mutual recognition thus leads to a beginning harmonization of state organization. Traditionally, it is up to Member states how they implement the law of the European Union. While mutual recognition allows ‘unity in diversity’ when it comes to regulation (cf. Joerges, 2007), paradoxically in implementation it leads to a new form of harmonization in the case of services. In terms of institution building, this is a significant development. Possibly, it lays the root for a network of nationally-based administrations pursuing European aims, rather than segmented national authorities pursuing domestic goals (cf. Egeberg, 2008). It remains to be seen in how far the redistributive conflicts inherent in services trade can be mediated successfully on this level.

While administrative cooperation may strengthen trust among governments, the problems mutual recognition in services raises in the relationship of governments to their citizens and among EU citizens are much more difficult to solve. As home-country rules are being taken along with services provision, these rules take effect outside the territory where they were legitimately enacted. Thus, service providers simultaneously work side-by-side under different rules and Member states may be forced to discriminate against their own citizens with their
domestic regulation. This is a consequence, that is hardly acceptable, and the directive does not find an answer to this problem of equality.

As Joerges argues, mutual recognition has the legitimatory benefit of forcing Member states to take into account their respective interests, given that economic decisions of one Member state very likely have implications for the others in the single market. This happens under the caveat that regulations are equivalent. Often, there are different ways for achieving the same regulatory objectives. By agreeing to mutual recognition Member states implicitly accept that the efficiency gains of a larger market come at the cost of some discrimination of their own citizens. This is the case whenever mutual recognition is being applied. The example of services trade seems to imply that it is not so much the kind of rules that are being recognized, but the very open inequality between different EU citizens arising, that makes mutual recognition unacceptable. With goods, and also with mutual recognition in JHA EU citizens subject to different home-country rules do not find themselves in the same place at the same time, noticing directly their different treatment. For services this is the case. It follows that while Member states have to take account of the regulatory situation in other Member states to lessen their legitimatory deficit, the Union cannot demand from Member states to openly discriminate against their own citizens. Consequently, in those areas where mutual recognition leads to a direct comparison of EU-citizens being subject to different home-country rules, mutual recognition cannot be taken as far as in other areas.
VI. Bibliography


