NEWGOV
New Modes of Governance

Integrated Project
Priority 7 – Citizens and Governance in the Knowledge-based Society

Book Manuscript -
Social Pacts in Europe: Emergence, Evolution and Institutionalization
Reference number: 18a/D14

Due date of deliverable: August 2008
Actual submission date: 31 August 2008

Start date of project: 1 September 2004
Duration: 48 months

Organisation name of lead contractor for this deliverable:
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Univ. of Amsterdam
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Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Sixth Framework Programme (2002-2006)
Summary

This book produces the first full-length theoretical and comparative empirical study of new social pacts in Europe. Hitherto, analysis of the social pacts of the 1990s and 2000s has engaged in ad hoc theorizing and has been based on a limited number of cases. By contrast, this book brings a wide range of complementary theories to bear on the emergence, evolution and institutionalization of new social pacts, and compares a wide range of cases from both Western and Eastern Europe, including Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Poland. The theoretical innovations include a highly novel application of qualitative fuzzy-set analysis to the explanation of emergence; an adaptation of the extensive neo-corporatist theorizing of the 1960s and 1970s and a more contemporary game theoretic approach to understanding evolution; and an adaptation of traditional neo-corporatist theory and new institutionalist theory to understanding social pact consolidation and institutionalization. The empirical material for this analysis is drawn from the in-depth country studies, all of which are written along thematic, analytical lines, informed by a rigorous research design, by national experts.

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I. Introduction

This book produces the first full-length theoretical and comparative empirical study of new social pacts in Europe. Hitherto, analysis of the social pacts of the 1990s and 2000s has engaged in ad hoc theorizing and has been based on a limited number of cases. By contrast, this book brings a wide range of complementary theories to bear on the emergence, evolution and institutionalization of new social pacts, and compares a wide range of cases from both Western and Eastern Europe, including Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Poland.

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Our analysis in the book proceeds as follows. In chapter one, we undertake a critical review of the existing analysis of social pacts and find them wanting in numerous respects, in particular their inattention to theory, their over-concentration on structural variables (a trait they share with the original literature on neo-corporatism from the 1970s and 1980s) and their tendency to focus on too few cases. In chapter two, by way of setting the stage for the case study chapters that make up the large empirical body of analysis in this book, we present a fuzzy set/qualitative case analysis of a much larger set of countries than those we study in this book to establish the pathways to social pact emergence in the 1990s. The fuzzy-set chapter also helps justify our case selection, which gives us a good variation on the dependent variable, and provides us with information on countries (that we do not cover in depth in the book) that either did not attempt to forge social pacts, or those alternatively which tried and failed to craft them.

In chapter three, we move to our analytical framework to examine more closely the politics of pact making, moving away from countries as units of analysis to individual negotiation episodes. In that chapter we also present our bargaining model which is based on four central pillars of the bargaining model – bounded rationality, context-specific and changing preferences, non-unitary actors, and perceptions of power – for the real-world strategies of key actors. In that model we also hypothesize the relevance of four indicators of the relative power of actors and thus their negotiating strategies: organizational attributes, institutional resources, the degree of inter- and intra-sectional unity and the degree of actors’ interdependence. We also set out a series of hypotheses regarding pathways and mechanisms of institutionalization, which we broadly conceive of in terms of institutionalization vs. de-institutionalization and repetition vs. abandonment.

In the country chapters that follow, the case studies use this bargaining model to examine the success and failure of their particular social pact negotiations, and in addition examine alternative pathways to institutionalization, as well as the theories that might best explain them – from functionalist, utilitarian, normative and power-distributional perspectives. In the concluding chapter, which produces a cross-case analysis and derives conclusions from the empirical analysis in the country chapters, we evaluate the utility of the bargaining model to explain social pact outcomes as well as the best ways to understand the mechanisms of institutionalization.
The remainder of this introduction puts our analysis in the context of the broader literature on social pacts, presents the core themes of analysis in the book, and sets up the structure of analysis in the individual country-case chapters.

I.1 General Framework and Comparative Analytical Background

We now understand from a plethora of studies conducted in the 1990s how different social pacts of the last 10-15 years are from the neo-corporatist deals or political exchange that were characteristic of the Keynesian-era. These different features can be understood in terms of (a) the context in which they happen (i.e. a shift towards more liberal market policies and decentralization in industrial relations; the presence of new exogenous shocks, such as EMU); (b) the content of pacts (i.e. more regulatory than redistributive); (c) their aims (most notably, greater international competitiveness); and (d) a much stronger role for government. Due to this distinctiveness, they have been characterized as ‘competitive corporatism’ (Rhodes 2001), ‘supply-side corporatism’ (Traxler et al. 2001; Visser and Hemerijck 1997), ‘post-corporatism’ (O’Donnell 2001) or ‘organized decentralization’ (Traxler 1995).

The recent literature has not only pointed to the distinctive nature of the content, aims, and composition of the new social pacts, but also to the fact that they have often appeared in rather unlikely cases, i.e. in countries without the organizational and institutional preconditions favoured by the neo-corporatist literature (see Regini 1999, 2000; Baccaro 2002; Hassel 2003; Rhodes 2001). This literature therefore argues that in order to understand these new social pacts, we have to shift our attention from pre-existing institutions to actors’ strategies and the interactive games they play (see in particular, Regini 2000; Baccaro 2002; Molina and Rhodes 2002).

However, while the need to strengthen the focus on interactive processes when analyzing social pacts is now widely accepted, we still lack a rigorous analytical framework able to facilitate comparative analysis and generate more wide-ranging conclusions regarding both the determinants of actors’ behavior and thus the likelihood that social pacts will emerge, and of their persistence and institutionalization as a specific form of governance. Creating such a framework is the task of the first three chapters of this book.

Two main questions guide our analysis in this book. The first is the question of institutional formation, i.e., how do social pacts emerge? To answer this question, we intend to examine not only the pre-conditions for, or motives behind, the formation of social pacts, but also to discern the dynamics of interactions during first-time negotiations of social pacts. The second is the question of institutional development, in which we try to understand how social pacts subsequently evolve, i.e. their continuation, reiteration and extension, or alternatively their termination. Here we aim to identify the determinants of their persistence, institutionalization, and a more solid embeddedness in different socio-economic contexts.

To answer these questions, we rely on the in-depth empirical analysis of eight European countries in our case-study chapters: Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. The case selection is based on the following considerations: first, all of these countries have recently attempted social pacts and most of them lack a strong tradition of neo-corporatist policy making; second, they comprise a group of countries with different types and traditions of industrial relations systems; and finally, these cases provide sufficient variation with regard to the degree of success or failure of social pact negotiations and of more regularized political exchange.

To locate these cases in a more general context, we envisage a spectrum between ‘old’ and ‘new’ modes of socio-economic governance under different kinds of social pacting. These
range from traditional (1950’s-1980s Scandinavian-style) neo-corporatism, with commitments based on the political exchange of resources and policy goals, through to a loose and flexible form of deliberation in which the partners exchange or redistribute little, but whose mere ‘agreement’ on policy goals facilitates or legitimises a policy shift or innovation.

Examples of complex reciprocity in social pacts combine elements of trust, loyalty and norms of cooperation with the ability of the actors, and especially the state, to transform non-cooperative into cooperative games via negotiation, trade-offs and pay-offs. In all except the weakest forms of pacts, however, which tend to be unstable and ineffective beyond achieving limited short-term goals, most so-called ‘second generation’ social pacts either accommodate competing actor goals via complex reciprocity or, in certain cases, come to approximate their ‘first generation’ neo-corporatist predecessors in terms of commitments, sanctions for defection, and political exchange.

I.2 The Emergence of Social Pacts

I.2.1 The fuzzy-set qualitative analysis (fs/QCA) of institutional and macro-economic variables

Explanations for the emergence of social pacts from the 1990s onwards have tended to focus on single or multi-cause arguments, prioritizing, according to author, problem-load (high inflation, government debt or unemployment); union power (degrees of employee coverage and/or centralization), levels of government strength, and political orientation (a weak incumbent, electoral pressures, left-party dominance). However, as argued by Sabina Avdagic in chapter three (also Avdagic 2006), the novel use of a fuzzy-set qualitative analysis (fs/QCA) of institutional and macro-economic variables, demonstrates that no single condition turns out to be necessary, suggesting that the resurgence of policy concertation in Europe in the 1990s is complex, multi-causal and strongly influenced by context-specific conditions.

Rather than one single variable, or a single set of variables, explaining all cases, there turn out to be three ‘causal paths’ to social pacting: path 1, which combines high inflation or deficits with weak governments and intermediate trade union centralization (the cases of Italy, Portugal and Spain); path 2 which combines high unemployment, relatively centralized unions and predominantly weak governments (Ireland); and path 3, combining high unemployment with intermediate trade union centralization (corresponding to Finland).

This analysis also contributes to explaining why pacts failed to emerge or were never attempted in certain other countries. Where economic problems were evident, but governments were not weak, the latter either tried to correct imbalances unilaterally, or threatened unilateral intervention. In Greece, for example, where Maastricht-related problems were particularly pronounced, the uninterrupted rule of single-party majority governments was one deterrent to pursuing tangible concerted agreements, preventing an efficient policy response to the debt and deficit demands of EMU membership. In Belgium and the Netherlands, where unions remain moderately strong, rather than investing heavily in tripartite concertation, coalitions with comfortable majorities used threats of unilateral government action if employers and unions failed to agree on an acceptable course of adjustment.

Overall, the presence of weak governments appears to have been a particularly important factor leading to successful concertation. Where governments have been strong enough to act unilaterally, they have preferred to avoid pacting and the costs of political exchange and trade-offs. By contrast, governments with small majorities have compensated for their weakness by mobilizing support from trades unions and employers. A particular insight from this analysis is that the existence of serious problem loads (high unemployment and fiscal deficits,
and possibly in the near future, the declining competitiveness of certain Euro-zone economies) do matter as triggers for social pacting, but only in certain circumstances – those where unions have a certain degree of strength (moderate-to-high levels of centralization and membership rates, enough that is to make them useful partners in policymaking and implementation) and where governments are relatively weak.

The fuzzy-set analysis only provides us with the broad contours of an argument which are refined by the country chapters in this book. We are therefore interested in the following characteristics of social pact formation in each country, details of which are provided by the qualitative institutional analyses in our country-case chapters:

- Organizational attributes, most notably the electoral strength of the government (majority or minority), and the size and encompassingness of unions and employers’ organizations;
- Internal unity, or the absence of visible internal conflicts and divisions;
- The ability to present a credible threat of ‘exit,’ which in the case of the government signifies the capacity to act unilaterally, and in the case of unions and employers, the capacity and the willingness to bear the likely costs of abandoning pact negotiations.

This is where the bargaining model comes in.

I.2.2 The Bargaining Model

The bargaining model informs the analysis of social pact negotiations in our country-case chapters that follow. In order to strengthen and render more schematic our interpretations of both spontaneous and intentional institutional creation (discussed in Avdagic, Rhodes and Visser 2005: 9-14), we make four general assumptions about actors, their preferences and their cognitive capacity:

(1) We make the assumption that actors involved in attempts to craft social pacts are intentionally-rational utility maximizers. But we also clarify this assumption by claiming that actors’ ability to calculate correctly the prospective payoffs of alternative courses of action is impeded by the high degree of uncertainty characteristic of times of economic difficulties and crisis - situations that most often trigger attempts to negotiate social pacts.

(2) We assume that actors’ rank-order of preferences cannot be established deductively because the way in which actors evaluate different options depends on the structural and historical contexts within which they operate. We therefore warn against making a simple assumption that union preferences over social pacts will be determined by sector (e.g. public vs. private or exposed vs. sheltered sector). Similarly, we warn against assuming that weak(ened) unions would always consider social pacts their preferred (or at least second-best) solution because this would give them more visibility and a more stable role in policy making.

(3) We assume that unions, employers’ organizations and governments are non-unitary actors. Rather than depicting these actors as coherent entities with clearly identifiable and stable interests and preferences, we recognize that they often comprise different and even conflicting interests. In making this assumption, we caution against explaining the strategies of these actors as simple responses to shifts in the external environment and in other actors’ strategies. Instead, our assumption implies that the strategies these actors eventually settle on reflect to a considerable degree their internal politics and struggles.

(4) Finally, we assume that perceptions of relative power play a more important role in determining actors’ strategies than trust, habits and norms. The latter, we posit, might become more relevant if pacts are regularly repeated and widely perceived as successful. Absent such
experience, however, the strategies of the government, unions and employers should reflect their perceptions of relative power.

We rely on these four assumptions to develop a heuristic bargaining model which allows us to make predictions about pact negotiation outcomes. We conceptualize the creation of pacts in terms of processes of institutional emergence or formation, and argued that these processes are considerably influence by actors’ perceptions of relative power. Our framework depicts this process of institutional emergence as a simple bargaining game consisting of a series of offers and counter-offers proposed by two lead players (i.e. government vs. unions, or unions vs. employers). Drawing on standard bargaining theory we adopted two further assumptions about actors’ attitudes towards risk and their time preferences.

First, we assume that actors with ‘more abundant resources’, i.e. those who perceive themselves as being in a relatively strong position, are more likely to persist in pressing for their demands - even at the cost of breakdown. In the same line of reasoning, those who see their position as weak and deteriorating should be more likely to settle for a quick solution rather than risk the costs of breakdown. Second, to simplify the model, we assumed that discount rates (which affect the value of future bargains) are similar for all actors. Because pact negotiations are usually initiated in periods of crisis, we assume that prolonged bargaining is costly for all actors, and that they therefore all prefer to reach an agreement sooner rather than later. On the basis of these assumptions, we derived the following predictions about negotiation outcomes:

- Negotiations are more likely to be successful (i.e. to result in pacts) in cases where one actor perceives its position as strong or increasing and the other as weak or decreasing, and where such perceptions are mutually shared. In such cases, the content of an agreement should be more favourable to the actor who is perceived as strong.

- Negotiations have a higher chance of failure in cases where both actors perceive their power as strong/increasing, or alternatively as weak/decreasing. In the first scenario, none of the actors would be willing to settle for a quick and less favourable solution. However, since prolonged bargaining is likely to result in significantly discounted payoffs, actors will eventually reach a point at which the expected benefits of prolonged bargaining would not be considered sufficiently high to continue negotiation. In the second scenario, both actors might be inclined to opt for a fast agreement, but such an agreement would have a high potential for failure because the actors might lack the capacity to enforce its terms. (Alternatively, mutual perceptions of extreme weakness might even prevent actors from signing an agreement in the first place.) On the basis of the above discussion, we can derive the following hypotheses:

H1: In the absence of a history of institutionalized concertation, social pacts are likely to be achieved only if actors can define such agreements as relatively beneficial (in whatever way) to their own interests.

H2: During the negotiations of such pacts, actors’ strategies are likely to depend on their perceptions of their relative power (defined, as in assumption (iv) above, not only by organizational resources, but by the existing institutions, internal organizational dynamics, and perceptions of interdependence in a particular situation).

H3: In the course of negotiations, actors adjust their strategies so to, first and foremost, optimize their responses to incentives and constraints provided by others; and second, to bring their strategies in line with their expectations about the economic situation.
H4: The more the actors perceive their relative power as increasing, the more likely they are to persist and try to push through their preferences in the negotiation process. Alternatively, the more they perceive their bargaining power as decreasing relative to other actors, the more likely they are to settle for a quick and, from their standpoint, less preferred solution.

H5: Institutional outcomes or, more specifically, particular forms or types of social pacts that emerge through such negotiations are likely to reflect by and large the preferences of those actors who perceived an increase of their relative power.

We return to an assessment of the validity of these assumptions, predictions and hypotheses in the concluding chapter of the book.

1.2.3 The Institutionalization of Social Pacts

We hypothesize in this book the following possible forms of social pact evolution, focusing on five types of social pact with different degrees of concertation and institutionalization:

i) Pacts that are based on shared understandings regarding procedures and policy areas (in this case they may be multiple and interlinked) for concertation. Such pacts are likely to become institutionalized over time (Ireland is an example) and assume some of the character of a ‘consensus society’. These pacts begin to approximate traditional neo-corporatism as found in Scandinavia and Austria in the 1950s-1990s;

ii) Pacts that have basically renegotiated (and re-institutionalised) a particular package or set up for concertation. Such pacts would not happen too often and would (after some difficult period of negotiations) lead to a new compromise. Such pacts usually reflect a shift in the balance of power. The Dutch (and perhaps also the Danish) case could be an example.

iii) Pacts that are based on sporadic agreement on areas of policy concertation as well as on procedures, but which are only loosely institutionalized (an example in the contemporary period is Spain);

iv) Pacts where there is a limited level of agreement on policy concertation and the procedures thereof and which weaken over time under the pressure of ongoing contestation of their basic architecture and ambitions (Portugal); and

v) Pacts that are one-shot solutions to a small range of policy problems and that occur in moments of extreme policy turbulence and government weakness. In these cases there is no stable institutional structure and little agreement on when and in which policy areas concertation should occur (a case in point is Italy).

This categorization does not of course fully explain why pacts institutionalize in different ways. But it does put the pacts we are analyzing into a useful comparative framework concerning institutional outcomes. Explaining those outcomes is of course a major task in our country-case chapters, especially those sections of the chapters on reiterated bargaining (subsequent to the pact’s initial emergence) and institutionalization.

One question that arises in this regard is whether the same variables that account for the emergence of social pacts are also those that account for their differing degrees of institutionalization. They may indeed play a role. But it is also the case that other variables will come into play.

Thus, the Irish pact is without doubt the most institutionalized and enduring of all contemporary social pacts, and the reasons for its survival over time appear to be distinct from those – i.e., high unemployment, relatively centralized unions and predominantly weak governments – that help explain its emergence. A recent analysis (Roche 2007) points in particular to the
capacity of the Irish government to engage in an ongoing process of political exchange (swapping tax reform, the sustained value of welfare benefits and employment creation for wage moderation) as a key determinant of the Irish pact’s institutionalization – a luxury that other governments (e.g. Italy and Portugal) have enjoyed to a lesser degree given the more parlous state of their public finances.

Many analysts have regarded contemporary pacts as ‘post-corporatist’ - in the sense that they are no longer dependent on the kind of large-scale distributive bargains and social contracts that characterized Scandinavian neo-corporatism in its heyday. There has therefore been a tendency to disregard issues of political exchange. Nevertheless, as the Irish case illustrates, the latter can still be critically important for social pact credibility and commitment and therefore also for their varying degrees of institutionalization from one country, and one period of time, to the next.

Indeed, the capacity of governments to provide material inducements (tax reform, purchasing power adjustments, social and labour market reform incentives etc.) for continued social partner participation – which falls under our second ‘utilitarian’ hypothesis (H2B) below - should not be neglected in seeking to understand why some pacts continue to exist and others fail. The weakness or absence of repetition and institutionalization in many of Europe’s new social pacts, and their frequent limitation to one- or two-shot cooperation games, is likely due to their lack of hierarchical ordering and the weakness of political exchange (Rhodes 2008).

The country-case chapters investigate the institutionalization of their pacts by examining a series of alternative exploratory hypotheses derived from the four standard frameworks for institutionalist analysis in the political science, sociology and economics literatures: the functionalist, utilitarian, normative and power-distributional perspectives. They are as follows:

- The functionalist hypothesis (H1) is that social pacts are likely to become institutionalized, if their institutionalization serves system needs. Or more specifically: the likelihood of the institutionalization of social pacts is higher, when a large problem load coincides with the absence of solid micro-foundations for problem resolution (e.g. with regard to wage setting and skill formation). Conversely, de-institutionalization is more likely, the smaller the problem load or the stronger the micro-foundations for problem resolution.

- The first utilitarian hypothesis (H2A) is that social pacts are likely to be institutionalized if they are associated with satisfactory outcomes for the actors. Conversely, the likelihood of their institutionalization is expected to be lower (and of de-institutionalization higher) if actors do not perceive pacts as satisfactory. The second utilitarian hypothesis (H2B) is that the likelihood of the institutionalization of social pacts is higher, the higher the investment in supporting arrangements and the stronger (and more extensive) inter- and intra-organizational ties and networks. Conversely, the weaker and the more fragmented the networks and the smaller the investments in the supporting arrangements, the less likely the institutionalization of social pacts.

- The normative hypothesis (H3) is that the likelihood of the institutionalization of a social pact is higher, the stronger beliefs are that the previous pact has generated just outcomes. Such beliefs, in turn, are likely to strengthen pact-accommodating cooperation norms. Conversely, the likelihood of de-institutionalization is higher, the stronger the beliefs of unjust outcomes and the weaker the cooperation norms.

- The first power-distributional hypothesis (H4) is that social pacts are likely to become institutionalized when actors - in particular those with more power - support their reproduction. Conversely, de-institutionalization of pacts is likely to occur when powerful actors
lose interest in supporting their reproduction, or alternatively when power shifts towards those who do not support pacts.

I.3. Specific Chapter Content and Structure

In order to maintain a strong thematic unity, and to make the cross-country comparison carried out in the concluding chapter more effective, each country chapter follows an identical form of structure and organization.

i) Introduction

In the introduction, each chapter sets out briefly the main thrust of its argument, and how that argument differs from previous interpretations of social pacting by other authors.

ii) Emergence of Social Pacts

(a) Drivers or triggers of pacts in different periods

Looking at two or three time periods (the 1980s where applicable, the 1990s, and the 2000s), each chapter considers briefly the relevance of the following conditions as potential drivers or triggers of pacting in the particular country case:

- **Economic conditions**: high inflation, deficit, debt, unemployment, declining competitiveness;
- **Political institutions**: prevalence of minority governments, unstable coalitions, left-of-centre governments, parliamentary fragmentation, a tradition of consensual decision making;
- **Institutional/organizational prerequisites**: high or intermediate union centralization, (moderately) strong unions.

The aim here is to have a brief discussion of the potential causes of pacts in each country in different time periods. Organizing the discussion in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for pacts allows the country case chapter material to feed into a more in-depth analysis of the findings in the fuzzy-set qualitative analysis mentioned above. This also allows a consideration of some counterfactual examples – e.g. would the pacts have been signed in a particular country in period X, had the governments been more stable, or not dominated by Left parties, or had weaker unions, etc? A comparison of these conditions between different time periods assists in our overall analysis in the concluding chapter.

(b) Negotiation process and actor preferences

Moving away from the likely drivers of pacts in different time periods, this section focuses on the negotiation of individual pacts. Previous cross-country analysis offered a general assessment of the relevance of the four central pillars of the bargaining model - bounded rationality, context-specific and changing preferences, non-unitary actors, and perceptions of power - for the real-world strategies of key actors. Our focus here is on evaluating the relevance of the factors we hypothesized as indicating the relative power of actors and thus their negotiating strategies: organizational attributes, institutional resources, the degree of inter- and intra-sectional unity and the degree of actors’ interdependence. Overall, our country chapters confirm the relevance of the central pillars of the bargaining model in shaping actors’ strategies, while also suggesting some further refinements to our indicators of relative power.
iii) Institutionalization of Social Pacts

a) Mechanisms of institutionalization

In this section, our country authors consider the relevance in their cases of the mechanisms of institutionalization, which were derived from the functionalist, utilitarian, normative and power-distributional perspectives. The hypotheses derived from these perspectives are not mutually exclusive; but they are useful as a tool for understanding the development of pacts over time.

b) Institutionalization paths

Each country case chapter uses a basic conceptualization of the institutionalization paths (institutionalization vs. de-institutionalization) and trajectories (repetition vs. abandonment), as set out by the editors in chapter three. Each chapter author also comments on the extent to which these paths adequately capture the development of pacts in their particular countries. Considering the institutionalization and/or deinstitutionalization of pacts in each country in terms of (a) repetition vs. abandonment of pacts, (b) the integration vs. disintegration of pactmaking institutions, and (c) the expansion vs. reduction of the number of policy areas covered by the pact, provides a useful template for the analysis of institutionalization.

And finally, returning to the issue raised above of whether the variables that drive the institutionalization and evolution of a country’s pact differ from those that help explain its emergence, the country chapter authors discuss whether in comparison to the negotiations of the first (or early) pacts in their country, they found any evidence that the negotiation of subsequent pacts has been driven by a different logic.

I.4 Bibliography


II. Book Manuscript: List of Contents

The book manuscript will be composed of final versions of deliverables already produced as separate documents. The country reports are in the process of revision, the other chapters will only need minor editing work before the book manuscript is being submitted to the publisher:

1. Introduction, Sabina Avadagic, Martin Rhodes and Jelle Visser (chapter I of this document)
2. Synthesis: A Fuzzy Set Analysis of the Resurgence of Tripartite Concertation in the 1990s, Sabina Avdagic (see deliverable 18a/D13)

Country reports (see deliverable 18a/D09)

3. Ireland, Rory O’Donnell, Maura Adshead and Damian Thomas
4. Italy, Marino Regini and Sabrina Colombo
5. Netherlands, Jelle Visser and Marc Van der Meer
6. Poland, Sabina Avdagic
7. Slovenia, Miroslav Stanojević and Alenka Krašovec
8. Spain, Óscar Molina Romo

Overview Analyses

9. Emergence and Consolidation in the 1990s and 2000s, Martin Rhodes (see deliverable 18a/D10)
11. Conclusions, Sabina Avadagic, Martin Rhodes and Jelle Visser (to be finalised)