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Summary

The paper is organized as follows. It first makes some preliminary and general specifications concerning the topic examined. It then concentrates on the subnational level of concertation, discussing the reasons for the emergence and spread through Europe of local partnerships and pacts, and presenting the forms identified in the empirical literature. Particular attention will be paid to territorial pacts for employment and development (European and of local/national origin) with reference being made to Italy and Spain, as the countries in which territorial pacts have developed to the greatest extent. The concluding section sets out proposals for the future development of the inquiry and provides some preliminary concluding remarks.
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I. Introduction

In a discussion of the new modes of governance in Europe, two preliminary observations appear to be of particular importance. The first is the centrality assumed over time by the involvement of the recipients of economic and social policies in the policy making and implementation processes; or in other words, in the concerted production of policies. The second is that this recourse to the method of concertation may take place at several levels.

As a first approximation, both aspects are connected with the growing complexity of the economic and social processes to be governed within the particular political space constituted by the EU, with its member states, and in a general context of increasing openness of the economy and interdependence of international markets.

But it is not this general level of the discourse which is of interest here. Instead to be stressed is a shortcoming in reflection and literature on the topic whereby analysis is not sufficiently articulated to take account of both these initial observations.

And in fact, while in the European countries concerted ways and mechanisms to address complex and critical issues in the economic and political arena may take place at different levels – i.e. at supranational, national, sub-national level, as well as within workplaces – the current debate tends to focus either on each of them individually, or to implicitly assume that the basic features of concertation remain substantially similar between one level and another. As a corollary, systems of multi-level governance are sometimes expected to develop rather smoothly through combinations of concerted initiatives at various levels.

In other terms, our understanding of the possibilities of concertation is hampered both by a segmentation and compartmentalisation of points of observation, and by the tendency to under-estimate the specific features of each level and the differences between them.

Thus, a large body of literature is available either on corporatist arrangements and social pacts at the national level (within the debate on varieties of capitalism, with a political economy approach); or on local level partnership and territorial pacts (within the broader debate on the importance of local socio-economic systems and on the local level as most appropriate for regulatory intervention in complex matters); or on forms of micro-concertation and pacts for employment and competitiveness within workplaces (especially from an IR perspective); or else on the opportunities expected to derive from European social dialogue and open methods of coordination (Avdagic, Rhodes and Visser 2005; Zeitlin and Pochet 2005; Zeitlin 2005; Crouch et al. 2004; Trigilia 2005).

But on the one hand, insufficient attention has been paid to the specificities of concertation at each level with respect to the others, although there is no lack of interesting analysis on the theme, such as that by Geddes (2000), to which I shall return. On the other hand, few, if any, attempts have been made to look – from an empirical point of view – at the relationships between two or more of these levels. It is true that Traxler (1997), for example, in a study on national pacts discusses the possibility of extending concertation at the national level both upwards and downwards: upwards so that questions which can no longer be solved within the member states should be concerted at the level of the EU; downwards, as happens when ‘between the collective partners a framework agreement only is concluded, leaving the detailed regulation [...] to the parties in the workplace.’ (Traxler 1997: 33-4). This observation is important, and I shall return to it as well. But Traxler’s interest is wholly focused on national pacts, and he considers what may take place at other levels only in relation to these, as if autonomous and independent initiatives cannot develop at other levels. Similar but entirely
the reverse considerations apply to the study by Andersen and Mailand (2002), which deals with local-level partnerships.

Both on the terrain of specific differences among levels, and on that of the relations among them, there is a lack of systematic reflection on the potentialities, outcomes and limits of governance based on concertation methods in Europe, within a sufficiently general framework able to respond to the main issues that may arise.

In the former perspective, which regards the characteristics of concertation at the various levels at which it may occur, the essential question to consider should be whether, besides the obvious difference constituted by the level itself, there are specific differences in terms of logic of action, the actors involved, the issues addressed, and the effects that ensue.

In the latter perspective, i.e. that of the relationships between different levels of concertation, the questions to answer – at least in principle – are the following. What are the relations between two or more of these levels in the European countries? Does recourse to concerted arrangements at one level tend to combine with recourse to concerted arrangements at other levels, or do they tend to stand as alternative or independent solutions? Under what conditions is one solution (co-presence) or another (alternative) more likely?

From this latter point of view, restricting for sake of simplicity the discussion to the relations between national social pacts and forms of local-level concertation, and considering only the presence or otherwise of concerted actions at the two levels, one may analytically imagine the following stylized situations, in which the units of observation are national systems (see Figure 1.1).

**Table 1.1 Possible concerted arrangements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National social pacts</th>
<th>Local-level concertation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
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All four quadrants are empirically possible in principle, and the typology that derives from them could be used to classify the European countries on the basis of the information available.¹

In regard to quadrant 1 (co-presence of both levels), which is of most immediate relevance to analysis of the relations among levels of concertation, one may first presume that decentral-

---

¹ In reality, the exercise is less simple than may appear at first sight: not only because of the insufficiency of the data but even more so because of the peculiarity of certain concerted programmes – namely the European Territorial Employment Pacts-TEPs – which in the 1990s were introduced in all European countries. I shall return to this point later.
ized concertation may either follow its own independent logic, unconnected with that of the national level (independence of levels), or is in some way dependent on/connected to the latter (hierarchical subordination of one level to the other).

From the point of view of local concertation, therefore, it is possible to envisage a cline of increasing institutional complexity (see Figure 1.2):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.2 Local concertation with respect to national pacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No local concertation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only local concertation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local concertation + national pacts independent of each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local concertation connected/subordinate to national pacts</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In what sense can we expect relations of either dependence or independence to arise between the levels?

Dependence or hierarchically ordered relations may be the outcome of:

1. a general strategy of concerted governance at a higher level requiring or incentivating a diffused recourse to partnership method at lower levels (in this case one may speak of procedural vertical integration);

2. the emergence of specific policy programmes providing for concerted initiatives at different levels, for example in the field of employment strategy (in this case one may speak of substantial, specialized vertical integration).

Note that case 1 is more ambitious and seeks to be all-encompassing. It will probably fail. Case 2 corresponds to a lighter, specialized project centred on individual areas of intervention. It may be successful.

Finally, there may also be the reverse relation, where the national level is dependent on the local one as the outcome of a bottom-up construction/generalization process.\(^2\)

Independence relations can be expected to arise from a specialization of levels by problem/intervention area.

Note further that even in the case of the independence of decentralized concertation from national-level pacts, concerted arrangements may nevertheless fall within a more general normative framework as parts of broader-ranging policies.\(^3\) This normative framework may consist in agreements, laws, or the like, according to the cases established at sub-national, national or supranational level and not necessarily intended to regulate pacts explicitly. Or it may involve rules introduced for other purposes but which prove useful to bring a pact about.

In light of these preliminary remarks, it is evident that, even if we focus on only two levels of concerted arrangements, when both the sets of questions – relative to the characteristics of

\(^2\) Although initially unexpected, our review showed that such possibility does happen in the reality (see 4.4 below).

\(^3\) Andersen and Mailand (2002) frame the problem of the relations between levels differently by distinguishing between hierarchical coordination and inter-level adjustment.
each level and the relations between them – are considered, the potential field of observation
turns to be extremely broad and needs to be significantly delimited.

Thus, taking also into consideration the aims and objectives of the other two research pro-
grammes with which this one is connected – i.e. in-depth analysis of the consolidation of local
partnerships in a specific national setting, and study of national social pacts in various Euro-
pean countries – in this preliminary study we have concentrated on local-level forms of con-
certation and partnership, but from a broad perspective extended to several countries.

More specifically, the focus is restricted to the forms of concertation that have developed at
sub-national level – regional, local, territorial – but seeking to pay particular attention to their
connections with upper (and lower) levels of governance and to the specific features which
may characterize and distinguish them from such levels.

The analysis is based on a review and reconsideration of the data and studies available on
various European countries, supplemented by interviews with key informants in some of
them. In a field that, as we shall shortly see, is extraordinarily wide and diversified, and on
which the information is sporadic and erratic, this was practically the only option available if
broad-gauge observation was to be conducted.

After a first phase of general discussion, we concentrated on a particular policy area, that rela-
tive to local concertation for development and employment. This was not the only area avail-
able, but it was probably the most important one, and with which other issues addressed by
local-level concerted arrangements are more or less explicitly connected. It was also the area
best suited to analysis of the relations among different levels of concerted governance.

However, this choice required revision of the scheme of possible concerted arrangements (see
Figure 1.1.) with which we began, as will soon become clear.

This report is organized as follows. It first makes some preliminary and general specifications
concerning the topic examined. It then concentrates on the sub-national level of concertation,
exploring the reasons for the emergence and spread through Europe of local partnerships and
pacts, and presenting the forms identified in the empirical literature. Particular attention will
be paid to territorial pacts for employment and development (European and of local/national
origin) as a good example of concerted arrangements with connections with other levels of
concertation. The concluding section provides with first tentative general remarks, useful for
future research.

II. Preliminary specifications

The scope of the study is therefore rather limited. But even so, problems of defining the field
of analysis immediately arise.

The focus, as said, is on territorial-local concertation framed within discussion of concertation
more generally. This requires specification of both the terms ‘concertation’ and ‘territorial-
local’.

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4 I wish to mention that I have been able to draw in particular on interviews concerning the situations in Swe-
den, the UK, Germany and Italy conducted respectively by Alessandra Sartori, Luca Dall’Agonl, Daniela
Denaro, and Emanuela Galetto, as well as on research materials collected by Daniela Bellani. I am grateful to
these PhD students of the doctoral programme in Labour Studies at the University of Milan for making these
materials available to me. A preliminary study on the Spanish case has been carried out under this pro-
gramme by Francesc Gibert, of the Autonomous University of Barcelona, with whom I have already collabo-
rated in a previous European programme (Lope and Gibert 2006).
As regards the former, the literature is somewhat vague and allusive as to how ‘concertation’ should be defined in the socio-economic field. However, there is concurrence – often implicit – on the idea that concertation is policy-making activity based on the search for/construction of consensus (Lehmbruch 1977; Traxler 1997) between parties with different interests. In the literature on socio-economic regulation, concertation – based on agreement among organized groups – is envisaged as a ‘third way’, of horizontal type, between vertical authoritative-hierarchical regulation by the state (and/or the corporation) and automatic, invisible and impersonal, regulation by the market. Its development is seen as a response to the failures and limitations of regulation both by the state (and more generally based on the principle of authority) and by the market (Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Cooke and Morgan 1998; Le Galès and Voelzkow 2001). But then the definitions display numerous nuances according to the features that action assumes, and according to the actors involved.

From the former point of view, that of action, definitions range from broader ones in which concertation is synonymous with coordinated action among actors to narrower ones where concertation refers to action explicitly oriented to reaching agreement. Concertation, it has been pointed out (Pichierri 2002), is action which is not only coordinated but has stronger connotations: it is formalized collaboration among actors: “concertation [is] formalized (i.e. not merely implicit or tacit) agreement on goals shared by actors whose interests are traditionally and/or potentially diverse and/or conflicting. The two best known and most common types of cooperation and concertation are those between public and private actors and between employers’ associations and trade unions” (Pichierri 2002: 79). Thus explicitly introduced is the criterion of a joint search for agreement on the goals to pursue.

On this narrower definition, the term has been used mainly to denote macro or national level concertation involving few large organized actors around a restricted set of issues of general interest. As Traxler, for instance, has proposed, the need for macro-concertation arises from the “structural division of society into relatively autonomous sub-systems and [...] the separation between the state and civil society which is a feature of capitalist societies” (Traxler 1997: 27). In fact, the increased functional specialization of social subsystems which are relatively autonomous, but whose interdependence must be guaranteed, increases the need for procedures and institutions specialized in coordination functions; all the more so, the greater the need to undertake the adjustment and reform processes required by the pressures of change in the world economy (Traxler 1997: 29-30). In these cases, concertation typically takes the form of tripartite agreements between the government and the representatives of capital and labour: namely, social pacts.

On moving to the sub-national and local level, the meaning of the term becomes more vague and polysemous. ‘Concertation’ does not necessarily have to do with pacts. In these cases, as Pichierri (2002) has pointed out, the agreement may in fact precede the concerted action, rather than being its goal. The actors work in concert because they have already agreed on the goals to pursue; if anything, they must concur on priorities and the use of resources. And particular importance may be acquired by forms of cooperation among several actors in the implementation of programmes (social partnerships). In other words, at this level, ‘concertation’

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5 In reality, pacts at national level may also be of bi- or multi-lateral type. More importantly, economic-social concertation is not necessarily equivalent to the reaching of explicit pacts. As has been pointed out (Hancké and Rhodes 2005), pacts may also be implicit, routinized or embedded in the relevant institutions. Also Traxler (1997: 28) has remarked that “the more the concertation becomes strongly rooted in procedures and institutions the more the formation of compromise will become a matter of routine, making the conclusion of specific social pacts on individual subjects by and large superfluous”.
may denote both a mode of policy-making in the form of social pacts, and a mode of policy-
implementation in the form of social partnerships.

Finally, at the level of workplaces (micro-concertation), ‘concertation’ may signify both the
emergence, by deliberate intention of the social partners, of even highly informal kinds of
joint decision-making in the regulation of specific aspects of employment conditions and the
organization of work (in general, those that are most critical in the given corporate context)
(Regini 1995), and the reaching of explicit bilateral ‘pacts’ of formal type (as in the case of
PECS, pacts for employment and competitiveness). In the former case, action takes the more
fluid form of cooperation and coordination; in the latter, it resembles the formalized action of
macro-level social pacts.

If we consider the second criterion cited – that of the actors involved – again we can identify
narrower meanings of the term ‘concertation’, which in their most complete form imply the
participation of the three canonical actors (the government and the two social partners), where
involvement of the government is an indispensable requisite. There are then broader and inde-
terminate definitions by which concerted action involves an indefinite number of participants
according to the circumstances (and not necessarily the government).

In the narrower meanings, the logic and novelty of concertation (with respect to other forms
of regulation) reside essentially – though not exclusively – in the willingness of the govern-
ment to share, in more or less formalized manner, its decision-making prerogatives with other
actors. In the other meanings, the novelty is rather the adoption of courses of action inspired
by cooperation among actors which represent contrasting, or at any rate different, interests. In
the former case, a crucial question is therefore why, or under what conditions, the government
will be willing to share some of its decision-making prerogatives with private actors (Baccaro
and Simoni 2005). In the latter case, it is why, or under what conditions, private actors with
different interests will be willing to cooperate rather than seek to maximize their utility by
unilaterally using their power to apply influence or pressure.

It is obvious that the narrower meaning does not apply to micro-concertation in workplaces.6
Rather, it concerns the level of national social pacts, and in general also that of sub-national
concertation. But pacts may be reached at both levels (and especially perhaps at the national
one) even without the government’s explicit involvement (as in the Netherlands, for exam-
ple). As indicated, the actors vary in number from the two involved in micro-concertation
agreements at company level, to the three of national social pacts, to the broad and variable
array of actors involved in local concertation.

Taking joint account of both the characteristics of the actors involved and the logic of the in-
teraction, it has recently been pointed out (Donolo 2005) that it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween on the one hand concerted arrangements characterized by the interaction between pub-
lic actors and interest organizations and based on a negotiative logic, and on the other, con-
certed arrangements characterized by interaction between public actors and civil society ac-
tors and based on the deliberation method. This distinction, which partly corresponds to that
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of partnerships proposed by Andersen and Mailand (2002)
proves useful, as we shall see; but especially so if it is understood more as an analytical dis-
tinction between two possible poles of action – not necessarily opposed in reality – than be-
tween different configurations of actors.

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6 However, it may be so in cases of local concertation where the institutions intervene to resolve problems
concerning workplaces.
For my purposes here, I shall generally use the term ‘concertation’ in its more fluid meaning of coordinated action among two or more public and/or private organized actors, with distinct interests, undertaken through negotiated or deliberative methods to reach and/or implement agreed solutions to critical problems. This will enable the use of the same approach with different kinds of concertation at different levels. It will be then the task of empirical inquiry to determine which forms are relevant in reality.

Turning to the other part of the definition – the one concerning the specific level of concertation – the term ‘local’ or ‘territorial’ does not denote a particular type of geographical area or administrative unit defined \textit{a priori}, because the dimensions of what is considered as local or territorial may vary greatly. They have, as Pichierri (2002. 84) puts it, a ‘variable geometry’ in that they range from an area spanning several regions to a district, from a city to a neighbourhood, from a consortium of municipalities to a single municipality. The only constant is that these are territorial areas of sub-national level.

Note that this has major implications for the functioning of this kind of concertation. With respect to the other levels at which concerted forms of economic-social action may develop, in fact, here it is not possible satisfactorily to identify \textit{a priori} the extent of the intervention (who and how many it may involve) and the relevant organizational actors. Instead, in the cases of both national social pacts and forms of company-level concertation, the dimensions and the extent of the ambit of reference (the state and its citizens; the company and its stakeholders\footnote{Of course, state and company belong to different categories. A company does not delimit a territory. It is an organization which has functional more than territorial boundaries, although it is located in one or more territories.}) are given, and the range of the relevant organizational actors is sufficiently well known (although, as said, not all of them are necessarily present).

In other words, in this case, concerted action takes place in an indefinite though limited (being situated between two poles) space which must be defined. A first phase of concertation will therefore concern the identification and delimitation (closure) of the space (in terms of territory, interests, etc.) that it is proposed to occupy. The start-up dynamics of the concertation (who takes the initiative and why, the role of leadership, etc.) are obviously crucial at this stage. But one may also expect the initiative’s domain of reference to extend/diminish over time, given that it is largely defined, and redefined, by the participants themselves. This is not to imply that in this case the actors operate in an entirely open or boundless space. Here the distinction is between limits connected with the characteristics of the local interests and problems, which structure the concerted action from within, and the limits that may be imposed by external normative programmes and interventions, which instead structure it from without. I shall return to this point when I discuss national and European territorial pacts.

By way of summary, we may draw the following distinctions among the characteristics of concertation according to the level at which it takes place (see Figure 2.1.).
### Table 2.1 Characteristics of economic-social concertation according to the level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National level</th>
<th>Local level</th>
<th>Company level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logic and type of action</strong></td>
<td>Negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on matters of general importance (social pacts)</td>
<td>Concerted initiatives, based on contractual and/or deliberative methods, to address critical issues and/or to implement policies and programmes at local-scale</td>
<td>Joint management of critical problems by means of formal or informal agreements (integrative collective bargaining)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Limited, usually three: government and interest organizations (social partners)</td>
<td>Numerous, public and private (to be defined)</td>
<td>The two private IR actors (management and workers’ representatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The action’s ambit of reference</strong></td>
<td>definite and stable</td>
<td>to be defined</td>
<td>definite (may vary within the company)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### III. Local concertation. A variety of initiatives

#### III.1 A not entirely new phenomenon

Turning now to the part of the problem on which this paper will concentrate, it is evident from the discussion thus far that local concertation is not a smaller-scale version of national concertation. It is characterized by a logic of action which may be extremely variable but in general is more explicitly oriented to the coordination of initiatives, the construction and consolidation of networks, and problem solving. It is distinguished by a sometimes extraordinarily broad and heterogeneous array of actors; and the indeterminacy of the action’s ambit of reference, which is constantly defined and redefined, sometimes in relation to constraints and incentives originating from outside.

One of the main obstacles against proper understanding of forms of concertation at sub-national (and also company) level is the fragmentary nature of the information available. Not only does no database of initiatives exist – this being by force of circumstance, given that by their nature they cannot be monitored (there is a finite number of ‘centres’ but an indefinite number of ‘local terrains’) – but also, and especially, the documentation that can be obtained, in the absence of sample-based research, is closely dependent on fashion – that is, what at a certain time seems worthy of attention – or on the launching of specific higher level – European or national – programmes, and therefore on what their promoters expect of them. As a result, it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to establish the extent to which an increase in local concertation practices corresponds to a real upsurge in the phenomenon, or instead to increased attention paid to it by observers.

In general, the interest of observers and politicians in sub-national forms of concertation intensified in Europe – and particularly in Italy – during the 1990s. In actual fact, however, forms of cooperation between social partners and institutions to solve local-level critical problems existed much earlier. The empirical phenomenon that gave rise to the analytical notion of ‘political exchange’ (propounded by Pizzorno in the mid-1970s, and which thereafter greatly influenced the debate on ‘neo-corporatism’ and concertation), occurred not at national...
level but at the local-regional one, when the crisis of large industrial groups (in Milan) prompted local interest organizations to involve (from bottom up) public actors (especially the nascent regional governments). Subsequently the process shifted to the national arena. But initiatives in this form (the creation of partnerships in order to tackle economic-productive crises by lobbying the centre, where the public authorities acted as mediators) were largely sub-national. Some time ago I suggested that in Italy between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s what today might be called local partnerships, but which at the time was described as political bargaining based on tripartite relations between the social partners and local governments, developed as a result of the birth of the regions, which sought legitimacy vis-à-vis central government (Regalia 1987).

Recent research has also reported that concertation in the form of pacts among local actors – sometimes embryonic, sometimes well-developed – occurred in other European countries as well during the 1970s and 1980s. Consider, for example, the Spanish local pacts for employment of the period prior to Spain’s entry into the European Community or the Saar Gemeinschaftsinitiative in Germany of the 1980s based on an extraordinarily broad partnership of diverse local actors.

As regards the Spanish case, Lope and Gibert have commented:

“The first local pacts, in fact, date back to the period between the late 1970s and approximately the late 1980s. These were pacts on the implementation of active labour market policies. Focused on a narrow set of objectives and with limited financial resources, they were promoted by municipal administrations (mostly on the political left) with scant experience in dealing with such issues, and by unions not yet well organized at the local level, whilst the involvement of the employers’ organizations was relatively marginal. These processes were poorly coordinated, highly voluntaristic, and with little visibility; moreover, they were sometimes characterized by clientelistic trade-offs when it became necessary to involve higher-level governments (Comunidades Autónomas, or Autonomous Communities) in order to obtain resources” (Lope and Gibert 2006: 177-8).

As to local concertation in Germany, studied by Stefani Scherer (but see also the case of the Common Initiative Programme in Baden-Württemberg in the same period discussed by Bovier, 1997):

“The Saar Joint Initiative (Saar Gemeinschaftsinitiative) serves as an example of a regional pact signed to address the specific employment problems of a region by actively involving all the relevant social actors. As we shall shortly see, the initiative also established the framework for implementation of specific labour market measures. The pact came into being in the mid-1980s as an attempt – initiated by the then social-democratic state government – to develop an active labour market policy model at the local level which contrasted with the labour market policy of the then conservative federal government. The initiative, which should also be viewed against the background of considerable structural changes combined with very high unemployment, was developed as a loose but widespread concerted action aimed at covering as many areas of employment as possible, and with the widest possible participation of relevant actors. Therefore, the Landgovernment, the large town councils, the social partners, the chamber of industry and commerce, the local trade union headquarters, the regional de-
part of employment, the major training institutions, the churches, and various non-profit welfare associations were all involved in the initiative. Funding was provided by the federal government and by the European Community.” (Scherer 2006: 94).

Also to be pointed out is that Italy and other continental countries have a long tradition of including representatives of the social partners on the boards of local authorities and social security institutes. Moreover, the association of interest organization representatives to boards, committees, agencies, and the like, has been frequently stipulated by labour-market reform measures since the 1980s. These may be described as forms of institutionalized social partnership.

But, as Caruso (2002) has observed in relation to this latter form of involvement, during the 1970s and 1980s the interest organization representatives were associated to the public administration, which maintained its central regulatory role. The social partnerships of the 1990s tended instead to be coalitions/associations among local private and public actors which worked together on a more equal footing. Consequently, whilst in the past the social partners were involved in the public sphere, in more recent forms of concertation institutional involvement has taken place – or has been expected to take place\(^8\) – outside the administration’s orbit. This may be a significant difference between more traditional and more recent kinds of local partnership, although it should be added that there seems in recent years to have been a reverse tendency to a revival in the public authorities’ decisive role in territorial concertation.

III.2 Towards a catalogue of initiatives

It is probable that an adequate historical survey of local governance practices in many European countries during the 1970s and 1980s would greatly enrich the picture. But the preceding brief outlines already indicate that the phenomenon of local concertation is not entirely new.

However, if we concentrate on the past fifteen to twenty years, there is no doubt that during the 1990s concerted local action oriented to economic and social development expanded markedly in different settings and in different forms, and scholars and politicians became greatly interested in its potential.\(^9\) A first general observation to be made is that recourse to some form of local-level concertation is widespread in Europe, much more than is currently the case at the national centralized level, and especially in the form of social pacts. Indeed, examples of sub-national-level concertation and partnership are documented in all the EU countries, whilst this is not the case of national pacts.

Although necessarily based on what is documented, or indeed only mentioned, in the literature, a list could include the following:

1. EC programmes for rural areas (Leader I, conducted experimentally in the period 1991-3, and followed by Leader II, 1994-1999 and Leader +, 2000-2006) (Vesan and Sparano 2005);
2. EC programmes for urban renewal (Urban I in the period 1994-1999, and especially Urban II, 2000-2006);

3. the EC programme of local development and employment initiatives (LDEIs) launched in 1995 (Geddes 1998; Geddes 2000; Laville and Gardin 1999);

4. the EC pilot programme of territorial employment pacts (TEPs) between 1996 and 1999, and subsequent revised programme for 2000-2006;

5. the EC Local Social Capital pilot programme launched in 1999, whose “overriding idea was to design and set up bodies which could relate to the experience of people intending to run micro-level projects” (European Commission 2002: 21; Kjaer 2001; Evans 2003);

6. pacts and similar programmes for local development and employment promoted by national programmes or funding schemes in various European countries, and in particular the Italian experience of negotiated planning – territorial pacts for development and area agreements – of the 1990s and early 2000s (Di Gioacchino 2001; Cerase 2005; Trigilia 2005);

7. national programmes for urban regeneration based on partnership schemes: for example, in Italy the *Contratto di Quartiere* (neighbourhood agreement) introduced in 1997, and the schemes for urban renewal and sustainable local development instituted in 1998 (Vesan and Sparano 2005); or the numerous initiatives for local development and urban regeneration undertaken in the UK by the Labour government (Urban Regeneration Companies) as part of a long tradition of involving private actors in local policies (De Magistris et al. 2004);

8. strategic planning initiatives by numerous large European cities (Van De Berg et al. 1998);

9. numerous local pacts for development and employment, or to regulate aspects of the labour market, of autonomous origin, i.e. based on the planning and negotiative initiative of local-level actors: in Italy, for example, the pacts of Ferrara, Modena, Milan, the regions of Umbria, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany (Viscomo 2001; Costantini 2004); and similar ones in Germany (Pichierri 2002: 94);

10. diverse and diffused forms of local-level social partnership documented by recent studies (Andersen and Mailand 2002; Regalia 2006).

To be pointed out immediately is that, however ample and diversified, the available documentation does not permit assessment – except to a limited extent and only hypothetically – of the diffusion of forms of local concertation and the conditions that facilitate them. However, it is possible to examine the features of this wide array of initiatives and discuss some of their main implications.

### III.2.1 The EC programmes

Firstly, the range of EC promoted/encouraged initiatives (i-v above) is indubitably very broad and articulated. It comprises: (a) participative policies for rural development based on the involvement of Local Action Groups consisting of public and private partners tasked with devising and implementing development strategies; (b) policies for the regeneration of urban areas characterized by social exclusion, initially based on forms of partnership among institu-

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10 In fact, apart from individual case studies (see e.g. Regalia 2006), information is lacking on situations in which local concertation has not developed or has failed.
tions with private support, and more recently on more explicit and thoroughgoing partnerships between local private and public actors; (c) experimental programmes for employment creation based on initiatives in the social economy and the secondary labour market; (d) active labour policies incentivising integrated programmes to promote local development and employment based on broad partnerships and the assumption of responsibility by all the actors concerned.

Quite broad is information available on these types of programme as well. Various documents and studies based on the monitoring of schemes or the analysis of best practices can be consulted on forms of local concertation promoted by the European Union and undertaken, albeit in different ways, in all the member countries.\[11\]

To be stressed is that a key feature of EC initiatives in this area is their progressive shift in favour of concertation among local actors (or better partnership, to use the prevalent term) as a way to use resources and implement programmes more efficiently, and therefore as a prerequisite for access to funds (Goetschy 2000; Ferrera 2005: 175-91). At the end of the 1990s, with the renewal of programmes for the period 2000-2006 and revision of the rules on the use of structural funds, the forms and procedures of partnerships were further defined, with greater emphasis placed on the role of coordinating and integrating programmes that intermediate local institutions (regions) were expected to perform.

### III.2.2 The initiatives promoted by national programmes

Differently from the case of the European programmes, less systematic information is available on a second group of concerted local initiatives: those which form part of programmes promoted at national level in single countries – or coordinated at regional level in federal countries – although the studies on the topic are growing (see Geddes 2000: 785). Provided here is an outline with no claim to exhaustiveness.

The Italian case of negotiated planning (discussed in more detail later) is probably the most developed, and almost certainly the best documented. But significant experiences have been reported in other countries as well.

Also in Germany, as in Italy, various types of pacts for employment and development other than European TEPs have been promoted at the regional-local level. These are principally the pacts reached under the national *Bündnis für Arbeit*, which uses resources made available by the *Land*. Since the first agreement in Bavaria in 1996, accords of this kind have become widespread and indeed have formed the subject of a bulletin issued by the Hans Böckler Stiftung, the Foundation of the DGB-German federation of trade unions (Pichierri 2002: 94). Of considerable interest is the InnoRegio programme promoted in 1999 by the Ministry of Education and Research, and also financed by European structural funds, which supports territorial development schemes through local partnerships in the eastern *Länder*. This programme marks a change from the previous policy largely based on a combination of privatization and top-down incentive measures, and whose results fell well short of expectations. It is inspired by a logic of bottom-up promotion of development (and therefore resembles Italian negotiated planning) through cooperation among local partners in implementation of projects.

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11 Useful information can be found, for example, at the European Union website, in its section on ‘regional policy’, or at the Inforegio website, which publishes the guidelines for individual programmes, illustrative reports and assessments of projects. Intermediate reports and summary assessments of *Local Development and Employment Initiatives* (LDEIs) are also published by the European Foundation of Dublin.
selected for their particular innovativeness\textsuperscript{12} and in whose definition they have been involved. “The main aim is to establish stable cooperative structures through the guided creation and implementation of the projects financed” (De Magistris et al. 2004: 49). Promoted in the same period – especially in Berlin, where twelve were in operation in 2006 – were Local Pacts for Business and Employment (BBWA) within the framework of the federal Local Social Capital programme, part of an already-mentioned European Commission programme (OECD-LEED 2006). Earlier, in 2005, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs had launched the “Perspective 50 Plus” programme to promote the employment of lower-skilled workers aged over 50 through special regional pacts to create jobs for elderly workers. By 2006, 62 of such pacts had been approved by the Ministry (OECD-LEED 2006). Finally, the creation of local partnerships is sometimes encouraged during the experimental phases of specific national programmes for employment creation (see e.g. the case study of the CAST project in Scherer 2006).

In France, a country with a long tradition of attention to local development, but with a top-down orientation led by the state, local partnerships characterized by the pre-eminence of public actors are foreseen by recent national programmes for urban regeneration: for instance the programme for the Développement Social des Quartiers and the Contrat de Ville (Geddes 2000: 784; Le Galès 2002). The new contractualized local policies introduced at the end of the 1990s (Contrat d’agglomération, Contrat de pays), moreover, seem to go further by emphasising the involvement of other local actors – first of all large firms and their associations – and not just public-public partnerships (De Magistris et al. 2004: 21-2; Burroni 2005). Currently, four co-operation models are at work in the field of economic and occupational development: i) the Comités de Bassin d’Emploi (CBE), co-ordinating local actors in establishing an economic strategy for the global development of local areas; ii) the Maisons de l’Information sur la Formation et l’Emploi (MIFE), operating since 1982 and active in the promotion of training programmes; iii) the Espaces Ruraux Emploi Formation (EREF), operating since 1992, and providing a local unique structure over wide range of activities in the fields of employment, training and social inclusion; iv) the Plans Locaux pour l’insertion et l’emploi (PLIE), aimed at the social inclusion of most vulnerable people (LEED 2006; Mériaux 2006).

In Ireland, too, where the influence of European social policy is particularly intense, various national programmes have promoted forms of local concertation: the Area Programme for Integrated Rural Development, the Area Based Response to Long Term Unemployment Programme, the Programme for Integrated Development, and the Local Enterprise Programme (Geddes 2000: 784).

In the UK, local regulation policies promoted from the centre and based on forms of public-private partnership have been reported since the mid-1980s. Initially, the intention of Conservative governments was to involve private interests in the creation and management of local policies (from training to urban development\textsuperscript{13}). “In this case, the partnership was a means to by-pass local governments perceived and represented as ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘pro-Labour’, as obstacles against economic development” (De Magistris et al. 2004: 63). To be noted is that the dominant approach in this period was strongly decisionist and top-down. However, em-

\textsuperscript{12} More than in the case of European territorial pacts, the decisive criterion for approval of these projects is their focus on technology and product innovation (De Magistris et al. 2004: 49). Indeed, this seems to be a characteristic of most if not all German pact-based schemes.

\textsuperscript{13} Examples are TECs (Training and Enterprise Councils), UDCs (Urban Development Corporations), EZs (Enterprise Zones) (De Magistris et al 2004: 63; Geddes 2000).
pirical studies (Raco 2002, cit. in De Magistris et al. 2004: 64) have shown that the successful projects were conducted in different form: that is, through the construction of relations and the involvement of local actors in the promotion of programmes. In a second phase, following the recession of the early 1990s, British policies on local and urban development addressed new issues of social and environmental type.  

Partnerships were expanded and local governments were once again involved. The local partnership method – for which the further extension of participants is envisaged – has assumed an even more central role in the strategy adopted by Blair’s New Labour and comprises a large number of policies (local development, social inclusion, crime prevention). Among such initiatives, of particular importance are the Urban Regeneration Companies, the first of which date back to 1999 (De Magistris et al. 2004: 65, 70-2). At present there are 25 of these companies. They consist of institutional networks with private-law legal personality comprising municipal councils, regional development agencies, and representatives of private interests. The goals pursued are the promotion and regeneration of urban areas through production of a Master Plan, the management of public and private investments, and the production of tangible and non-tangible local goods for competitiveness. Introduced in 2000, following enactment of the Local Government Act, were Local Strategic Partnerships, these being complex and wide-reaching forms of partnership (see box 3.1.). Over 360 of them are now in operation in England, some of them dating back to local initiatives in the early 1990s, as in the case of the Greater Nottingham Partnership, established in 1994 (see below) (OECD-LEED 2006). The use of forms of local partnership is sometimes encouraged by national programmes especially in their experimental phases (see e.g. the case of the New Deal for Young People in McIlroy and Marginson 2006).

14 See the Business links, the City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget projects.
15 See the http://www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/page.asp?id=531.
Box 3.1: Local Strategic Partnerships

LSPs were introduced as a result of the Local Government Act 2000. There are currently over 360 in England.

**Partners:** local authorities, public sector officers, service firms, voluntary and civil society associations. The Government participates with its offices to facilitate the creation of LSPs, to resolve disputes, and to assess whether the requirements are fulfilled for financing *local neighbourhood renewal strategies* (see below);

**Leadership:** LSPs are networks among equals, so that the local governments are not necessarily the central actors;

**Financing:** public service budget, partners’ contributions and central government grants

**Legal status:** non-statutory, non-executive organisations

**Policy areas:** economic, social and environmental well-being, community development, labour market and social inclusion.

**Instruments:** forum for debate, discussion and shared decisions; consultancy, strategic planning through, for example, a *Sustainable Community Strategy*, *Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy*, *Local Area Agreement* and *Local Development Framework*;

**Main tasks:**
- Draw up and implement a *Sustainable Community Strategy* for the area, identify the most important actions, and constantly monitor their progress;
- Bring together the plans, networks and local initiatives so as to construct a forum in which public service providers can work together effectively;
- Work in concert with the local administrations developing local public service agreements (PSA) and support them in pursuit of their goals;
- In the case of a particularly depressed area, develop a local neighbourhood renewal strategy aimed at increasing employment, enhancing education, reducing crime, improving the housing stock, and reducing the gap between the most deprived areas and the national average. All these schemes set themselves *quantitative goals* (for example, all social housing must fulfil particular standards of ‘decency’ by 2010; the domestic burglary rate must not exceed three times the national average rate, etc). This strategy is also financed by the government’s *Neighbourhood Renewal Fund* (NRF).

**To achieve these goals, LSPs:**
- Collaborate with the local population, seeking to include religious groups and ethnic minorities;
- Define common goals and allocate tasks;
- Pursue transparency in goals and priorities;
- Assess the contributions of all the actors involved;
- Circulate information and good practices.

Source: ForumPartnerships 2006

In Spain, besides European programmes which perform a key function in stimulating and developing concerted initiatives, various anti-poverty schemes based on the local partnership principle have been undertaken (Geddes 2000: 786), and local pacts for development and employment have proliferated (Lope and Gilbert 2006) with national and especially regional (i.e. of the *Comunidades Autónomas*) support. In 2005 in Catalonia nineteen territorial pacts were active in the Province of Barcelona, within the framework of the policies for economic pro-

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16 See for instance the pilot project under the Local Social Capital programme in Villaverde and Usera (Kjaer 2001).
motion of the Diputació de Barcelona. The wider policy framework included the Catalan Strategy for Employment and the National employment Action Plan for the Kingdom of Spain. Policy areas were labour market policy, social policy and economic development. The partnerships included local municipal and district authorities, unions, employers’ associations, the voluntary sector and the Diputació and were governed by a contract signed by the partners and the Diputació (OECD-LEED 2005). Pacts are widespread in most of the other Comunidades Autónomas as well, as documented by Rocha Sánchez (2005).

In Sweden, a country with a long tradition of national-level concertation between the government and the social partners, but with a scant tradition of collaboration between local-level public and private actors, local-level concertation began to spread during the 1980s in a period of intense industrial restructuring. This was micro-concertation centred mainly on the ‘soft’ management of local economic and employment emergencies, and it involved local bodies (municipalities and counties) and the local trade unions and employers’ associations (Östhol, Svensson 2002: 87-88). However, examples of partnerships proliferated during the 1990s, as an effect of both Sweden’s joining the European Union in 1995 and implementation of a regional development policy by the social-democratic government in 1998. The distinctive feature of this new phase of local-level concertation was that it took place mainly at regional level, despite difficulties due to the fact that regions in Sweden are a very recent level of governance and substantially devoid of autonomous functions and political legitimacy. Sweden’s entry into the European Union entailed that it was eligible for structural funds, which, as well known, are granted with account taken of local and regional needs, and assign a key role to partnerships among actors. Not surprisingly, therefore, the advent of structural funds in Sweden not only contributed to the spread of local-level concertation but also influenced the characteristics and implementation of the regional development policy introduced in 1998 (Östhol, Svensson 2002: 87-89). In this context, the partnership became the essential instrument with which to determine local requirements, multiply sources of funding, and control the allocation of resources. The main instruments of this policy were initially Regional Growth Agreements (RGA): these were not legally binding but based on voluntary collaboration and funding agreements among the partners (European Commission 2004: 39). In 1998, partnerships to draw up RGA projects were created in all twenty-one of Sweden’s counties. However, financial administration and control remained firmly in the hands of the regional branches of central government, the County Administrative Boards (Hudson 2005: 319-320). In 2001, the competences of the RGA, now renamed Regional Growth Programmes (RGP), were revised, and their margins of autonomy from central government were reduced (Hudson 2005: 321-322).

Again, among local partnership programmes promoted by central governments are the Social Renewal Programme in the Netherlands; the Social Development Fund in Denmark (Geddes 2000: 784); and the Labour Foundations in Austria (Geddes 1998). National funding for programmes involving local partnerships is also available in Portugal (Geddes 2000: 786) and, though in still embryonic form, in Poland (De Magistris et al 2004: 120ff).

III.2.3 Bottom-up initiatives

Finally, a third group of concerted local initiatives is characterized by their endogenous, voluntaristic origin externally to, or in anticipation of, more general programmes.

This is the case of the strategic planning initiatives undertaken by numerous large European cities which have had to cope with industrial crisis, deindustrialization, and change of land use (Crouch et al 2004). It is the case of the Italian territorial pacts developed before the process of formal recognition by government and legislative regulation began; or of other locally
originated pacts, taking a variety of names and which are intended to intervene innovatively in management of critical aspects of the labour market (Viscomi 2001; Caruso 2002).

This is also the case of numerous other initiatives in many European countries involving the concerted search for solutions to local problems. Reported in Germany, for example, are various cases of local initiatives for the integration of people on the margins of the labour market (Scherer 2006), or to orient/accompany productive restructuring processes, or to promote the development of areas in decline (Lieb 2001).

In the UK, a highly successful local initiative anticipating a more general national programme has been the already cited Greater Nottingham Partnership, established in 1994 on the initiative of the City and County Councils in response to a number of government bidding programmes which required bidders to show that they were working in partnership. The Partnership was soon very successful: it greatly extended the network of participants, specializing in a large number of policy areas, and it was used as an example by national government in its guidance to all local authorities when they were required to set up Local Strategic Partnerships in 1999. More recent examples are the Birmingham and Solihull Economic and Development Forum, some innovative schemes in the industrial relations field, or the Tower Hamlets Partnership (London), to which I shall return.

More in general, those cited are only some examples of a phenomenon presumably widespread in Europe, but about which information is both scarce and erratic. In this case, the initiatives – precisely because they are restricted to local realities and promoted by local actors independently of more general programmes – tend to remain ‘invisible’ and not to make news externally unless they are subjected to studies and research, or, above all, as we have seen, they do not become the starting points, or the bases, for the launching of new programmes by higher levels of governance.

IV. Local concertation. Forms, origins, goals

IV.1 Variety of themes and forms of interaction

However incomplete, the survey has highlighted how local-level concertation gives rise to initiatives which differ along many dimensions: the contents of the concerted action; the number and characteristics of the participants; the forms that the interaction may take; the time horizon; relationships with other levels of governance; and others besides.

As far as contents are concerned, these vary greatly as regards both the range of issues that may be subject to concerted initiatives and the number of issues addressed by each of them – what we may call ‘thematic complexity’. As to the former aspect, the issues addressed are much more disparate than they are in national-level concertation; as to the latter, the degree of complexity varies according to the case, but may be much higher than in social pacts and national-level concertation. In the case of local concertation initiatives promoted by the EU, recent years have seen an evident tendency for issues to increase, combined with an endeavour to integrate initiatives (by means of a holistic approach) in order to increase efficiency and reduce waste and redundancy.

In effect, the issues addressed may include:

1. policies for local government (including public order and security), urban planning and regeneration; environmental policies;
2. policies for local development, industrial restructuring, innovation, technological transfer, training;
3. policies on employment and local labour markets, sometimes explicitly linked with policies on internal labour markets (as exemplified by the Vallés Occidental TEP, see Lope and Gibert 2006);

4. local welfare policies (innovative services; support for families and female employment; protection for weak groups and the socially excluded) (Bortolotti and Giaccone 2006);

5. policies for social inclusion and support for the social economy (LDEIs) (Geddes 1998, 2000).

Unlike the matters usually subject to national-level concertation – i.e. curbing inflation, reducing the cost of labour, or reforming single economic and social policies (Regini 2000) – in this case the thematic areas are highly diversified and combine with the marked variety, and dispersion, of programmes, and with features distinctive of the specific territory. Even a brief glance at the lists of policy areas set out in the tables on territorial pacts or the best practices connected with them to be read on EU websites or those dedicated to local development (see also below) is illuminating in this regard. In conclusion, whilst in the case of national pacts their content can be classified as regulatory vs. redistributive (Avdagic, Rhodes and Visser 2005), in this case it appears more opportune to speak of a problem-solving vs. acquisitive orientation.

Initiatives also vary considerably according to the number and characteristics of the actors involved. In this regard – and using the results of a recent European study which examined instances of local concertation to regulate the use of new forms of employment (Regalia 2006) – one can first identify bi- or tripartite interactions among the traditional industrial relations actors: between firms and/or their associations and the workers’ representatives; between the local and/or other level institutions and the social partners; but also between institutions and institutions, between firms and institutions, or between trade unions and institutions. In this cases, it has been pointed out, the “salient feature it is not the bilateral bargaining typical of contracts between private actors and public authorities (principal/agent relationship), but the natural plurality of the actors involved, where the fragmentation of the parties is balanced by the pursuit of a shared aim, which leads to co-operation, originally voluntary but then forced (because of the political responsibility in force of an agreement publicly announced, or the legal responsibility if loss of planned funding)” (Caruso 2002). Yet other actors are often involved, such as labour market agencies, coalitions of employers (different from employers’ associations), chambers of commerce, banks, education and training institutes, non-profit organizations, churches, environmental organizations, and other civil society organizations.

Note that this is not simply an extension of the array of possible actors with respect to centralized concertation. It is more an increase in the heterogeneity of the actors and in the diversity of their logic of action: the latter actors cited, unlike the former, are not representation organizations and are not accountable to those that they represent.

The difference is therefore qualitative and affects the forms that interaction may take, and especially the behaviour of actors. Traditionally, centralized concertation typically assumed the ‘lean’ form of a three-party coalition between the government and the representatives of employers and workers, which in certain circumstances negotiated solutions to a limited number of certain problems of sufficiently general interest for a country (Avdagic, Rhodes, Visser 2005).

By contrast, according to the number and nature of the actors involved, decentralized concertation may assume a variety of forms: the redundant one of regional or territorial pacts, inclusive coalitions whose composition is decided case by case; and various other types of bi-
multilateral interaction in which the social partners, that are representative actors, cooperate – often in a secondary position and with reduced visibility – with actors that are not, and act according to a technical-operational logic more or less oriented to the market.

Organizationally, these are hybrids in unstable equilibrium where actors must move on a difficult terrain for which they may not be well equipped or legitimated. This applies to the social partners, which are often weakly organized at the local or regional level; and it also applies to local administrations and institutions, which often have limited or unwieldy resources in these fields.

As I have pointed out in the past (Regalia 1998), this shared uncertainty may be an advantage to the extent that it favours the creation of an ‘intermediate artificial’ space suited to the piloting or the cooperative development of innovative solutions. However, necessary for this to occur is a surplus of initiative with which to acquire a certain productive independence from the ‘centre’, as well as sufficient resources.

Local concertation initiatives also vary according to their prospects of enduring in time. Here the main distinction concerns the either stable or ad hoc nature of the interaction. One can distinguish cases in which inter-actor cooperation develops on an experimental basis and in a short-term time horizon – being activated in order to define measures and specific action programmes when necessary – and cases in which the interaction assumes more stable and permanent character.

Of course, this important dimension is not a stable feature given once and for all, of each programme concerted. On the contrary, it may vary in time according to the type of initiative and its degree of success. From this point of view, too, there are notable differences with respect to the logic of national social pacts, which – as has been observed – tend to take the form of ‘one-spot’ decision-making processes in which the partners address just one, or only a few, issues, and when they have identified a solution discontinue their cooperation, perhaps resuming it when another issue arises (Geddes 1998). Instead, in regard to forms of local concertation, of particular importance is the theme of the institutionalization and consolidation of partnerships (on this see the study by the URGE group).

Finally, as we have already seen, forms of local concertation vary according to their origin – that is, depending on whether the initiative stems mainly from a European programme, a national programme, or a decision taken autonomously by local-level actors – and according to relationships with other levels of governance.

IV.2 Why local concertation?

But for what reasons is recourse made to concertation in (local) policy-making?

In general, one may say that the advantages expected to accrue concern the greater potential for cooperation among actors representing diverse interests in cases where the purpose is to obtain competitive and productive advantages rather than redistributive and protective ones (Streeck 2000). Or, with a shift of emphasis, that they concern the potentialities connected with involvement of the recipients of policies from the outset, during the design phase, in order to forestall objections and vetoes in the implementation phase (Bobbio 2004). The former explanation centres on the objectives to pursue; the latter on the characteristics of the process and the behaviour of actors.

But why then has recourse to decentralised concertation intensified in recent years in Europe? The reasons put forward in the literature tend to centre on certain processes common to the European countries: the already mentioned European Union’s growing emphasis on the part-
nership method as a requisite for access to structural funds; the reduced regulatory and redistributive capacities of national governments, in a context where economies are more open and more closely integrated internationally; the processes of administrative decentralization that have recently affected the majority of the European countries; the failure of previous development policies based on top-down intervention by the state (as in the case of the Italian Mezzogiorno or, more recently, the East German Länder); but also the weakening of the national-level interest organizations (which may therefore be less able to engage in central-level concertation); or opportunities, in a period of increasing exposure to international competition, to obtain greater benefits from policies shaped according to the differentiated needs of local areas and societies and designed to increase their competitive advantage.

However, on their own these general reasons are not sufficient to account for why local concertation initiatives have developed differently in different countries. Nor do they explain why, besides the lists of best practices compiled according to EC guidelines, there seems to be little sign of convergence among such practices. In reality, convergence may perhaps be apparent as the outcome of European programmes, but it has implications probably different from those often theorized or recommended by its promoters, as we shall shortly see.

Generally, the various reasons cited are introduced together in the literature on local concertation, implying that they tend to accumulate and to overlap. However, on closer inspection it is evident that such reasons correspond to different interpretations of the possibilities of local concertation. According to the case, in fact, such recourse may be more or less explicitly viewed as:

1. an opportunity for local mobilization connected with the ‘soft’ social policies promoted by the EU in the past ten to fifteen years;
2. a response to failures in the traditional forms of centralized policy-making by the state in regard to various economic and social aspects;
3. a way to tackle and solve controversial problems difficult (or potentially difficult) to deal with in concerted manner at national level by shifting them to the local one;
4. an opportunity arising from the broader powers assigned to local governments as a result of administrative devolution;
5. an opportunity to modulate solutions according to the characteristics of local contexts; indeed, to innovate or relaunch policies and programmes from the bottom up, rather than from the top down.

Thus, corresponding to these analytically different – although in reality not necessarily alternative – interpretations of local concertation are diverse expectations, functions, and patterns of action. In other words, and to simplify greatly, recourse to local concertation can be viewed as an alternative to solutions managed in accordance with traditional administrative procedures (or to market regulation), i.e. as a reaction to government (and market) failures. Or it can instead be seen as action positively oriented to grasping new opportunities (originating from outside, or from within the national policy-making system) which can be used to strengthen or to renew local-level policies.

17 Delayering controversial issues to other levels of regulation is a classic technique (see also Traxler 1997: 33-4). The shift may be upwards or downwards – or else from the sub-national level to the workplace. It is of particular importance for an analysis such as the present focused on the characteristics of different levels of concertation and the relations among them.
If we add to this distinction the one relative to the origin of concerted initiatives already mentioned, in both the former case (reaction to failures) and the latter (proactive action to grasp opportunities), an initiative may be predominantly endogenous and bottom-up, or exogenous and top-down, in its origin.

On combining these two dimensions, we obtain four analytically distinct logics or patterns of local concertation as summarized in Figure 4.1.

**Figure 4.1 – Patterns of local concertation according to the predominant motivation and the origin of initiatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reaction to failures</th>
<th>Top-down</th>
<th>Bottom-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem-solving coalitions empowered by higher-level institutions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships as routinized forms of access to resources and opportunities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships for experimentation with unconventional concerted solutions to critical problems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships for innovation in local policy-making and policy-implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scheme is useful for our purposes because it is a first step in analysis of the relations between local partnerships and higher levels of government/governance.

It first highlights that situations can be identified where local-level concerted initiatives depend on higher-level ones (i.e. laws or directives, programmes, possibly pacts), as in the cases of the European or national programmes already mentioned (see the two left-hand quadrants in the figure); or situations where local initiatives are independent from higher-level ones, as in cases where the origin is endogenous (see the two right-hand quadrants in the figure).

Note that, whilst in the former case local initiatives are evidently prompted or directly stimulated by higher-level initiatives, it is not that in the latter case the actors operate in a normative and institutional vacuum: on the contrary, as we shall see, what counts is that they can use to their advantage, i.e. in pursuit of the partnership’s shared goals, the set of constraints and resources relative to their goals which derive from the normative and institutional context in which they are embedded. In other words, conditionings from above, beneficial or otherwise (Streeck 1997) are constantly at work; but in one case they are deliberate and direct; in the other they are unintentional and indirect.

But the scheme also suggests that it is necessary to distinguish, within this basic dichotomy, between initiatives (of exogenous or endogenous origin) undertaken to cope with the limitations, imperfections, and failures of consolidated and centralized ways to resolve critical problems, and initiatives undertaken to exploit opportunities and new resources which directly or indirectly become available.

Also from this point of view, the scheme raises the issue of the relations among different levels of governance. In the former case (the two upper quadrants in the scheme), initiatives will be more conditioned by the need to deal with some sort of emergency (due to the limitations...
of previous/centralized regulation), and will therefore seek to innovate the logic of the regulation locally; in the latter (the two lower quadrants), they will be more oriented to local acquisitive innovations in relation to resources or to opportunities directly or indirectly deriving from the centre. In both cases, local initiatives may develop either according to pre-established guidelines or within an ad hoc framework more oriented to invention and experimentation.

Note also that the former distinction (between initiatives in local concertation of exogenous or endogenous origin) mainly concerns the dynamics of actors’ strategies in relation to influence by the institutions (Avdagic, Rhodes and Visser 2005). In one case, the actors’ propensity and ability to cooperate will develop within a context of vertical articulation of the possibilities for action binding actors at different levels; in the other, they will develop within an institutional context with scant vertical articulation and in which the local actors’ interactivity and their ability to forge horizontal relations will be much more decisive (Crouch 1993).

The second distinction (the reactive or proactive logic of action) mainly concerns the contents of action. It has already been pointed out, following Streeck (2000), that in general local-level rather than national concertation mainly pursues competitive and productive advantages, rather than redistributive and protective ones. It can be added that, in cases most characterized by a reactive logic, most vigorous pursuit will be made of improvements in competitiveness deriving from a more efficient concerted regulation of economic-social processes, while in others it will be productive and occupational improvements deriving from additional access to resources and opportunities that are pursued.

I now briefly return to the three types of initiative identified according to their origin – and therefore according to whether an initiative stems mainly from a European programme, a national one, or an autonomous decision taken by local-level actors – while also briefly commenting on them in light of these considerations.

First, however, it should be pointed out that the scheme has been constructed with particular regard to the initial phases – promotion and constitution – of local concerted initiatives. Such initiatives may then evolve following logics different from the initial one, thus ‘shifting’ from one quadrant to the other. This amounts to imagining local concertation as an open process, however embedded in an institutional context, in which of particular importance are the strategies of the actors and interaction among them. Analysis of this process requires a distinction to be drawn between the more or less successful phases of partnership construction, and those involving the development, consolidation, and institutionalization of initiatives.

IV.3 European initiative programmes

The case of local concertation developed under European initiative programmes is of particular interest because these programmes are characterized by a strategy that grew increasingly explicit between the end of the 1980s and the early 2000s: the intentional top-down creation/promotion of local partnerships as both a method to implement social and development policies and as a criterion for access to structural funds, as part of a general endeavour to promote and reward innovative initiatives expected to engender virtuous processes of change by imitation.

In this respect, the European programmes seem entirely consistent with the ‘neo-voluntarist’ – as it has been called by Streeck (2000) – basis of the European social model, which combines the definition of general strategic goals (the fight against social exclusion, employment creation, and similar), to which resources are allocated, with the involvement (polycentric and competitive) of national and local governments in the devising of methods to pursue objec-
tives and allocate resources, rather than defining positive and universally applicable norms (see also Scharpf 1996).

In this model, local partnerships are devised as efficient means to implement EC policies as part of a process – promoted from above but which requires to be implemented from the bottom-up and pursued at intermediate levels of governance – with possible advantages for the various categories/levels of actors involved.

Advantages for the Commission may include:

1. the possibility of combining a distributive logic, whereby all member-states are eligible, with a competitive and meritocratic logic where of key importance is the quality of the local partnership (besides that of the project submitted) as a criterion for selecting among competitors in each country;  
2. the possibility of increasing an efficient and effective utilization of resources, reducing the risk of indiscriminate distributions;
3. avoidance of conflicts over the allocation of resources, in that responsibility for the selection of successful applicants is shifted downwards;
4. the possibility of developing and maintaining, in the programme implementation phase, direct relations with local communities mediated by the partnerships, which become the reference collective actor, avoiding the ‘filter’ of national bureaucracies when deemed appropriate.

Among the possible advantages for the government of member-countries of particular importance are:

1. the availability of additional resources in particularly critical areas (those of social policy);
2. the possibility to use European strategies as occasions to reorganize – also in terms of styles of governance – certain aspects of national policy-making.

All the more so in the case of local-level actors (these being the direct beneficiaries of programmes) European initiatives may be seen as additional and perhaps unforeseen – when new programmes are launched – external opportunities, to which access is sought by forming local coalitions.

This point requires however further elaboration. In much of the literature on territorial concertation in general and European programmes in particular, there is a more or less conscious tendency to view the process by which local pacts or partnerships are created as a sequence which starts with identification (by certain local actors) of a problem, proceeds with the search for a solution (during which an inter-actor coalition forms or begins to form), and concludes with the reaching (after discussions of varying duration) of agreements and the identification of the means (funds, management, implementation and monitoring bodies) with which to actuate them.

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18 See the TEPs programme of the late 1990s: all countries are eligible for funding of pacts for employment (and in fact the 89 experimental pacts approved since 1996 have been distributed among all the member-countries – see the list in the Appendix – regardless of the severity of their unemployment problems). The Commission selects from among cases submitted by governments.

19 The explicit reference is to European pacts for employment (TEPs), although the following considerations are probably more generally valid.

20 Note that it is owing to this – largely implicit – view of territorial concertation as an ordered sequence guided by a logic of functional coherence between means and ends, and in which the aim is to tackle critical prob-
In reality, however, it is likely that in a large part of this kind of cases the sequence operates in reverse. It is because unpredictable/unforeseen opportunities to obtain external resources, or to increase those already available, arise – and which cannot be taken into prior account because access to them is conditional on submitting a successful bid in a competition of uncertain outcome – that at local level, and on the initiative of certain well-informed actors, problems may be imagined and identified for which there exist potential solutions (see also Geddes 1998).

In other words, the logic is probably disordered and fuzzy logic à la March and Olsen (1989), which entails a radical revision of the way in which the problem is viewed and assessed.

Hypothetically, two main alternatives can be imagined:

1. At the local level, there already exist projects at a relatively advanced stage of development, and initiatives on matters of European interest (employment creation, renewal of degraded areas, rural development, etc.), which can be started up in concerted manner, as well as local coalitions – even at an embryonic stage – able to pursue them. In this case, the possibility of accessing European resources prompts implementation of some aspects of the projects, while at the same time strengthening or institutionalizing the already-existing local partnership. According to the profiles published on the INFoRegio website and other studies (McIlroy and Marginson 2006) it is this sequence that seemingly characterizes many TEPs in North European countries: especially in Denmark, Sweden, the UK;

2. No explicit project has yet emerged at local level, nor has a robust partnership developed (although there exists some form of local leadership or political entrepreneurship, without which any concerted initiative would be impossible). In this case, the opportunity to access European resources is the immediate cause of the endeavour to devise projects and to create an adequate local coalition. The case of the Albertville TEP (Mériaux and Laurent 2006) is perhaps an example.

Note that it may not necessarily follow in reality that situations of the former type are more likely to be successful than those of the latter type. Cases of both success and failure have been recorded relatively to the former type, also in entirely similar contexts (in the same country). Particularly interesting, for example, are two cases analysed by McIlroy and Marginson (2006) in the UK (see box 4.1.), in which the difference between outcomes seems due to differences in the interaction among significant local actors during the project institution-alization phase. As for the outcomes of the second type of situation (the one characterized by weak initial conditions, as exemplified by various Italian TEPs), we observe both the development of an ability by actors to extract ample profit from external opportunities, a learning capacity which will stimulate a more general process of innovation, and a propensity to use external resources in improvised and short-termed purely acquisitive manner (Cerase 2005).
Box 4.1: Two similar projects as part of two TEPs in UK: two different outcomes

The first case is that of the not-for-profit employment agency, Jobs Junction, set up under the Birmingham-Solihull-Black Country territorial employment pact. Conceived as an original and ambitious experiment in pooling labour supply, which on paper should have permitted innovative uses of temporary labour tailored to the particular needs of local demand and supply, some years later it had turned into a much smaller-scale agency, understaffed and with scant resources. Its purpose had been substantially reduced to the recruitment of personnel for the local airport after their personal characteristics had been screened for compliance with recently-introduced rules on airport security.

And yet demonstrating that the highly ambitious original project could have been successful is the fact that, at the time of the follow-up survey, a very similar programme (the ‘Runway to Work’ project established by the North London and Stansted Airport Partnership under the Tottenham territorial employment pact) was operating with considerable success in another part of the country with similar characteristics. The difference between the two projects seems to have been due to the different degrees of commitment to them by the local actors and authorities.

For details, see McIlroy and Marginson 2006

However, it is likely that the development of European supported programmes based on the requirement of the involvement of local partnerships, and subject to the competitive tendering mechanism, foster an instrumental use of partnerships, while engendering new functions and competences: those of experts in EC programmes.

It is also likely that, other factors remaining equal, the resources made available by programmes are allocated more according to the ability of local communities – or, better, local leaderships – to mobilize themselves than according to a classification drawn up on the basis of needs.

Studies assessing the outcomes of programmes concerted at local level – and the reference is again to TEPs – have often stressed the better performance of European programmes compared to similar ones promoted at national level, owing to their greater precision and prior definition of the procedures to follow, both in the design phase and in those of implementation and control (Cersosimo and Wolleb 2001). This is probably true and should be verified empirically. But it is probably also true that any better performance is due less to the precision of programmes than to the selection mechanisms for access to programmes, which tend to exclude applicants unable rapidly to mobilize the initial resources necessary to build the coalition, identify objectives, and prepare projects.

In short, in the case of European programmes, it is probable that a particularly important role is played by the initial local endowment of social capital and/or political-institutional leadership and/or technical-planning expertise (see also on this Staniscia 2003).

21 The criticisms of many observers concerning the limitations of local concertation instead centre on a tendency by local actors to reverse, à la Michels, the order between means and ends, so that the construction and maintenance of the partnership tends to be the ultimate aim of initiatives. It is likely that this tendency, that is common to organizations, especially representative ones, and causes frustrations for participants (especially militants), develops in these cases as well. However, it should be stressed that the point in these cases is that a local coalition with some chance of enduring must first be constructed, or even improvised, because this is a precondition required by external regulations: a local partnership, therefore, as an instrument which serves to obtain something else.

22 In this regard, of particular importance may be the role performed by national governments: e.g., whether they provide support and lobbying action during the tendering phase (but with what candidate selection procedures?), or whether they furnish technical assistance and know-how, or else intervene in some other way in support of local communities.
Overall, according to what we have observed, these are cases of local level concerted initiatives promoted/encouraged from above and undertaken to gain access, according to a competitive logic, to extra opportunities and resources (European social and structural funds) made available for social policy and development programmes.

They therefore pertain to the lower-left quadrant in the above scheme, in which partnerships are routinized forms of access to resources and opportunities.

IV.4 National programmes

Also territorial concertation programmes – which in regard to matters often analogous to those addressed by European programmes have developed in several European countries on initiative by the centre (see Section 3.2. above) – offer local societies additional opportunities, more or less foreseen/predictable, to obtain external support for their development or for social cohesion.

The fact that such programmes are not undertaken in all the European countries raises however the problem of why in some cases they have been. In other words, the question concerns the advantages expected to accrue to national governments, or to other actors which have taken the joint initiative, from encouraging the development of forms of local concertation, other conditions remaining equal. Answering this question may yield information on the conditions in which it is more likely that these kinds of programme will develop.

Taking account of the considerations made earlier, one can imagine three main different types of advantages for national governments.

1. One is the possibility to shift downwards to local level the search for solutions to problems which – especially in a situation of diminishing state resources – are difficult to address in concerted manner at the centre, because they are fraught with antagonism and therefore liable to provoke strong resistance and deadlock among the central interest organizations, or in their relations with their members. From this point of view, local concertation appears to be a socially more practicable form of governance than its central counterpart. An example may be provided by the development of regional-pacts after the failure of the Bündnis für Arbeit and of the Allianz für Arbeit, in Germany.

2. A second advantage is the possibility to enhance, by decentralizing the level of action, abilities to deal with complex issues requiring the deployment of local knowledge or requiring solutions differentiated according to the circumstances. From this point of view, local concertation appears to be a more efficient and effective form of governance than its central counterpart. Examples may be the various local pacts for employment promoted in Spain by the Comunidades Autónomas within the framework of the central government’s policies for employment. A further example is the development of so-called ‘negotiated planning’ in Italy in relation to national-level pacts: the pact for employment of 1996 and the Christmas Pact of 1998. The latter explicitly stated the intent to make widespread use of local-level concertation in order to deal with the numerous and diverse problems of a complex society and economy.

3. A third possibility may reside, vice versa, in the interest of the national government in backing, regulating in uniform manner, and generalizing experiments in local concertation which have arisen in free and uncoordinated ways as responses to local needs for which suitable national intervention does not (yet) exist. Contrary to the other two cases, in this one the original design of initiatives does not originate from above, but from below. The central government may find it convenient to take over the decentralized initiative, give it greater stability, and equip it with resources, as a way to demonstrate its interest in renew-
ing the traditional policy-making process by remedying its shortcomings, and/or as a more advantageous and efficient way to address complex issues. An example is again provided by the first legislation on territorial pacts in Italy, which came prior to the above-mentioned legislation of top-down origin, that legitimated the first concerted experiences arisen from below. Another example is the already cited programme of Local Strategic Partnerships in the UK, which drew on good results independently achieved at local level.

In general, one may hypothesise that the likelihood of local concertation schemes developing on the central government’s initiative is, at least in part, inversely correlated with the characteristics (adequacy, degree of articulation, development and success) of the intervention, and of previous public policies, especially social and in regard to the labour market. Although, this is of course only part of the story.

Bearing in mind the discussion thus far, the local concertation supported by these kinds of programmes tends to pertain to the model constituted by the upper-right quadrant in figure 4.1: the one which we have said is characterized by the search for solutions better suited to complex problems through the shifting of concerted initiatives to lower levels.

In these cases, too, the above considerations concerning European initiatives apply to local actors, the direct beneficiaries of programmes. In these cases, too, access to programmes is a major additional opportunity, albeit one conditioned by the uncertainty of the tendering process. However, the requirement of the prior existence of an adequate local partnership, or the ability to create one rapidly, is probably less stringent. And it is probably easier to influence and control decisions on the allocation of resources at the central level.

The fact remains that national programmes, too, tend to encourage a local mobilization of actors which is at least to some extent bureaucratized (in the sense that it has to comply with rules and procedures laid down by national norms) and conditional on the possibility of obtaining external resources (subject to considerable uncertainty over availability and payment schedules).

Moreover, the extent to which this will generate an ability to transform a one-off occasion into an opportunity for longer-term innovation it is by no means determined by the characteristics of the programme, but it will presumably depend on the characteristics of local endowment of resources, combined with a learning process driven by the interaction among the actors.

**IV.5 Endogenous initiatives**

Those considered thus far are situations in which recourse to local-level concertation is part of programmes for economic-social intervention promoted by higher levels of government. This is therefore structured concertation conditioned from outside. As such, the logic of behaviour by actors will, at least initially, be profoundly different from that of actors involved in concertation processes as a matter of choice, and which select this among other possible courses of action – as happens in the case of social pacts at national level\(^{23}\) but also of micro-concertation at company level (Regini 1995). In these cases of ‘dependent’ local concertation, the logic of the interaction and the cooperative game among the actors may seem at odds with

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\(^{23}\) It is true, for instance, that in Italy the social pacts of the 1990s were reached under pressure to meet the Maastricht criteria, which therefore conditioned the actors’ behaviour from above (Regini and Regalia 1997; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). But these were conditionings or (beneficial) constraints that pushed for innovation and change, but in themselves did not involve concertation.
the stereotyped image of concertation as a way to decide based mainly on the free search for agreement among actors with conflicting interests.

Matters are different – and come close to this last situation – in cases where concertation is undertaken on the initiative of local-level promoters, public or private. In these cases the initiatives will be markedly heterogeneous and unpredictable, and also difficult to document, as we have already seen.

Yet these are the cases that we can hypothesise as most closely matching the potential of local concertation as a policy-making and policy-implementation method suited to the management of crucial or critical problems in specific local contexts.

These are the cases in which the partnership method may prove most efficient in addressing issues perceived by local actors as critical, or at any rate as requiring particular attention, and in yielding appropriate solutions, if necessary by circumventing the standard practice (i.e. by running round or counter to standard or routine solutions).

In other words, these are probably the most innovative programmes as regards both problem-setting and problem-solving (see also Cersosimo 1998), ones not yet structured or structured to only a limited extent, suited to experimentation, and to the cooperative development of innovative solutions (Regalia 1998).

However, they are cases where the requirements for success are the most stringent, since needed are the presence of an authoritative and reliable leadership, the ability to set up a sufficiently wide partnership including all relevant local actors, the identification of commonly accepted rules of the game, the patient use of deliberative decision-making processes based on principled discussion through which some sort of shared understanding of the situation and then shared agreement on what has to be done may be achieved (Bobbio 2004). They are “sword-less pacts”, as they have been called (Perulli 2004), where consensus is sought through persuasion, and the risk of exit, and subsequent breakdown of the coalition, is ever-present.

Concertation schemes that arise within local contexts rather than being induced from outside are characterized by the need constantly to identify and define procedures and modes of operation, the reference legal framework, and the resources deployable by the participants or which can be accessed by making new use of already-existing programmes.

Then, once the process has been set in motion, it can evolve in different ways. According to the case, it may peter out with attainment of the goal (as envisaged by the theorists of soft regulation); but it may prolong the experience through a process of institutionalization whereby the original project may be even profoundly transformed.

It seems evident that it is in this area that one should look for situations that pertain to the two right-hand quadrants in the scheme (see fig. 4.1). Located in the upper quadrant are processes of local concertation which experiment with unconventional concerted solutions in reaction to critical problems. In the lower quadrant are processes that constitute occasions for innovation in local policy-making and policy implementation.

It is this latter case that comes closest to open, strongly inclusive, deliberative democracy which seeks to exploit the potential of the horizontal linkages among different issues that favour innovation.
V. Some examples: local concertation for development and employment

V.1 One field, many forms of intervention

If, by way of example, we concentrate on the particularly broad field of local-level concerted initiatives for development, and in particular those for employment, we find all three types of programme discussed thus far, but distributed unevenly across the European countries.

The form of territorial pacts for employment of European origin (TEPs) is present, as already said, in all the countries of the EU. But not so the other forms: neither initiatives promoted by national programmes, nor those of endogenous origin.

However, as repeatedly pointed out, there is at present insufficient information to say with certainty in what cases initiatives of one or other type have been realized, or even only attempted. Consequently, generalizations cannot be drawn from this brief analysis. Anyhow, it may help to answer not so much the first question from which we started – the specific features of concertation at sub-national level – as the second – the relations among the various levels of concertation.

V.2 TEPs of European origin

Territorial employment pacts (TEPs) of European origin, introduced experimentally in 1996 and then re-proposed in a new form for the period 2000-2006, constitute a model of territorial concertation which has been adopted in all the countries of the EU. From this point of view, they represent a case of intentional institutional innovation and construction of a uniform model, initially of experimental type, for concerted action. One may consequently enquire as to whether this strategy has helped harmonize forms of in-the-field intervention.

A territorial employment pact can be defined as an agreement among several public and private actors to undertake joint initiatives to improve the employment situation and development of the territory in which they operate (Staniscia 2003: 59).

In operational terms, according to the EU regulations, first to be identified when a pact is drawn up is the target territorial area. The programme may cover all areas with serious problems of unemployment, and therefore all those to which EU structural policies apply. Identifying the specific territory – which must be of supra-municipal but sub-regional size – is the task of the initiative’s proponents. The national government then selects the territories to admit to the programme (either by inviting applications or by making its own proposals) and then informs the Commission.

The second stage is definition of the local partnership. This should be as broad as possible, so as to involve all the main actors concerned with job creation in the area. Their participation – one reads in the EU documents – should not be purely formal or merely to make up numbers: each partner should be determined to undertake specific tasks. The partnership must be based on a shared view of the territory’s problems defined by agreement among the partners and not imposed by some of them. It should consequently take the form of a horizontal structure in which all participants have equal status. The public authorities perform the key role of promoters of the process and mediators among the partners. In other words, they act super partes with the task of ensuring that all is in place to facilitate the concertation process.

Finally, the development strategy should spring bottom-up from concertation among the partners. It should be innovative and seek new solutions to the problem of unemployment in the local area, paying particular attention to weak target groups and sectors, especially in services with high potential for employment growth (culture, the environment, research, information...
technologies, education, training). To be noted finally is that this new Community programme does not qualify for independent funding, but draws on the Structural Funds and other Community programmes, and requires co-financing by public and private sectors, national and local (for a detailed analysis of the entire process, see Staniscia 2003: 58 ff.).

Table 7.1 (in the Appendix), compiled from the official figures published on the Regional Policy-Inforegio website (Europe Innovation-2000 2001), sets out summary data on the distribution of the 89 pacts among the 15 EU member-countries which had been authorised by the end of the 1990s, the number of new jobs foreseen, the total budgets for each pact, and the European funding for them, while it does not give information on the target areas relative to individual pacts.

Even rapid inspection shows that there is no evident match between the amount of funding and the number of new jobs foreseen, nor between the total budget and European funding. Italy stands out from the other countries both for the presence of two pacts for which no European financial contribution is envisaged (because ineligible for various reasons) and for its high level of European grants.

Careful analysis of the available data has not only highlighted marked differences among the member states on all the parameters considered (Staniscia 2003: 80 ff), but has also discovered a number of somewhat unexpected results. One is the greater likelihood that pacts will be created in more dynamic areas, at least in terms of local organizational resources. Another is that in some countries (Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, France) one finds pacts in areas in which the unemployment rate is below (rather than above) the European average. Moreover, the connection between the investments foreseen and unemployment rates appears to be highly variable, and generally unpredictable. Also markedly differentiated is the EU’s participation in funding, which seems unconnected with the investments envisaged per inhabitant.

Among the factors probably most responsible for these differences, particularly important seems to be an area’s previous experience of self-organizing: in other words, other conditions remaining equal, areas with already-existing organizational resources tend to obtain more funding.

Analysis of the action plans adopted by pacts reveal marked heterogeneity among the strategies proposed. In general, the majority of projects pursue three macro-objectives: development of the local production system; enhancement of human resources; improvement of infrastructures. The first of these objectives has attracted the largest amount of investments, estimated at almost 60% of the total. The third objective is the one which is on average least developed (only 17% of the total). But the differences among countries are considerable. According to the statements accompanying action plans, human resources enhancement and combating social exclusion are given particular priority in the Scandinavian countries, while development of the local production system is the main concern of the UK and Ireland. In the countries of central and southern Europe, where investments concern all three objectives, human resources enhancement and training are most important in the Netherlands and Austria, but also in Portugal and Spain, whilst greater attention is paid to development of the production system and infrastructures in Germany, France and Italy (Staniscia 2003: 89-90).

If one instead considers the processes of partnership definition/creation and relationships with the central government, apparent in the case of the North European countries is more explicit regulation by the centre, and a greater emphasis on the valorisation of local partnerships already well-established within active labour policy programmes. The case of other countries is different – Italy and Spain in particular – where creation of a local partnership may instead be the outcome of a new process in which control and coordination by the centre is less evident.
One gains the impression that the European programme, especially in the former cases, should be viewed as an opportunity to obtain additional resources which does not substantially alter an already-existing set of (well-functioning) interventions, and which does not necessarily require use of the concertation method to intervene in the labour market, rather than as a catalyst of change.

This impression is reinforced by the data of a Swedish study assessing *Partnership Arrangements in Employment Policies in Europe* (Håkansson and Pauloff 2002) in which pacts for employment are not even mentioned, except with reference to Greece and the Netherlands. This is rather surprising, especially if one considers that – as said earlier – a regional development policy and the local-level concertation connected with it have been recently and closely connected with Sweden’s entry into the EU in 1995, with consequent eligibility for Structural Funds; and also if one considers that it is precisely Sweden which has launched an innovative scheme as a cross-border pact (with Denmark) (see box 5.1. below).

The scant importance given to European territorial pacts by the Swedish study is indicative of a more general feature: the scant attention paid to European territorial pacts by large part of the literature on active labour policies, apart from European Community publications or studies explicitly devoted to the theme of territorial concertation, especially in Italy and Spain (Cersosimo and Wolleb 2001; Rosetti, Lope, and Gibert 2002; De Magistris et al. 2004; Gambaro 2004; Trigilia 2005; Rocha Sánchez 2005).

It is difficult to say at the present state of knowledge whether this reticence indicates that programmes are actually of little importance, or whether they have low visibility in national public discussions, probably because they are likened to programmes of domestic origin. Particularly illuminating in this regard is the pact of Albertville, in France, studied by Mériaux, because in this case even the formal head of the pact tended to include the initiative within the framework of local labour policies of national origin, rather than acknowledging its European origin (Mériaux and Duclos 2006). Whatever the case may be, this conflicts with the positive evaluations, in terms both quantitative (expected number of new jobs, comparatively low average cost of creating new jobs) and qualitative (capacity to develop a virtuous mobilization of local resources), by European Commission reports (see also Staniscia 2003) – to the point that, after a first appraisal of the results, in 1999 it was decided to make greater use of this approach in the new period of structural fund planning for 2000-2006 (European Commission 1999a).

The apparent exceptions in this general scenario are Italy and Spain, in both of which countries, according to the above-cited studies, European territorial pacts are generally considered to produce more satisfactory results than national territorial pacts: they are more efficient owing to a better endowment of procedural resources and technical assistance (Italy), or because they are better able to set a change process in motion, also by virtue of the larger amount of funds made available (Spain and in particular Catalonia).

One may therefore conclude that the form of programmes and their importance tend to vary according to the characteristics of policies for employment and development of individual countries and the ways in which they are regulated at the moment when the programme was introduced.
### Box 5.1 The Öresund Territorial Employment Pact

#### The constitution process
The Territorial Employment Pact of the Öresund region was established in 1998 by the public labour offices of Sweden and Denmark in order to address common labour-market problems accentuated by construction of the bridge across the strait separating the two countries. However, the TEP received Community funding only for the Swedish part of the project.

The Partners were the central governments of Sweden and Denmark (which took decisions and allocated resources), the local public employment offices of the Öresund region (which implemented the guidelines laid down by the central governments), representatives of the social partners already present in the decision-making bodies of the local public employment offices, the local and regional authorities (which implemented the guidelines issued by the governments, albeit with autonomy on certain matters), universities and institutes of higher education (key actors in regard to technology innovation and labour force training).

The main objective was to integrate the labour markets of the two countries. Specifically, the following goals were established: a) increase labour mobility through the greater availability of information; b) increase employment through training and placement schemes targeted on the long-term unemployed; spread knowledge of job opportunities in the Öresund labour market.

#### Structure, operation and results
The TEP has given rise to a formalized structure: the Öresund transnational Coordination Committee, the function of which is to foster integration between the decision-making processes of the two countries, which differ greatly in terms of the decentralization of their respective state structures (in Denmark, decisions are taken only at the state level, while the local level is more influential in Sweden). The Committee does not have effective powers. Its function is instead to create a climate of trust between actors in the two countries. A Secretariat has been created within the Committee which cooperates with the Labour Market Council of the Öresund region.

Sources of Funding mobilized by the agreement are: 1. national public grants; 2. EU grants (structural funds financing objectives 3 and 4); 3. resources of the local public employment offices of Malmö and Vestsjaelland.

The TEP implementation procedure has involved 1. information and counselling for unemployed workers and firms on both sides of the Öresund strait; 2. creation of four employment offices, two on each side of the strait, which also collaborate through job rotation schemes; 3. dissemination of information about the labour market on both sides of the strait; 4. identification of future ‘bottlenecks’ in the region’s labour market.

The most important results achieved by this TEP are: 1. increased cooperation between the local public employment offices of the two countries; 2. the creation of four employment offices; 3. increased labour mobility between the two countries.

#### Final assessment
This TEP is unique in that it is based on cross-border cooperation.

The strengths observed are the pact’s effect of creating stronger linkages among firms, public authorities (to be noted in particular are joint training courses for Swedish and Danish workers), social organizations on both sides of the strait; and the pact’s capacity to stimulated the interest of actors not previously involved (small and medium-sized firms, young people).

Weaknesses reported by the actors involved are the differences between the public administrative and decision-making process of the two countries, which have hampered the pact’s implementation. Therefore, one of the scheme’s most interesting features is also a factor which impedes its complete success.

Source: www.oresund.com/oresund/creation/territorial.htm
V.3 National programmes

In many EU countries, national initiative programmes (which in federal countries include ‘regional’ programmes – i.e., those conducted at the level of the Land in Germany and Comunidad Autónoma in Spain) have originated independently of European ones. But since the end of the 1990s they have often interwoven with the latter in a manner difficult to disentangle without careful ad hoc analysis.

I have already pointed out that policies for local development promoted by the centre, and which involve forms of public/private partnership, have a long and specific tradition in the UK. And other examples of national (or regional) programmes for development and employment which incentivise or regulate forms of local concertation have been reported in several other countries (Germany, Ireland, Austria, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden).

However, it is especially in Italy (and to a lesser extent in Spain) that the development of this kind of national policy programme termed ‘negotiated planning’, has spread widely, becoming for many years a central – and controversial – issue of political debate, as well as being an important topic for reflection and prediction of concertation’s potential (Carrieri 2001; Regini 2000; Trigilia 2005). This is a program that has developed, and partly changed, over time, in stages corresponding to the sequence of legislative provisions that have defined the requisites and the characteristics of the projects devised through concertation at local level to gain access to funding made available by the central government.

Initially conceived to replace extraordinary intervention by the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (the Southern Development Fund, which was terminated in 1992), and therefore allocated only to the Objective 1 areas of the South of Italy, the programme was then extended to the Objective 2 and 5b areas of the Centre-North Consequently, whilst the first pacts were all located in the southern regions, subsequently they spread through the rest of the country (see Table 5.1).

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In Italy, the development of so-called ‘negotiated planning’ has been accompanied by sometimes fierce debate on the real potential of the method. See in particular the highly negative assessment by the economist Nicola Rossi (2002).
Table 5.1. – National Territorial Pacts in Italy, by year of activation, geographical zone, funding envisaged (millions of Euros)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of pact</th>
<th>Year of activation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>of which</th>
<th>Funding envisaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Centre-</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I generation</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II generation</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory In-</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quiry 2001*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministero Attività Produttive, Ministero Economia e Finanze

* The last category includes the pacts for which the preparatory inquiries concluded in 2001 but whose funding was allocated by the Budget Law for 2003.

** Not counted in the distribution of pacts between Centre-North and South are the 11 most recent pacts, for which the figure is not available.

To give an idea of the magnitude, at least on paper, of the phenomenon, one observes that, according to official estimates, in the space of about ten years around one half of the national territory has been involved in pacts, albeit in unequal measure: around one third in Centre-North and 80% circa in the South.

For the reasons, goals, characteristics, normative process, and assessments of negotiated planning, and on the main instruments with which it was implemented – territorial pacts and area contracts – I refer the reader to the numerous studies available.

To be emphasised here is firstly that negotiated planning becomes part of a process which previously had generated forms of local concertation of substantially endogenous origin (various kinds of pacts and partnerships in the northern and central regions, territorial pacts established on the initiative of the Cnel-National council of economy and labour-in the country’s southern regions) (Viscomi 2001; Caruso 2002; Costantini 2004); and secondly that negotiated planning has been interpreted and discussed on the one hand as a novel way to address the problem of local development, and on the other as a particular form of concertation, which differs both from other kinds of local concertation and from the national concertation of social pacts.

From the former perspective, i.e. negotiated planning as a novel way to view and target development (Bolocan Goldstein et al 2000; Pichierri 2002; Trigilia 2005), the emphasis is on the potential for bottom-up rather than top-down development, and therefore on the active involvement of the various local-level actors, which are encouraged to create new coalitions – “artificial local economic systems”, as they have been called (Cersosimo 1998) – as opposed to traditional development policies governed from the centre without the involvement of local...
societies (Trigilia 1992). The assumption is that it is possible to generate so to speak ‘arti-
ficially’, i.e. through the political initiative, conditions favourable to the endogenous develop-
ment of local economies similar to those that historically, and so to speak ‘naturally’, have
fostered the endogenous development of certain local contexts (industrial districts), thereby
overcoming the limitations of traditional policies of centralized intervention. On this view,
local concertation is response to the failures of the policies of national governments.

From the other perspective, i.e. negotiated planning as a particular form of concertation, in the
literature the stress is on the ‘logic’ of this specific type of concertation constituted by negoti-
ated planning and its relations with concertation at other levels.

As to the former point, the essential aspect is that this form of territorial concertation – as
codified by a series of legislative measures enacted since 1996 to establish the procedure for
tendering for public funds – becomes over time something different from the original inten-
tions of the first promoters of pacts in the early 1990s (De Rita 1998; CSAR 2000), when the
initiative was largely endogenous.

Note that the distinction between pacts of local-endogenous origin and pacts of external origin
does not solely concern the actor taking the initiative: it also concerns the characteristics of
the decision-making process that leads to creation of the local coalition (because the latter is
different if the decision is unconstrained by norms or if it is taken in a context which encour-
gages coalition-forming) and the issues that will most probably be addressed (given that the
participants will be induced to give priority to the issues more or less explicitly stated by the
regulations). It is significant, for example, that a study on the Piedmont scheme (CSAR 2000)
finds that the theme of vocational training tends to disappear or to move into the background
in plans subsequent to the national formalization of 1996 with respect to those drawn up pre-
viously, because the new regulations do not foresee funding for this purpose. It is subse-
quently, in the phases of realization and institutionalization of pacts, that the objectives may
be redefined and adjusted according to local needs, as the outcome of interaction among the
actors. To this should be added – and this is not of marginal importance – that on the other
hand the value added of pacts approved by the centre is that of being able to use (extra) fund-
ing from outside.26

The second point concerns relations with the national level of concertation. It should be
stressed that the question has not yet been clearly defined.

On the one hand, it has been pointed out that the tripartite national agreement of July 1993
already envisaged territorial concertation on employment issues,27 and that further references
have been subsequently made by the Pact for Employment of 1996, and especially the
Christmas Pact of 1998,28 which explicitly recommended local concertation as a method with
which to tackle the development and employment problems of local societies (Costantini
2004).

26 Discussion of the financing of negotiated planning pacts would be beyond the scope of this study. It should
be borne in mind, however, that the law foresees relatively minor disbursement by the government (no more
than 51 million Euros) and with limits on its use (no more than 30% can be allocated to infrastructural in-
vestments). The intent is a) to prioritize productive investments, ii) to select projects avoiding the indiscrimi-
nate distribution of incentives, iii) to stimulate the provision of resources by the participants.

27 One may also cite a previous agreement on tripartite concertation for development in the Mezzogiorno
(Michelacci 200 ).

28 On the social pacts of the 1990s in Italy, see Regini (2000; 2003); Regalia and Regini (2004).
On the other hand, the development of negotiated planning seems to have proceeded in parallel with these recommendations, rather than being just connected with them. Nor does one observe explicit relations between one level and another, like those, for example, between the various levels of collective bargaining in the case of coordinated decentralized bargaining. On the contrary, as repeatedly pointed out, one also finds relations of opposite sign, in the sense that national provisions on negotiated planning have the tendency to take up practices in the design of local-level initiatives for development and generalize them, standardize them, and endow them with resources. To the point that one can imagine that they also influenced the social pacts of the end of the 1990s.

We may therefore conclude (tentatively) that local concertation has tended to develop in the shadow of the cooperative logic of the national-level agreements of the early 1990s, of which in a broad sense it is a complement or articulation, but distributed erratically and on a voluntary basis. And that on the other hand it has partly influenced the contents and approach of the national pacts of the late 1990s.

In the case of Spain – on which, however, the literature is much less abundant – it seems that during the 1990s concerted agreements for employment creation (in addition to pacts of European origin) were reached in all the autonomous communities, and connected to them were numerous local pacts of more restricted scope (González et al. 2005). The same source reports a series (although declaredly incomplete) of territorial pacts in force in 2004 in several autonomous communities. A more systematic picture is provided by another study based on trade-union surveys which reports for the same period the presence of employment pacts in all the autonomous communities (Rocha Sánchez 2005). It is significant that, for example, at the website of the government of Catalonia territorial employment pacts are currently (2007) described as consolidated instruments of active labour policies.

This suggests that in Spain the use of pacts has become, at least on paper, a widespread, consolidated and hierarchically ordered method for the local-level management of employment policies; policies, note, for which competence has only recently been devolved to the autonomous communities from central government.

According to the existing literature, in Spain this development has been largely (though not exclusively: see Section 3.1. above) stimulated by European employment policy and by the TEPs of the 1990s. In particular, at present it should be set in relation to the new method of managing European structural funds which gives priority to regional structures (see also Lope and Gibert 2006).

From this point of view, as regards the relations among levels of concertation, the Spanish case is the one that comes closest the model that we earlier called ‘specialized vertical integration’. In this case, the hierarchical integration tends to develop from bottom up (not only among local pacts and pacts at the level of autonomous communities, but also toward the level of agreements for employment with the central government and the supranational one of European policies for employment) and sometimes top downwards (as documented by studies on the influence of local concertation on micro-concertation at firm level) (Lope and Gibert 2006).

These considerations concerning the new modes of recourse to European structural funds bring us to a more general observation (already adumbrated) on concerted programmes of national origin: namely that in the early 2000s the distinction between programmes of national/regional origin and ones of European origin is more difficult to draw because the European plan for 2000-2006 provides for the active involvement of the regions in the use of structural funds.
Illuminating in this regard is the information set out in Table 7.2 (in the Appendix), which summarises data published by Forumpartnerships2005 (which can be accessed from the OECD website). These data concern ongoing partnership initiatives autonomously reported by their heads and promoters, connected together in a sort of transnational exchange network, and who periodically organize seminars and discussion sessions. One can easily notice that distinctions relative to the origin of programmes have become in many cases blurred, and probably irrelevant.

Finally to be observed is that the same sources just cited (Forumpartnerships 2005, and previous editions) suggest that it is necessary to highlight a tendency whose range and potential for development cannot yet be evaluated but which is certainly of notable interest. I refer to the tendency by the promoters of local initiatives to seek to establish horizontal, rather than vertical, relations with those responsible for similar initiatives. I shall return to this topic in the conclusions.

V.4 Initiatives of autonomous origin

I conclude with brief observations on the last type of concerted programmes: those of endogenous or autonomous origin (independently of external programmes), which have been developed according to extensive participative practices and have sometimes approached the model of deliberative democracy, that is, based on the logic of argument until conviction (Elster 1998; Bobbio 2005).

Precisely because they do not depend on external guidelines, programmes and funding, but are voluntary initiatives, they assume – at least initially – the highly heterogeneous and diversified form of ad hoc arrangements for solving specific problems, and for addressing issues perceived by local actors as critical and which depend on the willingness to cooperate of strongly motivated actors.

Although these concerted initiatives are often very efficacious in dealing with emergencies, they are likely to differ greatly in their capacity to consolidate by transforming themselves into stable partnerships centred on goals extending beyond the immediate crisis. Nor, for that matter, is it always necessary that this should happen.

In Italy this broad category comprises the early territorial pacts stipulated in the Mezzogiorno before legislation regulated them within the framework of negotiated planning. Above all, it comprises the many agreements reached by local administrations, social partners, and other local actors (at the level of the region, province, district, or consortium of municipalities) in the past 15 to 20 years in order to tackle specific problems in a specific territorial area: the decline of an industrial district, the crisis of a large company, an employment emergency, new problems connected with immigration or the growth of new forms of employment, and the like. Note that the use of pacts of this kind does not seem to have diminished in more recent years, when the reasons favouring the reaching of national-level pacts have seemingly faded; in these cases, one may say that they continue to be an alternative, however scattered, fragmented and erratic, to centralized concerted solution to critical issues.

Following Viscomi (2001), we can distinguish between concerted arrangements a of integrative, experimental or innovative type according to whether the local actors seek consensually

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29 At least not in the sense of those that are part of structured external programmes.

30 For a list of local concertation initiatives undertaken externally to national programmes in Lombardy alone, see Bolocan Goldstein, Pasqui and Perulli (2002). Other cases are in Ballarino (2006), Bortolotti and Giaccone (2006).
to achieve their economic and/or occupational objectives through a more efficient combination of the existing (contractual or legislative) norms, or through experimentation with new ways to interpret and to apply such norms, or finally through seeking to modify them. Which suggests the dynamics by which institutional innovations can take place through micro decisions taken within given contexts (see also Streeck and Thelen 2005). According to this distinction, cases of integration pacts are, again in Italy, the social pact of Sibari, or the concertation committees of Naples and Rome. Experimentation pacts are the local pact for employment of Ferrara, or the pact for the work integration of immigrants in Veneto. Finally, innovation pacts are the agreement in the lower Ionian area, or the so-called pact for Milan (Bolocan Goldstein, Pasqui, and Perulli 2000; Regalia 2002).

In Germany, examples of concerted initiatives strongly embedded in the territorial context are the Dortmund and the Nürnberg projects launched in the mid-1990s and still active.\(^31\) Both are cases of local-level cooperation within regional structural policies, but they constitute different varieties of local concertation intended to modernize the ‘German Model’ on the initiative of strong local trade unions. Both are cases of local-level cooperation within regional structural policies, but they constitute different varieties of local concertation intended to modernize the ‘German Model’ on the initiative of strong local trade unions. While central to the Nürnberg initiative is restructuring of the old industrial system and workplace modernization, the Dortmund-project aims at creating new leader companies in the IT, micro-systemic technologies and logistics sectors, after the demise of the traditional triad of coal, steel and beer industries. While the Nürnberg approach relies on an incremental structural change, the Dortmund-project tries to encourage radical structural change.

A different example again in Germany is the local partnership project Altmärkisches Aufbauwerk Apenburg e.V. (Lieb 2001), launched in 1993 by a group of local entrepreneurs and politicians to promote the development of a declining area of the former GDR.

In the UK, a cited recent example is the Birmingham and Solihull Economic and Development Forum, established in 2004 to follow on from a previous scheme (McIlroy and Marginson 2006). To be mentioned are also two innovative schemes in the industrial relations field: the West Midlands Employment Relations Forum, and the Employee Relations Forum for Yorkshire and Humber, which are informal networks comprising representatives of public services, human resources managers from local firms, trade unionists, representatives of employers’ associations, labour lawyers, academics, with the aim of fostering good employment relations through the exchange of information, the undertaking of research, and discussion of best practices.\(^32\) Again in the UK, another interesting example of a local initiative to make efficient use of available norms and programmes, according to what we have called an integrative logic, is the Tower Hamlets Partnership (London). This scheme, which aims to promote the economic and social welfare system of a disadvantaged area, divides into sub-projects (Local Area Partnerships, Community Plan Action Groups) and uses funds from the Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy (OECD-LEED 2006).

Also in Sweden there have developed endogenous forms of local concertation which some time constitute the bases for subsequent more structured initiatives. One example is the partnership which would later become the promoting core of the Territorial Employment Pact for the area of Strömstad. This was a partnership among local firms set up in 1996 initially as

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\(^{31}\) Interviews to Bernd Rötter and Klaus Dörre (University of Jena), January 2007.

\(^{32}\) For information, see [http://www.erforum.org.uk/index.htm](http://www.erforum.org.uk/index.htm) (for the employee relations forum for Yorkshire and Humber); and [http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/research/irru](http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/research/irru) (website of the Industrial Relations Research Unit of Warwick University, for the West Midlands Employment Relations Forum).
a simple forum for the exchange of ideas, but which already in 1997 was structured into a non-profit association of 34 firms (public and private).

Particularly articulated and innovative is the partnership created in the province of Småland, characterized by the presence of numerous small and medium-sized firms. In this area, on the initiative of not only 69 firms but also of the local metalworkers and clerical workers unions, created in 1996 was the Gnosjö Industrial Development Centre. This is a non-profit organization which finances projects in technological innovation out of public funds and reinvests all proceeds in its own initiatives. It also collaborates with training schemes by matching demand by firms with supply from schools and universities. One of the most successful projects is the Learning Network Programme launched in 1997 to intensify relationships among firms in the area with a view to transferring experience, skills and organizational models from medium-sized firms to small ones. Also part of the network are the unions, universities and the Arbetsslivsinstitutet (National Institute for Working Life) (Barbera 2004: 145; Brulin 1998).

This last case is a good example of many other initiatives of local origin: those individual initiatives taken in diverse local settings on disparate issues, which have given rise to agencies, consortia, stable bi-multilateral bodies. Other examples are, in Italy, the CAAM consortium or the Leccolavoro and Forum Nord Milano agencies in Lombardy (Ballarino 2006), the FIL centre for training and employment services in Tuscany (Bortotolly and Giaccone 2006). Or again, the Coventry Clothing Resource Centre in West Midlands, UK (McIlroy and Marginson 2006).

The field is therefore very extensive, and only some examples have been cited here. And by definition is characterized by the variety of arrangements.

The distinctive features of individual cases aside, the diverse experiences of local concertation that develop externally to programmes structured from outside him can nevertheless be divided into three main types according to the functions performed and of the degree of stability in initiatives.

A first type (which in Italy is recorded mainly regional level or in big cities) is that of general pacts, or forums, between local administrations and social partners and concerned with development and employment. These often only amount to joint declarations of intent and mutual commitments on the minimum procedures to be followed in cases of difficulty or crisis. What counts is that parties concur on defining consensually a stable space for discussion and negotiation, to be activated when necessary, and in which occasions for the exchange of information and points of view can be promoted.

A second type (opposite to the previous one) is that of initiatives undertaken to tackle specific problems which need to be addressed rapidly: the crisis of a firm, support for particular groups in difficulties (immigrants, the long-term unemployed, elderly workers, and the like), the launching of specific programmes functional to the local economy and labour market (e.g. in the field of vocational training). What counts in this case it is the ability to deal with the problem effectively. Once the emergency has subsided, the concertation experience may peter out, or instead turn into a stable initiative. Which takes us to the third type.

This last type consists of stable, institutionalized initiatives (like the first type) but geared to operational intervention (like the second type). This is the case of the agencies, consortia, and other stable forms of organized concertation discussed earlier. And it is the type which seems to be acquiring an important role in the local management of economic and social policies in many countries.
VI. Conclusions

In this concluding section I shall return to the point from which I began, and to the questions that were posed at the outset.

The point of departure was the observation of the widespread diffusion of concertative methods for the solution of economic and social problems at sub-national level, sometimes in addition to recourse to the logic of national-level and workplace concertation. There are also, of course, the soft governance approaches adopted at European level in regard to social policies. These last have not been discussed here (except very indirectly, and mainly in relation to the European TEPs programme), and in regard to which I refer to the relevant literature (see for all Zeitlin and Pochet 2005; Zeitlin 2005).

It did not seem however that the wide diffusion of sub-national concertation practices was matched by an adequate attempt to interpret the potentials and limitations of this level of governance compared with the others: that is, bearing in mind the more general context in which it is embedded.

There were essentially two questions asked at the outset. One concerned the distinctive features of this level of concerted action among several actors with respect to the others: in what way can local concertation be distinguished from, for instance, national-level social pacts, apart from the obvious difference of level?

The other initial question concerned the types of relations among levels: are they vertical relations of hierarchical dependence (of the lower level on the higher one)? And with which characteristics? Or are they relations of independence whereby each level develops autonomously?

However limited, the foregoing survey allows me to outline some answers by synthesising the numerous insights gathered, as I do in the next two sub-sections. But it also allows me to venture reflections on the results of these modes of intervention.

VI.1 Which kind of concertation

As we have seen, local concertation is not simply national concertation in reduced format; nor is it workplace concertation on a larger scale.

It is instead characterized by notable plasticity: as regards the actors (which may vary greatly in characteristics and numbers); as regards the range covered by the action undertaken (which must be defined and delimited on each occasion); as regards the issues addressed (which may be highly diverse, but with a preference for issues of regulatory or acquisitive, rather than redistributive, type); as regards the institutional form that it can assume (a temporary coalition for ad hoc intervention, a stable institutionalized forum for discussion and information exchange, a stable partnership tasked with devising and implementing policies); and as regards the circumstances (external or internal to the local context) that favour its activation.

Because of these characteristics, local concertation is a particularly appropriate space for experimenting with new procedures/approaches to resolve new critical issues; for innovating outmoded routines; and for grasping, to the advantage of local societies, new opportunities which may arise externally and internally to them.

In other words, it is a space in which the shortcomings and failures of national policies, or centralized pacts, can be (partly) remedied, and more suitable responses made to emerging local problems. It is for this reason that it has been frequently considered as the emergence of
forms of local governance based on the horizontal cooperation principle, in reaction to the traditional forms of government centred on the vertical principle of authority.

Yet these considerations, which concern the characteristics and the potentialities of this form of concertation, are not enough to explain its diffusion, success or failure in reality.

Indeed, on the basis of what we have seen, the creation and diffusion of experiences of local concertation cannot simply be explained as forms of spontaneous response by local communities to the emergence or exacerbation of local problems. Nor can they be interpreted as the natural consequences of programmes intended to furnish new opportunities or to devolve functions from central government or the European Union.

The piecemeal diffusion of experiences among countries, and within each of them, and above all their unequal distribution and success to some extent regardless of, or even in inverse relation to, the gravity of the local problems to be resolved (as said above in regard to European TEPs) suggest that functionalist explanations fall wide of the mark and are indeed wholly unsatisfactory.

In other words, it is not simply because there is a need for and/or because opportunities have been intentionally created and resources made available, that it is advantageous to grasp, that experiences of local concertation actually arise and spread.

As we have seen, much depends on the characteristics, tradition, and endowment of social resources, or of social capital, of local societies. Once again, the case of the TEPs is illuminating. But so too is the case of the territorial planning pacts negotiated in Italy, whose different degrees of success are not certain correlated with the different degrees of need of individual territories (see Ramella et al. 2003; Cerase 2005).

Although the ability to resort to the logic of local concertation and to do so successfully is indubitably connected with the local endowment of resources (material, organizational, social), and is therefore closely dependent on the local tradition and history, purely path-dependent explanations type nevertheless seem unsatisfactory. And this is so both because a large amount of local resources may also give rise to phenomena of closure and resistance (as evidenced by a previous study on analogous problems: Regalia 2006, chap. 9), and because, within certain limits, actors may adopt strategies and play games that produce results different from those expected solely on the base of contextual features; that is that may allow the initial disadvantages to be overcome, as shown by case studies with different outcomes in similar contexts (Barbera 2001).

On the basis of the survey, it seems instead that the creation and diffusion of experiences of local concertation should be interpreted as a process, more or less developed, of collective mobilization. But as a process of collective mobilization among actors with different if not conflicting interests. Or also as the construction of a new system of interactions among actors (with different if not conflicting interests), not (or at least not entirely) regulated by the principle of authority on a bureaucratic-hierarchical logic, but instead by the principle of reciprocity within a framework of cooperation and the voluntary assumption of responsibility by the participants.

Especially in cases where concerted solutions are part of programmes originating externally to the local context (EC, national programmes), this construction of a new system of relations among local actors has a specific purpose; indeed, it is a goal of the programme, not simply a means to implement it.

Explicit or implicit among the promoters, in fact, is the idea that the existence/creation of a capacity among leading local actors to cooperate voluntarily is not only an important condi-
tion for the success of the economic and social schemes undertaken; it is above all a collective good with virtuous effects extending beyond the duration of individual projects. Significantly, as already noted in passing, an Italian commentator has described territorial pacts as “instruments to support, incentivise and foster the formation of artificial local systems; instruments which deliberately seek to ‘build’ the local system when there is a structural deficit of ‘natural systems’ and ‘spontaneous orders’” (Cersosimo 1998) – these natural ‘systems’ and ‘spontaneous orders’ being those which have historically developed in the industrial districts, constituting their local competitive advantages (Crouch et al. 2003).

As in every process of collective mobilization, three conditions must be in place for action to come about. The first is the existence at the local level of an at least embryonic form of leadership, provided by some social entrepreneur endowed with organizational know-how and the ability to grasp, select, aggregate, and represent unexpressed demand. The second is the existence of a potential for protest, or anyway of some potentially unifying goal around which a common vision can structure itself and an inclusive cross-coalition coalesce. The third condition is finally the emergence (from outside or inside) of favourable circumstances/opportunities that make a common action possible/credible.

In general, one can conclude that is the differing initial presence of these prerequisites which explains, other circumstances remaining equal, the differing abilities to initiate experiences of concertation. And then that their degree of success and subsequent evolution (degree of institutionalization) largely depend on the roles performed by the various crucial local actors involved. The above distinction among logics of action oriented to a more efficient combination of existing norms and resources, experimentation in their different use, or attempt to innovate them, may be an important interpretative key.

But it should also be pointed out that the survey suggests that the conditions for the start-up and success of local concertation experiences may differ according to the type of initiative; and in particular according to whether or not the initiative is part of a programme structured from outside.

Different are in fact the cases in which the operative solution (the package of the things to be done) has already been constituted and need only be applied, and those in which the solution to the problem must be constructed more or less from scratch, i.e. by deciding what it is necessary to do each time on the basis of the opportunities available.

It is true that in the former case the pre-established solutions may be less efficient and may prove unsatisfactory. And it is precisely on the basis of the differing abilities of the actors to make the best use, in the given context, of the opportunities already available that one observes variations in the performances of programmes of external origin. But in the latter case, that of initiatives which arise from the bottom up – because there are no already-existing clear guidelines for action – the conditions for the start-up first, and then the development, of local concertation are more stringent.

As a corollary to this is that pacts of the former type can last for a certain period of time even if they are inadequate and inefficient, precisely because they are anchored to external programmes. By contrast, the others, in that they are voluntarist, cannot survive unless they are at least partly successful.

To conclude, local concertation is a valuable instrument, with a great deal of potential, but it requires initial conditions which are not necessarily available immediately, and probably not where they are most necessary. In other terms, local concertation is by no means a cure-all solution, easily generalizable and adaptable to many contexts. On the contrary, it is a fragile and demanding solution which in many cases simply cannot be successful.
VI.2 Which relations among levels

Turning to the second of the our initial questions, the one concerning relations between different levels of concerted arrangements in policy-making in the European countries, the evident first observation is that the way in which the question was originally framed (presence/absence of national-level and local-level concertation is impracticable from an empirical point of view.

This is for two reasons. Firstly because, as we have seen, there is at least one type of local-level concertation – that of European pacts for employment – which recurs in all countries. It is therefore not possible to draw distinctions along the simple dimension of the presence or absence of programmes based on local partnerships. Secondly, because the foregoing survey has revealed a plurality of pact-based initiatives at sub-national level: a plurality not so much from the point of view of the issues addressed (which are innumerable) or the number and characteristics (extremely diverse) of the actors involved, as from the point of view of the nature of concertation in terms of the participants’ ability to take the initiative, and their autonomy, or degree of freedom.

Corresponding to this heterogeneity, which makes it difficult to reduce the phenomenon to a single category (and for which reason I have proposed a more complex categorization of it), is the differing visibility and ‘knowability’ of the various forms of decentralized concertation. In the absence of adequate surveys and monitoring efforts, examples of local partnership tend to be less visible and knowable, the less they depend upon or are connected to externally promoted programmes. As a result, it is difficult to reason not only on their diffusion but also on their influence and their actual workings; all the more so – paradoxically – when they consist of local pacts that have arisen from the bottom up.

With these caveats in mind, one can nevertheless make a number of observations on the basis of the results of the survey, proposing some interpretations of the functions performed by pacts and by local partnerships.

Firstly to be pointed out is that explicit references to direct connections between forms of local concertation and national-level pacts are rarely found. And when they are made, they seem mainly to serve as a pretext to strengthen the local pact by anchoring it to an authoritative external reference.

Thus, after the 1998 social pact in Italy, which explicitly stated the intent to make widespread use of local-level concertation in order to deal with the numerous and diverse problems of a complex society and economy, the reference to the national pact appears in some framework agreements between institutions and social partners of the type that I earlier called formalized agreements of procedural type (for instance, a pact at a regional level signed in Piedmont and a district-level concertation agreement signed in Rome, both in 1999). In this case, the connection seems to have had no more than the symbolic value of stating adherence to the line pursued by the government and social partners.

In other cases, as we have seen, the connection between local and national pacts is more meaningful, although not wholly explicit. In the Spanish case one can speak of a tendentially integrated and hierarchically ordered, multi-level (bottom up, but sometimes also top down) system of pacts for employment, at least in some areas of the country (especially Catalonia). Again as regards Italy, one may say that territorial negotiated planning pacts have initially tended to develop ‘in the shadow of concertation’ – that is, in the spirit of the cooperative logic of the social pacts of the early 1990s – probably, however, also influencing the socials pacts of the 1990s in their turn.
To resume the distinctions made at the outset, the Spanish case therefore tends to match the model that I called ‘substantial, or specialized vertical integration’. As to the Italian case, especially if one takes account of the strong endeavour to systematize and generalize the concertation method especially apparent in the 1998 pact, it partly resembles the model that I called ‘procedural vertical integration’.

Secondly to be noted is that, more than in the case of social pacts, of great importance instead, as we have seen, are relations of dependence on a higher-level normative framework. Examples are provided by all the various forms of local concertation induced by external programmes (European or national).

In these cases the pacts may perform functions which compensate for the shortcomings and failures of higher-level policies. Or they may be means to coordinate, and participate in, the most efficient implementation of policies. But they may also have the less virtuous effect of the mere opportunistic acquisition of external resources.

Thirdly, local concertation schemes may develop independently of higher-level normative frameworks. In these cases of endogenous development (and whose costs, at least initially, are largely borne by the participants), initiatives are taken and tasks assigned in addition to those envisaged by traditional policy-making, so that they somehow integrate and complete the latter. As we have seen, the effect may sometimes also be that of stimulating the innovation of policies from the bottom up.

In this case – and this is a fourth point not originally foreseen – the relation between the levels seems to be the reverse of the traditional one of vertical hierarchy. In fact it operates the other way round, from the bottom upwards, revealing the innovative potential of action concerted at sub-national level.

A fifth observation, which completes this exploration of the vertical relations among levels of governance, concerns the relationship with the level of micro decisions taken within firms potentially affected by the decisions of the local-level actors. This aspect is little considered in the literature on pacts and territorial concertation, but it certainly warrants closer attention, and not only in relation to cases in which pacts have been formed to deal with corporate crises. Some case studies on territorial pacts which expressly foresee impacts on the behaviour of actors in firms (Lope and Gibert 2006; Bortolotti and Giaccone 2006) have shown that this relationship may be critical and may greatly weaken the innovative capacity of accords.

Finally, reference should be made to a different type of relation among concertation experiences. I refer, not to the vertical relations among different levels of concertation or governance, but to horizontal ones between analogous concerted initiatives of sub-national type undertaken in different countries.

This therefore concerns horizontal relations of a trans-national kind, on which, as already said, we have only meagre and sporadic information.

The most widespread form seems to be that of the creation of linkages for information exchange and the sharing of experiences. An example is provided by the informal network created in the late 1990s among the European territorial pacts of Sweden, Ireland, France and the UK for the precise purpose of exchanging and evaluating experiences (cited in Inforegio 1994-1999). Another example (again drawn from Inforegio 1994-1999) is that of the “trans-national TEP”, which groups five large northern European cities – London, Berlin, Copenhagen/Malmö (S-DK), Hamburg, and Stockholm – to develop common themes, share good practices and consider the potential for a common approach to evaluation.
In the already-mentioned case of the Öresund Territorial Employment Pact an operational connection has also been established. The territorial pact concerns in fact an area straddling Sweden and Denmark. It is based on cross-border cooperation between the public labour offices of Sweden and Denmark and has given rise to a formalized structure: the Öresund transnational Coordination Committee.

But perhaps even more significant is the creation and continuing operation of a sort of transnational exchange network (the Forumpartnerships) among the heads and promoters of partnership initiatives in many European countries, who periodically organize seminars and discussion sessions.

The potential of these direct trans-national relations among the heads of territorial initiatives, externally to the (official) mediation of governments and to a large extent mediated instead by the Web, is still unclear. But they could prove to be an important novelty for the discourse on new governance in Europe.

VI.3 Concluding remarks

At the end of this exploration of the characteristics and importance of territorial concertation in Europe, its main shortcoming certainly concerns evaluation of the effects exerted by pacts.

As rather evident, it is also the most difficult and controversial aspect to deal with. This is not only because of the limitations of information and data available, but also because of the difficulty of defining what the effects of the pacts actually are and of identifying suitable indicators of them; and all the more so, because of the difficulty of agreeing on what the objectives of pacts are /should be before appraising their outcomes.

It is for this reason that, in the large majority of cases, studies have restricted their focus to the start-up phase of concertation schemes, or have sought to identify some very simple quantitative indicators, or have relied on qualitative assessments by experts and key informants.

It is certainly not possible to enter this minefield here. By way of conclusions I shall only make a couple of remarks concerning the effects of pacts from the point of view of their capacity to influence the governance process.

The available assessments on the effects of local concertation mainly concern TEPs, and in Italy the other territorial pacts based on negotiated planning. As already noted (see section 5.2 above), there is a paradoxical aspect to judgements on European pacts: namely that their positive effects tend to be underestimated precisely in relation to the countries of central-northern Europe where instead some of the most interesting experiences have developed (beginning with the just-mentioned attempt to establish trans-national linkages).

Illuminating in this regard is what one reads in an evaluation document drawn up for the European Commission by a team of experts in 2002 (ECOTEC 2002), which distinguishes three different situations. “The most successful applications of the Pact principle,” the document states, “were evident in the countries where an accepted and legally determined role for devolved governance powers at local level is in place, but this is not systematically combined with extensive, multi-stakeholder partnership working”. And this group of countries comprises, in first place Ireland and Italy as cases of great success, and in second place Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany and Spain. The document continues: “In countries with a long history of government intervention in the labour market and territorial development, and where partnership working is common (Denmark, France, Netherlands, Sweden, UK) Pacts often struggled to find a role”, although many cases of successful Pacts are cited. Finally, “In countries with a limited history of local level activity in relation to the labour market, Pacts
were least successful (Portugal, Greece and Luxembourg). The evaluation found there was as yet little appreciation of the merits of the bottom-up partnership and not enough competency or institutional capacity in place”.

Aside from evaluations of individual national cases, these observations highlight a crucial point: that the real meaning of local partnership schemes cannot be appreciated externally to the specific institutional contexts in which they take place.

In general, one may imagine a sort of trade-off between the likelihood that these forms of decentralized intervention will develop and be successful and the extent to which public policies operate efficiently. Put otherwise, these solutions should not be viewed as intrinsically good in themselves. In many cases they are simply not necessary. Or again, they may be so closely in line with the consolidated tradition of the public policies of a given country that they simply cannot be distinguished from the standard practices of good administration.

On the other hand, as said, the realization of local concertation schemes requires (social, organizational, etc.) factors which are not always already in place, so that these schemes may therefore simply fail.

Between the risks of irrelevance and of failure, the cases that may be most successful – those, that is, in which concerted initiatives can have a greater role and visibility – seem therefore to be those that are, so to speak, ‘intermediary’. That is, those in which on the one hand there is much to improve in the workings of the institutions (and the pacts can therefore perform the beneficial role of partially substituting for or integrating the shortcomings of public policies), and the other, the preconditions are in place for a mobilization of local actors.

A final remark concerns the effects of local concertation schemes of endogenous origin.

In that they are not part of previous defined programmes, as we know these experiences are unpredictable and characterized by low visibility. But this has already been said.

More pertinent is the observation that, in these cases, the just-discussed relations with the institutions and public policies are likely to be less important. Not in the sense that these experiences are free from external conditionings, but in the sense that they are even more strongly embedded in the surrounding environment, on which they closely depend; but with prospects of greater freedom in comparison to conditionings imposed from outside the territory of reference.

This may finally enable the emergence, in unpredictable ways, of highly innovative solutions even in apparently less favourable national contexts.

Of course, these are general considerations which do not exempt one from the task of examining case-by-case the objectives, the resources available and used, the results achieved, and so on. But they are considerations that open up new future directions for the analysis and understanding of what has been my underlying theme: the potentialities of the concertation method at the various levels in the management of social policies in Europe.
### Table 7.1 Territorial Employment Pacts in the 15 EU Member States (1996-99)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No of Pacts and employment target</th>
<th>Total budget per Pact</th>
<th>EU funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austria</strong></td>
<td>4 Pacts. A total of 2 575 060 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 4 Pacts are together set to create around 1 378 jobs directly</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>10 546 000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tirol</td>
<td>373 600</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>1 870 000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wien</td>
<td>10 319 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
<td>5 Pacts. A total of 2 637 765 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 5 Pacts are together set to create around 1 586 jobs directly</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bruxelles Capitale</td>
<td>25 239 600</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hainaut</td>
<td>1 745 000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Halle-Vilvoorde</td>
<td>825 950</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ouest Brabant</td>
<td>14 797 250</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tongeren</td>
<td>390 450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td>5 Pacts. A total of 3 959 966 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 5 Pacts are together set to create around 1 106 jobs directly</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bornholm</td>
<td>7 700 000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kronjylland 3</td>
<td>8 582 470</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Øresund</td>
<td>15 000 000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sønderjylland</td>
<td>5 164 000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Viborg</td>
<td>9 600 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>10 Pacts. A total of 1 870 756 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 10 Pacts are together set to create around 5 432 jobs directly</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Albertville</td>
<td>1 943 261</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hérault</td>
<td>16 355 000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Molsheim-Shirmeck</td>
<td>2 356 800</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pays de Valois</td>
<td>1 711 000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pointe des Ardennes</td>
<td>4 110 599</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Périgord Noir</td>
<td>7 336 200</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Roubaix-Turcoing-Vallée de la Lys</td>
<td>4 430 400</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saint-Herblain</td>
<td>675 430</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ussel</td>
<td>537 408</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Les Haut de la Réunion</td>
<td>6 704 267</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>No of Pacts and employment target</td>
<td>Total budget per Pact</td>
<td>EU funding</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>9 Pacts. A total of 6,798,583 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 9 Pacts are together set to create around 12,538 jobs directly</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Amberg-Sulzbach</td>
<td>23,306,400</td>
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<td>Berlin-Neuköllin</td>
<td>6,567,400</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Braunschweig-Peine</td>
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<td>17,763,000</td>
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<td>Bremen-Bremerhaven</td>
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<td>Güstrow</td>
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<td>Hamburg</td>
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<td>Nordrhein-Westfalen</td>
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<td>Zeitz</td>
<td>312,105,000</td>
<td>51,084,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Greece</strong></td>
<td>7 Pacts. A total of 1,790,318 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 7 Pacts are together set to create around 3,867 jobs directly</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Imathia</td>
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<td>Kozani &amp; Florina</td>
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<td><strong>Finland</strong></td>
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<td>Turun seutu</td>
<td>3,177,663</td>
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<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>4 Pacts. A total of 1,250,455 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 4 Pacts are together set to create around 1,649 jobs directly</td>
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<td>Dublin</td>
<td>4,115,228</td>
<td>1,111,428</td>
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<td>Limerick</td>
<td>14,599,096</td>
<td>9,232,359</td>
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<td>Westmeath</td>
<td>1,671,042</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>No of Pacts and employment target</td>
<td>Total budget per Pact</td>
<td>EU funding</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>10 Pacts (2 of which not under EU funding). A total of 2 284 700 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 10 Pacts are together set to create around 9 648 jobs directly</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agro Nocerino Sarnese</td>
<td>36 877 000</td>
<td>17 324 000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alto Belice Corleonese</td>
<td>39 720 000</td>
<td>17 323 000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appennino centrale</td>
<td>157 194 000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area Nord Est Napoli</td>
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<td>Calatino Sud Simeto</td>
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<td>Catania Zona Sud</td>
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<td>Matese</td>
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<td>Nord Barse</td>
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<td>Oristano</td>
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<td>17 325 000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sangro Aventino</td>
<td>83 798 000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Luxembourg</strong></td>
<td>1 Pact.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Portugal</strong></td>
<td>3 Pacts. A total of 473 191 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 3 Pacts are together set to create around 5 257 jobs directly</td>
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<td>Norte Alentejo</td>
<td>17 291 000</td>
<td>11 191 000</td>
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<td>Marinha Grande</td>
<td>11 624 000</td>
<td>8 461 000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vale do Souza</td>
<td>27 190 500</td>
<td>19 009 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td>6 Pacts. A total of 3 007 947 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 6 Pacts are together set to create around 5 580 jobs directly</td>
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<td>Asturias</td>
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<td>Ceuta</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Melilla</td>
<td>7 602 997</td>
<td>5 884 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Valles Occidental</td>
<td>7 059 247</td>
<td>3 529 624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>5 Pacts. A total of 799 396 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 5 Pacts are together set to create around 717 jobs directly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jämtland</td>
<td>2 200 000</td>
<td>1 200 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalmar Län</td>
<td>9 600 000</td>
<td>4 150 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stockholm del av</td>
<td>4 718 000</td>
<td>1 775 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strömstad</td>
<td>3 600 444</td>
<td>1 188 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Värmland</td>
<td>10 050 000</td>
<td>3 529 624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Netherlands</strong></td>
<td>3 Pacts. A total of 3 726 424 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 3 Pacts are together set to create around 885 jobs directly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flevoland</td>
<td>15 400 000</td>
<td>5 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limburg</td>
<td>7 800 000</td>
<td>2 400 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Noord-Brabant</td>
<td>8 859 900</td>
<td>3 057 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>No of Pacts and employment target</td>
<td>Total budget per Pact</td>
<td>EU funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>10 Pacts. A total of 4,538,987 people are covered by the pilot scheme. The 10 Pacts are together set to create around 2,375 jobs directly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barnsley</td>
<td>987,529</td>
<td>362,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coatbridge &amp; Easterhouse</td>
<td>139,290</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>1,827,000</td>
<td>314,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Wales</td>
<td>2,267,000</td>
<td>274,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newry &amp; Mourne</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Tyneside</td>
<td>253,268</td>
<td>16,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St Helens</td>
<td>1,137,500</td>
<td>680,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tottenham &amp; Haringey</td>
<td>2,301,050</td>
<td>166,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Cornwall</td>
<td>7,407,500</td>
<td>1,895,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>17,503,500</td>
<td>7,372,493</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7.2 Partnerships at the sub-national level in European countries (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Form of partnership</th>
<th>Geographic scale</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Policy areas</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Legal status</th>
<th>Financing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Territorial Employments Pacts (TEPs)</td>
<td>Established in all 9 Federal Provinces. Some additional TEPs set up at local level</td>
<td>TEPs contracted at regional level to better link employment policy with other policies</td>
<td>Labour market and employment policy (in co-ordination with other policies, such as regional development policies)</td>
<td>Provincial Governments, Regional Labour Market Services, Federal Office of Social Affairs, Economic Chamber, Chamber of Labour, Trade Unions, Federation of Industry, Association of Municipalities, Chamber of Agriculture, Provincial School Board, gender mainstreaming experts, representatives of employees, of employers, of Non-Profit-Organisations, Regional Management Associations</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Measures are funded by contributions of the contracting partners. For the local co-ordination of each pact additional funding is applied for from the Austrian Objective 3 (co-financed by ESF and Federal Ministry of Econ. Affairs and Labour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Regional Socio-economic Committees (RESOC) and Socio-economic councils of the Region (SERR)</td>
<td>Respective regions vary in size from covering 150,000 up to 700,000 inhabitants per RESOC/SERR region</td>
<td>RESOCs: to draw up a regional pact every 6 years, to stimulate innovative initiatives, to provide a consultative framework for regional actors on labour market and economic policy development. SERR: to organise bipartite consultation on economic and labour market policies and bipartite measures</td>
<td>Labour market and economic policy development.</td>
<td>RESOCs: local and provincial authorities, social partners, Public Employment Service, and NGOs SERR: is a regional bipartite body of the social partners</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Yearly staffing budget from the Flemish Government, further subsidies for innovative projects. Additional funding from provincial and local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3 area-based partnerships, working independently, without co-ordination</td>
<td>They cover sub-sections of counties.</td>
<td>To combat unemployment</td>
<td>Local and regional employment policy</td>
<td>Local municipalities, labour authorities, educational and third sector organisations, companies, Social Insurance Institution, congregations and the Employment and Economic Development Centres</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>ESF Objective 3, the municipalities, the Employment and Economic Development Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Form of partnership</td>
<td>Geographic scale</td>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Policy areas</td>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Legal status</td>
<td>Financing</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>Local Co-operation for Employment: Comité de Bassin d’Emploi (CBE), Maisons de l’Information sur la Formation et l’Emploi (MIFE), Espaces Ruraux Emploi Formation (EREF), Plans Locaux pour l’Insertion et l’Emploi (PLIE)</td>
<td>On a local and sub-regional level.</td>
<td>CBE and MIFE: to support employment development in the regions; EREF: to co-ordinate offer in relation to training, jobs and social inclusion for unemployed; PLIE: to enhance social inclusion, employment and social cohesion.</td>
<td>Labour market policy and social policy.</td>
<td>Local authorities are main partners. In addition, social partners, civil society, unions, associations and local actors.</td>
<td>The 4 models are associations or are integrated in a local authority.</td>
<td>Funding from the public sector (local and regional authorities, state policies, ESF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany (Berlin)</strong></td>
<td>12 Local Pacts for Business and Employment (BBWA), within the framework of the ‘Pacts for Business and Employment’ and the programme to support ‘Local Social Capital’</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>To create employment and training opportunities and support local businesses by establishing networks at the local level.</td>
<td>Labour market policy and economic policy</td>
<td>Local/district administrations, business support structures, business associations, employment agencies, workers organisations, welfare charities, citizens groups, representatives of the third sector, housing associations, professional bodies, universities and institutions for further education</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>City of Berlin, the German Federal Government, ESF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greece</strong></td>
<td>61 partnerships in the context of either the Regional Operational Programmes of ESF or area-based schemes</td>
<td>Regional and sub-regional level.</td>
<td>To create a favourable environment for job creation and prevent social exclusion associated to unemployment; development of innovative methods and the promotion of cooperation amongst local, regional and occasionally national actors.</td>
<td>Employment and social inclusion, regional and local development, social economy, community initiatives.</td>
<td>Local and regional authorities, social partners, educational and training organizations, actors of social economy, representatives of SMEs and employers’ associations</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>ESF Regional Operational Programmes, European Community Initiatives, European Article 6 Budget Line and own resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of partnership</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Geographic scale</th>
<th>Policy areas</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Legal status</th>
<th>Financing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38 Area-based partnerships, 32 Community partnerships, 2 Employment Pacts</td>
<td>To counter disadvantage and promote equality and social and economic inclusion.</td>
<td>Whole counties or municipalities or parts of them</td>
<td>Services for the unemployed, community development and community-based youth initiatives.</td>
<td>Representatives of local communities, Government bodies, social partners, elected representatives.</td>
<td>Partnerships are companies limited by guarantee, without share capital.</td>
<td>National Development Plan. In addition National government, EU, charitable foundations, and businesses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Portugal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of partnership</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Geographic scale</th>
<th>Policy areas</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Legal status</th>
<th>Financing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships of the Social Networks (formal discussion fora in which the social problems of local territories are discussed and solutions are jointly searched for) under the Social Network Programme (SNP)</td>
<td>To combat poverty and social exclusion and to promote local development through introduction of joint strategic planning dynamics.</td>
<td>Implemented in 275 of 278 continental municipalities.</td>
<td>Labour market policy and social policy.</td>
<td>Local governments, local public services, non-profit organisations, representatives of social groups, local Social Work Councils, Parish Welfare Boards.</td>
<td>Legal status based on the Council of ministers Resolution No. 197/97</td>
<td>Social Network within scope of area 5 of the Operational Programme for employment, Training and Social Development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Spain (Catalonia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of partnership</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Geographic scale</th>
<th>Policy areas</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Legal status</th>
<th>Financing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 Catalan TEPs</td>
<td>To promote integrated territorial development of employment initiatives, to facilitate social cohesion and business competitiveness.</td>
<td>Within municipalities and districts of the Province of Barcelona</td>
<td>Labour market policy, Social Policy and Economic Development</td>
<td>Local municipal and district authorities, unions, employers’ associations, the voluntary sector and the Diputació.</td>
<td>None. Participation is based on statements of good intention.</td>
<td>Particular actions are funded by the Diputació de Barcelona and the Generalitat de Catalunya. Technical assistance to partnerships is funded by the Diputació.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Norway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of partnership</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Geographic scale</th>
<th>Policy areas</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Legal status</th>
<th>Financing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Several different types of regional partnerships</td>
<td>To promote sustainable regional development, to facilitate co-operation between regional actors, to support local business development, entrepreneurship, innovation, infrastructure.</td>
<td>All 19 counties are involved.</td>
<td>Labour market policy, agriculture policy, regional development policy</td>
<td>County council, Innovation Norway (state owned company), regional state agencies. Occasionally, municipalities, education institutes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Regional development funds and various sectoral funds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Slovak Republic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of partnership</th>
<th>Local Social Inclusion Partnerships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographic scale</td>
<td>27 Partnerships established in 5 regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>To ensure social inclusion of marginalized groups and communities and to achieve higher employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy areas</td>
<td>Labour market policy and social policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Public administration, business sector, civil society (NGOs, schools, church) and representatives from socially deprived areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal status</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>European Social Fund through Social Development Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hungary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of partnership</th>
<th>Employment Pacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographic scale</td>
<td>In all 7 NUTS II regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>To create jobs through supporting local enterprises, to preserve jobs by initiating training projects, to match professional training structure to needs of the economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy areas</td>
<td>Labour market policy, social policy and economic policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Municipalities, Regional Councils, Labour Centres, training institutions, employers, NGOs, associations, regional development agencies, Chambers of Commerce and Industry, of Agriculture, Members of Parliament, minority autonomies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal status</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>ESF, public funding, contributions from partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Forumpartnerships2005
VIII. References


