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The Lisbon Agenda and the ‘Fiscal Philosophy’ of EMU**
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Summary

The Lisbon Strategy supports reform of member states' tax-benefit systems while the 'fiscal philosophy' of the EMU postulates that governments should allow only automatic stabilisers, built into tax-benefit systems, to smooth aggregate income. We ask whether these two pillars of EU economic governance are compatible. By exploring how structural reforms affect fiscal stabilisation, we complement a political economy literature that asks whether fiscal consolidation fosters or hinders structural reforms. Using EUROMOD, a tax-benefit model for the EU-15, we identify the connections between specific tax and benefit reforms and the size of the stabilisers. We conclude that Lisbon-type reforms may worsen the stabilising capacity of tax-benefit systems.

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0. Introduction

This paper asks to what extent two central pillars of economic governance in the EU are compatible. The European agenda for growth and jobs encompasses both the Maastricht pillar for macroeconomic stability, and the Lisbon pillar for microeconomic or structural adjustment. The Maastricht pillar is promoted by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) while the Lisbon pillar is developed through the European Employment Strategy (EES). We begin by viewing the issue of compatibility in political economy terms, and then explore the economic aspect further, focusing on the ‘automatic stabilisers’. Automatic stabilisers are revenue and expenditure items of the budget that vary counter-cyclically with the income or spending of citizens and thus add to their disposable income in recessions and reduce it in booms. They are ‘automatic’ in the sense that governments do not need to enact their operation through policy adjustments since they vary with GDP by design.

The fiscal philosophy of the SGP and BEPG endorses ‘rule-based’ as opposed to discretionary macroeconomic stabilisation.¹ Governments should rely on the automatic stabilisers to do the smoothing of aggregate income. However, the endorsement of automatic stabilisation is half-hearted, as the prevailing tenor of the EU’s reform agenda is that structural reform will also take care of macroeconomic stabilisation. The structural reform agenda emphasises the desirability of increasing the flexibility of the labour market and improving incentives for job creation through lower tax rates (CEC, 2005a, p.6). These reforms are seen as ‘improv[ing] the overall adaptability and adjustment capacity of economies in response to changes in *cyclical* economic conditions’ ((CEC, 2005c, p.15; our emphasis). In other words, appropriate microeconomic policies will obviate the need for macroeconomic stabilisation. In fact, a weakening of automatic stabilisers may be a blessing in disguise as less stabilisation would improve the private sector’s own capacity to adjust and self-insure (Buti et al, 2002; Buti and van den Noord, 2003). We address this argument both theoretically and empirically.

Our paper proceeds as follows: First, we outline in section I how our study relates to wider debates in the political economy literature. Section II describes the conceptual framework. Our empirical analysis in section III tries to establish, first, whether there is any evidence for reforms taking place to an extent that could affect the macroeconomy; secondly, how reforms would affect automatic stabilisers based on simulations in EUROMOD, a tax-benefit model of the EU-15 countries; and, thirdly, whether our results suggest a tradeoff between stabilisation and adjustment. The conclusions outline some policy implications.

I. The conflicting political economy of the EU’s simultaneous agenda

The relevant political economy literature on the links between structural reforms and fiscal policy can be divided in two strands. The first starts from the diagnosis of pervasive credibility problems in policymaking and argues in favour of fiscal consolidation being done simultaneously with structural reform, as is currently promoted by the SGP/BEPG and the Lisbon Agenda. The second strand, based on the comparative study of major reform processes, calls for sequential timing of reforms and budget consolidation, suggesting that fiscal austerity might otherwise impede structural reform. Our analysis fits into the second strand, to which we add the idea that structural reform under conditions of permanent fiscal austerity may jeopardize the stabilising qualities of fiscal systems, despite a potential to enhance them.

¹ See, for instance, Barrell and Pina (2000, p.1) and Buti et al (2003, p.28) on the underlying philosophy of the Pact.

I.1 The ‘back against the wall’ rationale for the EU’s simultaneous agenda

The first strand maintains that the simultaneous agenda of the EU promises a double dividend of fiscal prudence and reform activism (Bean, 1998; Padoan and Rodrigues, 2004). More specifically, the hardening of governments’ budget constraints will provide a political environment which facilitates labour market reforms. Because public expenditures are constrained by a fiscal rule such as the Stability Pact, the labour market parties (unions in particular) eventually realise that increases in wages and other costs have an immediate impact on employment. This ‘back against the wall’ hypothesis maintains that fiscal crises make reform easier because they raise awareness of the costs of the status quo and thus weaken the opposition to reform (Rodrik, 1996, pp.26-29; IMF, 2004a, pp.113-115). In more formal terms, an unconstrained government is assumed to choose time-inconsistent, inflationary policies. Once prevented from doing so by monetary and fiscal rules, its incentives change in favour of promoting labour market reform to lower the equilibrium unemployment rate.

The most explicit argument along these lines can be found in Calmfors (2001, pp.268-270). In his model, the government weighs up inflation, unemployment and labour market reforms, all of which are disliked by the majority in the electorate, who are also the dominant group in the labour market. Reforms can reduce equilibrium unemployment, but they are undertaken only if the benefits in lower expected inflation and unemployment outweigh the costs in terms of lower real wages or less employment security enjoyed by those in employment. In this model, the loss of access to countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies increases the incentive to reform. The model assumes that labour market flexibility can dampen cycles induced by both supply and inflation shocks, a view we question below. It is also assumed that more reform and less countercyclical demand-management is socially desirable, because such a move would raise the welfare of labour market outsiders, who are the political minority.

In ‘back against the wall’ models, all policymaking is seen as distortionary, unless it consists of attempts to correct structural market imperfections that can reduce the long-term equilibrium rate of unemployment. Given their preferences, governments need to be whipped into such enlightened reform policies. Externally enforced fiscal consolidation may provide for such a whip and thus yields a double dividend of increased structural flexibility and fiscal prudence.

I.2 The ‘need for bribes’ rationale for sequencing the EU’s dual agenda

The second strand of the political economy literature sees tensions between an ambitious agenda of structural reform and fiscal consolidation. It is based on what might be called a ‘need for bribes’ hypothesis, suggesting that fiscal space is required so as to allow compensation of potential or actual losers from reforms. Testing for these alternative hypotheses, the IMF sides with the ‘need for bribes’ hypothesis and recommends accepting a temporary worsening of public finances to make reforms happen (IMF 2004a, pp.115-116, 132; IMF 2004b, pp.48, 58). A rise in the budget deficit at the beginning of the reform process may be necessary not only to buy off opposition but also in order to bear the upfront costs of reforms, such as establishing more effective employment agencies in preparation for welfare-to-work measures.

This strand of the literature is interested in what determines reform dynamics,² stimulated by the wealth of experience with major reform processes in countries at all levels of political and

² Other papers following this line of argument are Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Pierson (2001), Grüner (2002) and Wyplosz in IMF (2004a, pp.130-131).

economic development (Rodrik, 1996). Partly for reasons of econometric methodology, policymaking is conceptualised as the outcome of a government optimising an objective function that is representative of an electoral platform or of the median voter's preferences. By contrast with Calmfors's model, there is no 'persecuted minority'; if it faced no obstacles, the government would steadily implement the measures that make the political economy move on the reform path towards the desired state of labour, product and financial markets or the tax system.³ But the government is constrained by entrenched special interests as well as facing uncertainty arising from economic factors that are not directly under its control (IMF, 2004a, p.109). These constraints determine whether structural reforms get sufficient political support to be carried out.

One important argument in favour of the 'need for bribes' is that structural reforms under conditions of 'permanent austerity' (Pierson 2001) are biased towards measures which are fiscally favourable and shift costs to firms. In particular, stricter employment protection may be conceded in exchange for lower non-employment benefits. Such perverse reforms are a product of reform activism under fiscal constraints. The Lisbon Agenda may thus get a double whammy from simultaneous fiscal consolidation and welfare reform: not only does austerity weaken the political support for reforms but it also gives interest groups reasons to seek forms of compensation that obstruct specific Lisbon goals. The general implication of this argument is that tax and benefit policies can support the efficient operation of markets, as groups will otherwise promote their interests through channels which distort markets. It therefore rests on a political economy in which governments may conduct enlightened policies to counteract market failures.

In practice, the extent to which the Maastricht criteria have generated a double whammy is questionable, partly because governments have not always complied with the fiscal rules. Fatàs et al (2003) find that, in the run-up to EMU, some governments engaged in procyclical contractions to meet the Maastricht criteria but, with the exception of Italy and Portugal, fiscal stances after 1998 have not been procyclical. Buti et al (2002) and Buti and van den Noord (2003) argue that governments have been able to pursue fiscal consolidation through welfare reforms without procyclical effects. With the partial exception of these latter studies, there has been little analysis of how structural reforms may affect macroeconomic conditions, nor their impact on fiscal instruments for stabilisation.⁴

To sum up: The literature implies two stark hypotheses on the simultaneous agenda of the EU. The 'back against the wall' approach argues that combining fiscal consolidation with structural reforms yields a double dividend, providing both for healthier public finances and signalling to entrenched interests that the status quo has become too expensive and must be changed. The 'need for bribes' hypothesis implies that the dual agenda of the EU will obstruct reforms because simultaneous fiscal consolidation and reform is likely to weaken political support and create counterproductive incentives for governments.

³ Econometrically, this means that a dynamic equation links the annual changes in structural reform indicators to their past levels (ie. taking account of initial conditions and path dependency), to a set of explanatory variables that presumably constrain a policymaker's reform decision (the economic and political constraints identified by the literature on the political economy of reform) and to a stochastic term that captures uncertainty (IMF, 2004a, Appendix 3.2).

⁴ CEC (2005b, pp.33-37) reviews the literature on the 'macroeconomic impact of some packages of Lisbon reforms', yet all that this survey provides are various estimates of the *aggregate* gains in GDP growth to be expected from microeconomic reforms in product and labour markets or investment in the 'knowledge economy'.

I.3 Bringing macroeconomics back into the political economy of reform

In this section, we extend the ‘need for bribes’ approach to argue for the importance of automatic stabilisers. Our argument is that policies to counteract special interests and combat market failure operate best when they are institutionally embedded, as governments’ discretionary interventions have a tendency to be procyclical.⁵ Procyclicality can arise from political opportunism by governments constrained only by a deficit limit, or by efforts to conduct a discretionary countercyclical policy which are liable to be foiled by decision and implementation lags. These problems point to the value of automatic stabilisation mechanisms generated by spending and revenue-raising processes which are deeply institutionalised.

If we think of structural reforms as involving changes to long-standing benefit commitments and tax assessment practices, we can see that there are at least three channels through which reforms might affect macroeconomic conditions and the conduct of policy. First, structural reforms could affect households’ expectations of their permanent income. Contributory insurance systems in particular make commitments which households may rely on in formulating their expectations. Reforms to these systems amount to a publicly endorsed breaking of commitments.⁶ They have the potential to affect households’ confidence in collective insurance and thus their spending decisions.⁷ Second, if employment protection is reduced and job-changing becomes more frequent, household incomes could become more volatile. The potential impact on household income expectations and consumption is uncertain: if increased labour market flexibility leads to lower long-term unemployment, income fluctuations might be of shorter duration if higher frequency. Third, reforms which lower tax rates or reduce benefits for low-income and unemployed households will reduce the size of the automatic stabilisers, implying that less smoothing of disposable income relative to market income will take place, which could also affect consumption, particularly among households which are constrained to base their consumption on their current income. The focus of this paper is on this third channel but we also touch briefly on the second channel.

Our conceptualisation of the sources of macroeconomic instability is Keynesian in that we assume that product markets are monopolistically competitive, ie. firms have some price-setting power and engage in product differentiation (‘brands’). In such markets, firms are demand constrained. Moreover, fluctuations in nominal demand are not immediately countered by compensating price adjustments; instead, costly processes of wage and price inflation or deflation are set in motion by fluctuations in demand in the absence of countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies. If households are far-sighted, confident about the stability of their permanent income, and able to smooth their consumption path with the aid of savings and credit, their reactions will tend to be stabilising and countercyclical demand management policies will be less important. Our argument that the automatic stabilisers are important therefore assumes that these conditions do not hold; in particular, that a significant proportion of households is credit constrained to some extent and thus varies consumption with fluctuations in current income (Andrés et al, 2004). More generally, failures in markets for insurance as well as credit lead to fluctuations in consumption (Flemming, 1973). By making counter-

⁵ Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) find that automatic countercyclical tax and spending changes were offset by increased spending during economic upturns.

⁶ We are grateful to Elena Bechberger (LSE) for alerting us to this paradox. Her thesis will explore welfare state reforms from this angle in France and Germany.

⁷ Compare the recent comments of the governor of the Bank of Finland that the weakness of the Eurozone is baffling: “Perhaps reforms first increase uncertainty.” (Financial Times, 2005)

cyclical payments to households and levying procyclical taxes, governments stabilise household disposable incomes in ways which private financial markets do not.

A key implication of this ‘market failure’ case for stabilisation is that the promotion of increased wage and price flexibility, as envisaged by the Lisbon agenda, does not make macroeconomic problems go away. Our line of reasoning can be contrasted with that of Buti and van den Noord (2003) which prioritizes microeconomic flexibility.⁸ They argue that automatic stabilisers will make households less flexible in adjusting to supply shocks. Buti and van den Noord’s argument relates to an intuition which has coloured understandings of the effects of the Lisbon process, which is that an economy with improved microeconomic flexibility will experience less persistent macroeconomic shocks, so that micro adjustment can be a substitute for macroeconomic stabilisation (CEC, 2005c). This intuition attributes macroeconomic problems to wage and price rigidity. Our argument is that macroeconomic stabilisation is needed to counteract market failures which are not due to wage or price rigidity but to the uncertainty of household income and limitations of financial markets. Complete credit and insurance markets would enable all households to maintain stable consumption in the face of income fluctuations. The incompleteness of these markets gives automatic stabilisers their importance.

In pointing to the existence of market failure, we depart from ‘back against the wall’ models which see government intervention as the source of macroeconomic instability. At the same time, we extend the ‘need for bribes’ theory by acknowledging the problem of procyclical discretion in fiscal policy. Stability in the structure of tax and benefit commitments generates automatic stabilisers which do not sacrifice the potential role of governments in counteracting market failures and limiting perverse impacts from interest group activism.

II. How structural reforms affect automatic stabilisers

II.2 Defining automatic stabilisers

As the discussion above has suggested, we are focusing on automatic stabilisation within the context of a Keynesian analysis of the macroeconomy, and this affects the way we define and measure the stabilisers. A number of studies have shown that larger public sectors reduce economic volatility (Rodrik 1998; Fatás and Mihov 1999; Agell 2002; Andrés et al 2004). These authors give an eclectic account of the ways in which the public sector may stabilise the economy. Rodrik (1998, pp.1019-21) offers a view in which the government (as a whole) is conceived of as a ‘safe’ sector generating relatively stable income flows for households (eg. through employment) as well as through transfers. However, he also tests the idea pursued here, that in high-income, developed countries the government plays its risk-mitigating role primarily through the provision of social security rather than through consumption and employment, and finds it strongly supported by the statistical evidence.

Our Keynesian analysis of income insurance focuses on the ways that taxes and benefits reduce the volatility of households’ disposable income relative to their market income. The reduction in volatility is designated by σ , the coefficient of cyclical stabilisation (see Box 1 below for a formal derivation). It is possible to derive estimates of σ directly from time series data, as has been done by Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Bayoumi and Masson (1995). These analyses have yielded ‘ballpark’ figures for σ in the USA of 30-40%; in other words, the volatility of dispos-

⁸ See Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) for a more benign view of demand stabilisation and labour supply flexibility.

able income is 60-70% of the volatility of gross income. However, these studies do not attempt to distinguish between automatic stabilisers and the effects of discretionary adjustments to fiscal policy; nor do they provide a framework for linking specific policy parameters to the magnitude of fiscal stabilisation. These limitations can be overcome by using a tax-benefit simulation model to calculate σ , and we do this below, using EUROMOD. The method resembles that used in a study by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) to arrive at estimates of σ for the USA of 25-30%.

The measures for automatic stabilisation reported here are explicitly based on the impact of taxes and benefits on the household sector. This approach to the stabilisers contrasts with that taken by the European Commission (2002) and the OECD (Van den Noord 2000), where automatic stabilisation is conceived in terms of the cyclical sensitivity of the government budget. There are several important differences between the factors which drive changes in the budget balance to GDP ratio (BB/GDP) and those that stabilise household disposable income. Mélitz (2005) points out that BB/GDP is invariant with respect to the size of a proportional income tax, whereas higher proportional taxes on household market income produce higher values for σ . The BB/GDP ratio is affected by corporate tax receipts, whereas in our framework, variations in corporate taxes are unlikely to have a significant stabilising effect on demand because firms are not generally credit-constrained: their expenditure depends on expected profits rather than current (net) income (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000, p.18 make a similar point).⁹

II.3 What determines the size of automatic stabilisers?

The impact of an automatic stabiliser such as the personal income tax or unemployment benefits is the result of two components:

Responsiveness: A stabiliser must vary with the business cycle so as to trigger a countercyclical response. This responsiveness or cyclical sensitivity is measured by the elasticity of the particular budget item, for instance the percentage change of tax revenue induced by a 1 per cent change of income. The more progressive the tax structure, the higher the elasticity and the larger the countercyclical responsiveness of automatic stabilisers (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000, pp.14-17; van den Noord, 2000, pp.7, 16). The withdrawal of benefits as income increases also raises responsiveness; thus high effective marginal tax rates are good for stabilisation although they may be bad for work incentives.

Weight: The effect of a budget item on the volatility of household income increases with its share of income. The share of taxes or transfers varies widely across different household income groups; this may be significant in determining their role in stabilising consumption. Smoothing the income of individuals with a high propensity to spend or households that are credit constrained will make stabilisation more effective as more of the income smoothing translates into consumption smoothing. Moreover, low incomes also tend to be more volatile, so there is more to stabilise to begin with (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000, p.12). Thus, transfers and tax credits or exemptions that directly target low income earners will have a stronger stabilising effect.¹⁰

⁹ However, it could be argued that the fiscal nexus between the government and the corporate sector may contribute to stabilisation if the corporate tax take is highly cyclically responsive and allows the corporate sector to act as a provider of temporary income insurance by hoarding labour.

¹⁰ However, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000, pp.13-14) estimate that a large share of automatic stabilisation benefits richer households where the multiplier effect is minimal.

II.4 Which elements of the EES are likely to have an impact?

As mentioned in the introduction, we focus on the European Employment Strategy (EES) as the core element of the Lisbon Strategy. Three elements of the Strategy are particularly relevant here. The first imperative is to make fiscal revenue systems more ‘employment friendly’. Measures entail (a) reducing taxes and social insurance contributions for workers or companies; and (b) lowering effective marginal tax rates, particularly for low-income or secondary earners. A second theme is the declared intention to make benefit systems more ‘activating’ for the inactive, the precariously employed and the unemployed. Measures include lower replacement rates, shorter benefit durations and the conditioning of benefits on participation in work or training programmes; they also entail increases in the minimum wage or the introduction of targeted tax credits. Finally, the Strategy advocates making employment contracts more flexible. The measures that governments envisage under this heading are not of immediate consequence to public finances but are supposed to reduce employment protection and to facilitate part-time work, in particular for women.

What impact are these reforms likely to have on the responsiveness and weight of automatic stabilisers?

- Lowering average and marginal effective tax rates (including social insurance contributions) can be expected to have a negative impact on the effectiveness of disposable income smoothing. Lower tax rates reduce the weight of the stabilisers, while lower marginal tax rates reduce responsiveness. There is an offsetting effect on the responsiveness of automatic stabilisers if governments simultaneously introduce tax credits for low-income earners, as some have done, making automatic stabilisers more responsive to fluctuations in these low incomes. However, it is unlikely that this is noticeable in the aggregate, given their negligible weight.
- Reforms of the benefit system that try to shift a share of welfare transfers to in-work benefits have an ambiguous effect. Transfers may become cyclically more sensitive since permanent transfers such as early retirement, disability or assistance to long-term unemployed become temporary, potentially responding more to the business cycle. However, benefit cuts reduce the weight of this automatic stabiliser. In sum, the net effect of reforms on the benefit side will largely depend on whether responsiveness or weight is the dominant determinant of the size of automatic stabilisers.

As noted, reforms to employment protection legislation do not affect public finances directly. Their indirect effects on the need for stabilisation are complex. There may be higher turnover in the labour market, exposing households to more risk. At the same time, households’ ability to manage risk may increase if their income sources are more diversified, due to higher participation rates and a wider range of labour market opportunities.

III. Empirical analysis: The potential impact of Lisbon reforms on stabilisation

In this section, we try to provide evidence for what may appear as a pure thought experiment: what would happen to stabilisation if Lisbon-type reforms, in particular the EES, were implemented? We ask, first, whether there is any evidence of these reforms happening and whether any pattern relevant to our study emerges. Then we use EUROMOD to examine the stabilising capacity of tax-benefit systems in 14 EU states. Finally, we look at empirical evidence for the hypothesis that weaker automatic stabilisers may be a blessing in disguise by improving the microeconomic adjustment capacity of member states.

III.1 Is there evidence of Lisbon-type reforms that might affect stabilisation?

Member states report on their reform programmes in their National Action Plans (NAPs) on Employment. Although the mid-term review of the European Commission claims that the reform record has been poor (CEC, 2005a), our own analysis of the NAPs suggests that states are undertaking reform measures, albeit often small and incremental in their impact.¹¹ This is confirmed by the evidence available from the social reforms database of the Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti (FRD), summarised in Table 1. This database documents reforms in employment protection legislation and non-employment benefits in the EU-14 countries from 1987 to 2002.¹² Dividing the data into two periods, 1987-1994 and 1995-2002, gives us some indication of whether there has been an increase in reform activism in the period covered by the Lisbon process, although the dates used are dictated by the availability of the data.

Table 1 synthesizes the FRD information in an admittedly crude way. The *direction* of reforms is indicated by positive and negative values, ie. they are assigned a plus if the database classifies them as ‘increasing flexibility’ (making systems less protective or generous), and, vice versa, a minus if reforms are classified as ‘decreasing flexibility’ (making them more protective or generous). The data in columns 1-4 summarise the overall impact of reforms, taking into account the *intensity* of each reform, measured by assigning a value of ± 1 to ‘marginal’ and ± 2 to ‘structural’ reforms. Columns 5 and 6, and the final row, indicate the number of reform measures adopted.

¹¹ In a more extended version of this article (available at URL: http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-BE407DA6/hbs/hs.xml/33_45901.html), we have documented in an appendix the reforms affecting automatic stabilisers that member states reported.

¹² We leave out pension reforms.-- Other documentation can be found in Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti (2001) for reforms until 1998, in Carone and Salomäki (2001) for the second half of the 1990s and in IMF (2004a) but only in a highly aggregated form.

Table 1: Welfare state reform direction^a and intensity^b, 1986-1994 and 1995-2002

	Employment protection legislation		Non-employment/unemployment benefits		Number of reforms ^c that decrease (-) or increase (+) flexibility of systems	
	1987-1994	1995-2002	1987-1994	1995-2002	1987-1994	1995-2002
Austria	-1	+3	0 ^d	+8	2 (-); 1 (+)	4 (-); 11 (+)
Belgium	+1	+2	+4	+5	1 (-); 5 (+)	3 (-); 9 (+)
Denmark	0 ^d	+1	+4	+9	2 (-); 4 (+)	2 (-); 8 (+)
Finland	+2	+3	+2	+13	0 (-); 2 (+)	2 (-); 14 (+)
France	-5	-6	+2	-6	4 (-); 2 (+)	16 (-); 9 (+)
Germany	-1	+3	-1	+14	3 (-); 2 (+)	4 (-); 18 (+)
Greece	+2	+4	-2	+5	1 (-); 2 (+)	1 (-); 7 (+)
Ireland	-1	-5	+6	+8	2 (-); 5 (+)	6 (-); 8 (+)
Italy	+1	+8	0 ^d	+5	4 (-); 4 (+)	1 (-); 12 (+)
Netherlands	+1	+5	+1	+19	4 (-); 5 (+)	2 (-); 20 (+)
Portugal	+2	-2	-2	-1	4 (-); 3 (+)	12 (-); 9 (+)
Spain	+1	-2	+4	+2	1 (-); 4 (+)	7 (-); 6 (+)
Sweden	+1	+3	+3	+12	1 (-); 4 (+)	1 (-); 11 (+)
United Kingdom	0 ^d	-6	+5	+11	1 (-); 4 (+)	9 (-); 9 (+)
Number of reforms^c	15 (-); 16 (+)	39 (-); 41 (+)	15 (-); 31 (+)	31 (-); 110 (+)	30 (-); 47 (+)	70 (-); 151 (+)

a - for reducing, + for increasing the flexibility of the system or rewards from the labour market, according to the Fondazione RDB database.

b ± 1 for 'marginal' reforms, ± 2 for 'structural' reform measures; one reform package can contain several (marginal) measures thus valued. Packages of multiple reforms were scored as having an intensity value of 2 if they contained two or more marginal measures and an additional 2 for including a structural measure (so ± 4 is the maximum for the intensity of any one reform package, ± 2 if it contains only marginal measures).

c Number of (more or less flexibilising) reforms irrespective of intensity; the net value of a reform package containing countervailing measures determines classification as - or +.

d The zero value signifies countervailing reforms, not the absence of reforms.

Source: Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti social reforms database (URL: http://www.frdp.org/documentazione/centro_doc.php), accessed 4 April 2005.

The main result is that member countries have become considerably more active in the second period (compare columns 5 and 6) as well as more inclined to reduce benefits for people out of work and increase incentives to work (compare columns 3 and 4). Reforms are often incremental, and they sometimes point in opposite directions, as simultaneous (+) and (-) measures in columns 5 and 6 indicate (France, Portugal and Spain in the second period provide stark examples). Restructuring rather than retrenchment across the board seems to be the result (Rhodes and Ferrera 2000). The results in columns 1 and 2 are compatible with the findings of the IMF (2004a) study according to which governments are less keen on reforms of employment protection – in fact some have increased rather than decreased EPL.

In sum: there has been a clear change in the thrust of admittedly gradual reforms that broadly corresponds to the thrust of the Lisbon Agenda, namely to improve work incentives as determined by the tax-benefit system.

III.2 How is the size of automatic stabilisers likely to be affected?

We outlined above how Lisbon reforms may affect stabilisation. For our evaluation of the impact of the reduction of benefits or of average and marginal tax rates, we use EUROMOD, a

tax-benefit simulation model based on micro-data for individual households in each of the EU-15 member states (Immervoll et al, 1999). It allows us to make comparable calculations of the effects that changes in policy parameters, such as taxes or benefits, have on household income. One limitation of EUROMOD is that the model does not allow for behavioural responses in consumption or labour supply to feed back onto household income and employment. However, this means that we can focus on the direct implications of the Lisbon reforms, without having to disentangle effects induced by the assumptions of a behavioural model (Atkinson 2002, pp.8-9; Sutherland 2005).

Our empirical assessment seeks to establish how much the size of automatic stabilisers would be affected by reforms which change *responsiveness*, measured as the (marginal) income elasticity of the affected automatic stabiliser, and *weight* which is its share in disposable household income. As Box 1 shows, the coefficient of cyclical stabilisation, σ , is the product of the responsiveness and weight of each of the taxes and benefits which affect household disposable income.¹³

¹³ The following is based on Mabbett (2004). We are grateful to the EUROMOD research team (Immervoll et al 2004), in particular Holly Sutherland, for giving us permission to use these results here.

Box 1: Estimating the size of automatic stabilisers and their determinants

The stabilisation coefficient relates household market income y^m to disposable income y^d : By treating transfer payments to households (benefits) as negative taxation, we get:

$$(1) \quad y^d = (1-\sigma)y^m$$

$$(2) \quad \sigma = \sigma(t_p, t_s, b; y^m)$$

The stabilisation coefficient σ incorporates ('is a function of') automatic stabilisers on the revenue side (personal income taxes t_p , social insurance contributions (SIC) t_s) and transfers on the expenditure side (benefits b) that determine disposable household income. For the analysis of cyclical stabilisation, we need to estimate σ in the vicinity of trend or equilibrium income y^* . However, a simulation model like EUROMOD examines changes in income, benefits and taxation relative to the model baseline (in this case, 1998), rather than being able to estimate equilibrium income.¹⁴ The coefficient of cyclical stabilisation can be measured as

$$(3) \quad \sigma = 1 - \frac{\Delta y^d}{\Delta y^m}$$

where Δ signifies 'arithmetic change' in the respective variable.

An equivalent method for estimating σ is to identify the elasticity or responsiveness of taxes, SICs and benefits with respect to a change in market income, and derive σ as the sum of the elasticity times the share in y^m of each component:

$$(4) \quad \sigma = \beta_p \cdot s_p + \beta_s \cdot s_s - \beta_b \cdot s_b$$

where β_i represents the income elasticity of each component and s_i represents the share in y^m of each component. It can easily be shown that equations (3) and (4) are equivalent formulations of the stabilisation coefficient (with t_p for income tax, t_s for employee SIC and b for benefits):

$$(3a) \quad \sigma = \frac{\Delta y^m - \Delta y^d}{\Delta y^m} = \frac{\Delta t_p + \Delta t_s - \Delta b}{\Delta y^m}$$

$$(4a) \quad \sigma = \left(\frac{\Delta t_p}{\Delta y^m} \frac{y^m}{t_p} \cdot \frac{t_p}{y^m} \right) + \left(\frac{\Delta t_s}{\Delta y^m} \frac{y^m}{t_s} \cdot \frac{t_s}{y^m} \right) - \left(\frac{\Delta b}{\Delta y^m} \frac{y^m}{b} \cdot \frac{b}{y^m} \right)$$

$$= \beta_p \cdot s_p + \beta_s \cdot s_s - \beta_b \cdot s_b$$

Table 2 presents estimates of the stabilisation coefficient σ generated by simulating a 10% increase in earnings. The model calculates for each household the effect of higher earnings on taxes, SICs and benefit entitlement. The simulation does not include any status changes for household members (e.g. from unemployment to employment) so the effect on benefits is slight since only benefits which are related to earnings, such as working tax credits or social assistance, are affected.

¹⁴ The microdata in EUROMOD are adjusted to 1998 values, but countries were not all at the same point in their economic cycles when the data were collected in the 1990s, so the deviations are not from the same cyclical position. This might affect the results if there are significant non-linearities in aggregate tax and benefit responses to changes in income.

Table 2: Estimates of responsiveness, weight and income stabilisation in EU-14

	Responsiveness ^a of automatic stabilisers (β_i)			Weight ^b of automatic stabiliser (s_i)		Stab. co-efficient σ
	Income tax (β_p)	Employee SIC ^c (β_s)	Benefits (β_b)	Income tax and SIC ^c	Benefits	
AT	16.4	7.7	0.0	36	38	0.46
BE	13.7	8.5	-0.3	38	40	0.51
DK	11.4	8.1	-0.6	49	25	0.58
FI	11.3	8.3	-0.2	42	37	0.55
FR	9.1	8.1	-0.6	31	36	0.33
GE	17.5	7.5	-0.6	36	29	0.51
GR	14.7	5.3	0.0	28	24	0.32
IR	18.8	10.9	-0.5	21	19	0.39
IT	11.2	8.4	-0.3	31	30	0.41
NL	19.0	5.8	-0.4	35	21	0.46
PT	14.4	8.5	-0.4	25	22	0.33
SP	16.4	3.8	0.0	22	29	0.32
SW	10.7	4.7	-0.5	42	38	0.49
UK	12.0	9.0	-0.5	25	21	0.33

a Percentage change from baseline value due to a 10% change in earnings (marginal income elasticity)

b Percentage share in gross household income

c Social Insurance Contributions

Source: EUROMOD, own calculations based on Mabbett (2004)

The first three columns tell us, to take the example of Austria (AT), that for a 10% increase in earnings, income taxes respond strongly in that they increase by 16.4%. By contrast, SICs rise a less than proportional 7.7%; and benefits decrease hardly at all.¹⁵ It can be seen that, for all countries except France¹⁶, income tax rises by more than 10% (elasticity of household income tax with respect to earnings is greater than 1), while the converse is true for SICs in all countries except Ireland. The values for the stabilisation coefficient in the last column range from 0.31 for Spain to 0.57 for Denmark. In other words, the tax and benefit system reduces the fluctuations of disposable income by one-third to more than one-half. This is consistent with the estimates of coefficients of 0.25-0.3 for the USA generated by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) using a similar methodology. We would expect European values to be higher, because European welfare states are larger.


Since we argued that the net impact of Lisbon-type reforms will depend on which determinant is more dominant, it is of interest to disentangle whether responsiveness or weight contributes more to the stabilisation coefficients in our set of countries. As chart 1 (disregarding benefits) illustrates, weight is the dominant determinant of the size of the stabilisers. Stabilisation coefficients are positively correlated with weight (the black dots follow a rising trend) while no

¹⁵ In principle, it is possible to simulate the change in (un)employment status related to a rise in earnings by using Okun's Law (Mabbett, 2004, p.10, table 3). This would increase the size of stabilisers on the benefit side.

¹⁶ The somewhat surprising result for France reflects a base effect. When earnings rise by 10%, market income rises by less than 10% because households have other sources of income. A proportional income tax would therefore also rise by less than 10%: in the case of France, by 8.7%. This result does not show up for other countries which have significant non-earned household market income because of higher progressivity in the tax system. For a full breakdown, see Mabbett (2004: Table 1).

such relationship is discernible for responsiveness (the square and triangle data points follow neither a rising nor declining trend). We can also see that Denmark and Finland, to the right of the graph (i.e. with high values for the stabilisation coefficient) have relatively unresponsive tax and SIC structures, yet their weight compensates this. Conversely, Ireland has the lowest weight of taxes and SICs in household income, but high responsiveness (the square and triangle data points are in the upper band of the two data series). Ireland's stabilisation coefficient is high given the small size of its government, although it is still below the EU average of 0.45.


Chart 1: Determinants of the size of automatic stabilisers



mand stabilisation really a loss, once we take labour supply adjustments into account? Their answer is a resounding “No”. They claim that automatic stabilisers are not the solution but the problem in that they prevent adjustments to supply shocks, thus making for stability with high unemployment. Weakening them generates a double dividend of supply-side flexibility and more effective stabilisation through *microeconomic* adjustment. The converse argument is that, notwithstanding the possible effects of taxes and benefits on individual behaviour (micro-level effects), the aggregate impact reflects the positive impact of the stabilisers on macroeconomic conditions.


The empirical data we used for our earlier analyses allows us to do a limited evaluation of this hypothesis. If it holds, tax-benefit systems that yield high stabilisation coefficients according to our EUROMOD simulations (table 2) should have both high levels of unemployment and low volatility of unemployment, the latter to be interpreted as persistence of unemployment.

Chart 2a: The size of automatic stabilisers and unemployment levels



As regards levels of unemployment, we find not a positive but a (weak) negative correlation: tax-benefit systems with stronger stabilising qualities or more generous unemployment benefits, respectively, had lower average unemployment rates in the period 1997-2004.¹⁷ The results for persistence or volatility of unemployment in chart 2b also fail to show the relationship hypothesised by Buti and van den Noord (2003) which implies a negative correlation (the higher the stabilisation coefficient, the lower volatility of unemployment).

¹⁷ The Pearson correlation coefficient is -0.28.

Chart 2b: Automatic stabilisers and unemployment persistence

Its critics see the welfare state as reducing flexibility by operating asymmetrically over the cycle, generating permanent responses (long-term unemployment, early retirement) to cyclical downturns. Our analysis suggests that demand stabilisation through automatic fiscal mechanisms does not increase unemployment and does not add to unemployment persistence. We have not been able to examine the cyclical responsiveness of transfer payments directly, but recent work by Méhitz (2005) suggests that transfer payments have a distinct counter-cyclical pattern in European countries, rather than exhibiting asymmetric persistence. This appears to work through a variety of channels: for example, pension payments may fall relative to GDP in upturns due to postponement of retirement. Such mechanisms would imply that automatic stabilisation through the benefit system may adjust labour supply to labour demand, enhancing rather than impairing flexibility.

IV. Conclusions

Our exploratory study suggests that Lisbon-type reforms, such as lowering the average tax burden and reducing high effective marginal tax rates, are problematic from the point of view of fiscal stabilisation. This is because they would lower the weight and the responsiveness of member states' tax systems to shocks and business cycle fluctuations. The potentially positive effects of reforms on the cyclical responsiveness of benefits are too small to compensate. Negative spillovers from structural reforms on the stabilising qualities of tax-benefit systems are particularly worrying for EMU members since they have little scope for discretionary fiscal policy. This finding is relevant for the political economy of reform and European integration. The dual agenda of the EU induces governments to ask their electorates not only to accept that not all past commitments as regards old-age or unemployment benefits will be honoured but also that they will have to self-insure more volatile market incomes.

Our findings on the size of stabilisers, as summarized in table 2 and chart 1, contain some lessons for the ongoing restructuring of welfare states. First of all, if governments are mindful

not only of microeconomic flexibility but also macroeconomic stability, they may want to exploit the possibilities of raising the progressivity of taxes while lowering the overall tax burden. SICs are generally less progressive (responsive) than income taxes, so reform of social insurance contribution structures or substitution of taxes for SICs may improve the operation of the stabilisers. However, there is no continuous tradeoff between responsiveness and weight; progressivity cannot vary that much and has to be limited as government gets bigger. The empirical results reported here give little insight into the potential on the benefit side, but theory suggests that Lisbon-type benefit reforms may actually be constructive since their overall thrust is ‘activation’ which in the context of our study means replacing permanent transfers by temporary ones.

Finally, we would like to stress that it is unlikely that fiscal stabilisation can be substituted by more flexible supply-side adjustment. Furthermore, we question the ‘back against the wall’ political economy which suggests that the absence of countercyclical macroeconomic policy will strengthen incentives to reform. On the contrary, we see adverse macroeconomic conditions as making welfare reforms more difficult, and our results suggest that such reforms may weaken fiscal stabilisation. This suggests that more attention should be paid to the compatibility of welfare state reforms and macroeconomic policy for which the recent decision to ‘streamline’ (link) fiscal policy coordination and the Lisbon process (CEC, 2005c) provides an opportunity.

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