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Summary

The dissemination conference “EU Governance: Are we on the right track?” took place on 10 April 2008, at the European Commission’s General-Directorate for Research. It was jointly organised by the Integrated Project NEWGOV and the Network of Excellence CONNEX and attended by more than 50 participants. The aim of this conference was to present the main achievements of the CONNEX Network and the NEWGOV project to practitioners and stakeholders in the Brussels arena. Scholars from the two consortia presented controversial findings and by doing so questioned conventional wisdom and dissipate erroneous assumptions. The conference also demonstrated the value of spending money for social science research on EU governance by the Framework Programmes.

Contents

I. OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE.....	3
II. CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS.....	4
II.1 CEES VAN DER EIJK: REALISTIC AND UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN THE EU.....	4
II.2 TANJA BÖRZEL: NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE AND ACCESSION. FALSE PROMISES OR WRONG PREMISES?.....	5
II.3 YANNIS PAPADOPOULOS: MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: MORE ACCOUNTABILITY, LESS DEMOCRACY?.....	7
II.4 WALTRAUD SCHELKLE: NEW INSTEAD OF EFFECTIVE? THE EVOLVING FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE	8
II.5 PAOLO PONZANO: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S WHITE PAPER - STATE OF PLAY	10
III. ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION ON LARGE RESEARCH PROJECTS.....	11
IV. PROGRAMME.....	12
V. PARTICIPANTS.....	13

I. Overview and Purpose of the Conference

The dissemination conference “EU Governance: Are we on the right track?” took place on 10 April 2008, at the European Commission’s General-Directorate for Research. It was jointly organised by the Integrated Project NEWGOV and the Network of Excellence CONNEX and attended by more than 50 participants. The main aims of this conference were

- to present the main achievements of the CONNEX Network and the NEWGOV project to practitioners and stakeholders in the Brussels arena, that is the European Institutions and other Brussels-based institutions and NGOs;
- to present controversial findings and by doing so question conventional wisdom and dissipate erroneous assumptions;
- to demonstrate the value of spending money for social science research on EU governance and legitimacy and reflecting on the merit of large research instruments such as CONNEX and NEWGOV.

CONNEX and NEWGOV are the first large FP6 projects on governance coming to an end in 2008. The conference had a pre-defined and limited thematic focus, in order to avoid a too general debate about ‘New Modes of Governance’. It was organised in addition to the two final academic conferences of CONNEX (6-8 March 2008, Mannheim) and NEWGOV (5-6 June 2008, Florence). The conference was structured along the key research areas covered by CONNEX and NEWGOV:

- Opening Session: Why research on governance and democracy matters?
- Session 1: Electoral representation: Does it function in the EU?
- Session 2: Governance and Accession
- Session 3: Does multi-level governance call for multiple forms of accountability?
- Session 4: The effectiveness of governance modes

Each session was opened by a statement of a leading scholar participating in either NEWGOV or CONNEX. For a summary of the presentations given in each session, see below. Each presentation was then followed by a short comment from the practitioners’ communities, e.g. Monica Frassoni (Member of the European Parliament, Committee on legal affairs), Nikiforos Diamandouros (European Ombudsman), Peter Wierts (De Nederlandsche Bank), and an open discussion. A final statement was delivered by Paolo Ponzano of the European Commission’s General Secretary, in which he put the implementation of the Commission’s White Paper on Governance in perspective and linked it with the findings of the two Consortia. The Power-Point presentations of all contributions can be downloaded at the NEWGOV website: http://www.eu-newgov.org/public/Dissemination_Conference_2008.asp.

In the afternoon, participants were invited to join a round table discussion on “Gains and disadvantages of large research projects / EU Research Policy and the Experience of NEWGOV and CONNEX”. The round table was chaired by Jean-Michel Baer (Commission, DG-Research); representatives from other Integrated Projects and Network of Excellences were asked to comment on the experience of the two Consortia.

The Network of Excellence CONNEX (“Connecting Excellence on European Governance”) is dedicated to the analysis of efficient and democratic multilevel governance in Europe. CONNEX seeks to integrate independent fundamental research and mobilise outstanding scholars from different disciplines to deepen our knowledge on European multilevel govern-

ance and build a Europe-wide research community which stands for scientific excellence. It also aims to contribute to the public debate on the future of European governance.

The aim of the NEWGOV Integrated Project is to examine the transformation of governance in Europe (and beyond) by mapping, evaluating and analysing the emergence, execution, and evolution of what is referred to as “New Modes of Governance”. The objective of this Integrated Project is to produce a deeper conceptual, empirical and normative understanding of all aspects of governance within and beyond Europe, giving special attention to the emergence, execution, evaluation and evolution of new and innovative modes of governance.

CONNEX is coordinated by the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) at the University of Mannheim; NEWGOV is coordinated by the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. In total, around 70 universities and institutions and more than 250 scholars from all over Europe cooperate within the two consortia.

II. Conference Presentations

II.1 Cees van der Eijk: Realistic and unrealistic expectations about electoral democracy in the EU

I. Introduction

Electoral democracy conceptualises elections as a mechanism for citizens to determine the direction of public policy. The ‘representation’ of citizens’ policy preferences is, thereby, reflected in the composition and decisions of representative institutions (outcome). This representation is, meanwhile, brought about by voters’ choices (process). Are elections for EP thus instruments of electoral democracy? (or, in H.G. Well’s words: are elections a ‘feast of democracy’?). In an attempt to answer this question, one needs to understand that it is unrealistic to expect EP elections to be about Europe, the EU, or European integration. It is also unrealistic to see EP elections as ‘real’ elections, i.e., occasions where election outcomes have predictable consequences for the direction of policy making. Rather, EP elections should be seen as second-order national elections and are thus difficult to regard as instruments of electoral democracy in the EU.

II. Second-order elections

Voters’ (and parties’) behaviour is determined by their political orientations towards their national political context. These orientations may lead to different voter choices than in national parliamentary elections because there are no direct consequences for government power (voters’ strategic considerations are therefore different). In view of EP elections, the second-order character accounts for low turnout, for losses by government parties and for losses by larger parties. Contrary to often held beliefs, none of these patterns signifies any particular pro- or anti EU message. In fact, Europe only matters indirectly. It is true that national politicisation of issues of European integration has clear consequences (but European integration is in most countries not or weakly politicised): the turnout is affected by the extent of national inter-party conflict about European integration. Parties that take a clear stand in such conflict actually enjoy an electoral ‘bonus’. This fits within the second-order perspective of EP elections.

III. Consequences of Enlargement and the Public Sphere

The second order perspective is in the 2004 EP elections relevant for both older and newer EU member states. The (national) factors that drive voter behaviour are indeed the same in older and newer member states. Important is the degree of ‘closeness’ to parties in broad policy terms: left/right orientations and major national issues. Furthermore, government approval

and affiliation with politically relevant social groups are decisive factors. The Media meanwhile pay little attention to EP elections.

However, the latter are more visible in the ‘new’ member states and on public broadcasting news compared to the ‘old’ member states and commercial news. EU actors were generally invisible in the media whereas EP elections were labelled as ‘boring’ in the news and turnout was generally predicted to be low. Political conflict was generally more present in the news in the ‘old’ member states than in the ‘new.’

IV. Conclusion

Voters’ choices are not based on parties’ positions concerning issues debated in the EP. Voters rather choose on the basis of parties’ political positions in their national contexts. Because of the ideological commensurability of the members of EP party groupings, and because of the cohesiveness of these groupings, voters’ broad political preferences are nevertheless – indirectly – represented in EP policy making. This representation does not include ‘constitutional’ issues relating to extent of integration or enlargement (on which national parties are often internally divided, but which are not comprised in the remit of the EP). In view of the future, there are three scenarios:

- I. Nothing changes: little politicisation of integration issues, weak media attention to EP elections. The consequences would be low, even falling turnout, continued pattern of government and large-party losses among other things.
- II. EP election campaigns witness a politicisation of integration, hence a growing importance of integration issues in EP elections. The consequence would be more media attention, higher turnout, less policy representation on issues debated by EP.
- III. National politics and NP elections witness a politicisation of integration, hence a growing importance of integration issues in EP elections. The consequences of this scenario would be more media attention, higher turnout, uncertain effects for policy representation on issues debated by EP.

PIREDEU, a pilot study for an infrastructure project that would ensure stability for long term study of electoral representation in EU, will allow continued study of these developments. More precisely, the 2009 study will encompass

- A voter study in 27 countries
- Studies of candidates, or MEPs
- Analysis of the media and campaigns nationally
- Analysis of party manifestos and party campaigning

II.2 Tanja Börzel: New Modes of Governance and Accession. False Promises or Wrong Premises?

I. Introduction

The presentation explores how transition countries in Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe have coped with the challenge of accession. It analyses the role of New Modes of Governance in the adoption of and adaptation to selected EU policies as an example of positive integration which imposes significant costs on and requires considerable capacities of accession countries. Through New Modes of Governance, public actors can mobilize resources in situations where they are widely dispersed among public and private actors at different levels of government, international, national, regional, and local. Private actors offer public actors information, expertise, financial means, or political support, which the latter need to make and enforce collectively binding norms and rules. In exchange, private actors receive substantive policy influence since public actors are unlikely to adopt and implement policies against the interest of the private actors on whose resources they depend. Next to providing

public actors with additional or necessary resources to make “good” policies, the involvement of private actors in the policy process helps to ensure effective implementation. The more the actors affected by a policy have a say in decision-making, the more likely they are to accept the policy outcome to be implemented, even if their interests may not have been fully accommodated.

II. Coping with Accession

The scarce emergence of only weak forms of new modes of governance (consultation, contracting out) came as a surprise to us. It is all the more remarkable since the accession countries in question significantly differ with regard to their political, social, economic and cultural institutions. What they have in common, however, points to some important factors in explaining the emergence of new modes of governance. We deal with both accession and transition countries. The combination of both factors results in conditions that, somehow paradoxically, may require new modes of governance but are unfavourable for their emergence. First, the top-down nature of the accession process, in which the candidate countries have to down-load a vast number of EU policies in a rather short period of time has most of the time not allowed for the involvement of private actors. On the contrary, accession conditionality and the focus of the Commission on the absorption capacity of the candidate countries has strengthened the autonomy of central government actors in hierarchically imposing policy outcomes.

Second, accession countries do not only have to cope with the challenge of adopting and adapting to the comprehensive *acquis communautaire*. Their governments also have to manage the still ongoing transition to democracy and market economy. Both, accession and transition require immense resources, a demand that is hardly met by the weak governance capacities of the candidate countries. On the one hand, state actors often lack sufficient financial (money), administrative (staff) and cognitive (expertise) resources, and the capacity to mobilize existing resources (e.g. due to administrative fragmentation), respectively, to effectively adopt and enforce public policies. Moreover, given the political instability and frequently changing governments, they may not appear as reliable negotiation partners. In the absence of a credible shadow of hierarchy, non-state actors have hardly any incentives to cooperate with state actors exchanging their resources for political influence. At the same time, state actors often shy away from cooperating with non-state actors, too, because they are afraid of being captured, or are indeed captured by powerful private interests. Finally, the engaging capacity of state actors has been severely limited since institutionalised arenas for interacting with non-state actors have been largely absent. On the other hand, non-state actors are often equally weak. They do not have sufficient organizational capacities to offer themselves as reliable partners to state actors. Or they lack any resources to exchange to begin with. Weak governance capacity is also often complemented by a state tradition which is hostile to the involvement of non-state actors in public policy-making. Not only are new modes of governance incompatible with the legacy of authoritarianism and socialism. New modes of governance do not necessarily correspond to the newly established institutions of representative democracies. Non-elected interest groups and civil society organizations are not always accepted as legitimate representatives of societal interests.

III. Escaping the Capacity Trap

Our findings have important implications for research on (new modes of) governance. If it is correct that non-hierarchical modes of governance require both a strong state and a strong society, this results in a serious dilemma or even paradox: the lower the capacity of a state, the greater the need for new modes of governance to compensate for state weakness or state failure but the less likely they are to emerge. However, there are ways out. First, EU pressure is a

prominent factor in inducing state actors to resort to new modes of governance. On the one hand, the EU may legally require the involvement of private actors. On the other hand, there is a normative logic that may drive the emergence of new modes of governance – it is the “EU way of doing business”. Second, the EU also helps strengthening governance capacities of accession countries. The transfer of money and expertise through Community programs and twinning processes provides state as well as non-state actors with additional resources they can exchange. These processes also foster policy learning and trust building. Moreover, the monitoring and sanctioning system of the EU have empowered non-state actors by opening new opportunities for them to pursue their interests, e.g. by taking their governments to court. State actors may resort to new modes of governance in order to accommodate the interests of non-state actors and avoid complaints to the Commission or legal proceedings. Despite such promising ways out, we probably need to lower our expectations in the first place.

II.3 Yannis Papadopoulos: Multi-level Governance: More Accountability, Less Democracy?

I. Introduction: Multi-level governance (MLG) in the EU

Cooperative relations (deliberation, bargaining, and compromise-seeking) exist between distinct government levels (local, subnational/regional, national, European, transnational, etc: multi-level government) as well as public and non-public actors. In view of the latter, public policies are formulated or implemented by networks and partnerships involving public actors (politicians and administrators) that belong to different decisional levels, together with non-public actors of different nature (firms, interest representatives and stakeholders, experts). Multi-level governance is probably a necessary shift for policy effectiveness. It is also considered to be a promising one in terms of broadening participation. However, the democratic anchorage of MLG is insufficient, and this is linked to a lack of democratic accountability. Such a deficit in democratic accountability indeed finds its origins in several characteristics of MLG.

II. Reasons for deficit in democratic accountability

Firstly, there is a weak visibility of governance networks. Decisional procedures in MLG are often deliberately informal and opaque. This is deemed to facilitate the achievement of compromise, but impedes public scrutiny. Responsibility is generally diluted among a large number of actors, e.g. public-private partnerships are propitious to «blame-shift games». Furthermore, one can observe a divorce between the sphere of problem-solving – dominated by governance arrangements – and the arena of party competition. In the EU “policy without politics” rules unless politicisation of the public opinion occurs through referendums.

Another reason is governance networks are often to a large extent uncoupled from the official representative bodies, legislative and control functions of parliaments are hence weakened. “Meta-governance”, i.e. the governance of networks (their design, the framing of issues on their agenda, and their management) is largely delegated to the administration. When the chain of delegation is lengthy, representation and accountability become fictitious. Parliaments do have the formal right to overrule decisions formulated in networks. It is questionable however if this represents a credible menace. The capacity of parliaments to exert effective oversight (lack of information) is doubtful.

Thirdly, the composition of governance networks cause problems. Policy networks are largely composed of administrators and other policy experts on the one hand, of interest representatives, NGOs, and purely private actors on the other. Elected politicians are not frequently at the core of networks. As members of the bureaucracy they are only indirectly accountable to the citizenry due to a lengthy chain of delegation (this is even more the case in the administra-

tive structure of the European Commission, or in the case of the blossoming regulatory agencies).

Finally, accountability is further inhibited by the multi-level aspect of governance. Cooperative federalism tells us that in order to avoid policy blockade informal cooperation between executives from different levels is required, at the expense of transparency. Even in the absence of non-public actors, MLG often rests on mechanisms operating along an intergovernmental logic that exacerbate problems of delegation and of dilution of responsibility. The lengthy chain of delegation makes the policy processes visible only to those who are familiar with them. In principle democratically accountable actors (governments) are only fictitiously accountable for intergovernmental policy coordination, because of lack of information on their positions and decisions.

III. Conclusions

On the one hand the democratic accountability of policy-makers is weakened in EU-MLG. The question of accountability is largely uncoupled from the question of democratic representation. If uncoupling and remoteness of multi-level governance from representative government occur, there is a risk of attribution errors in accountability. Decisions are made in reality by actors other than those (the most visible: elected politicians) regarded as authorised decision-makers by the people or the affected communities. Also, the effectiveness of democratic feedback procedures is undermined. The retrospective evaluation of office holders on the grounds of their policy achievements, and the prospective evaluation of candidates on the grounds of their pledges indeed become to a large extent fictitious. On the other hand we observe in EU-MLG a multiplication of control mechanisms. These are, for instance, accountability mechanisms adapt to network governance with the creation of accountability networks (of courts, of ombudsmen). These mechanisms of (political, legal, financial, administrative) accountability are composite and diffuse, leading “to a more diversified and pluralistic set of accountability relationships”. There are several implications for democracy of accountability in EU-MLG. These accountability mechanisms perform a different control function than mechanisms of democratic accountability, which allow citizens to be confident that their preferences (input) will be mirrored in decision-making (output): responsiveness. Actors in accountability forums may have a distinct agenda from citizens with whom policy-makers are in a relation of delegation and representation. Those who control ex-post are not necessarily the same as those who formulate democratic mandates ex-ante. Accountable governance is hence no substitute to democratic government!

II.4 Waltraud Schelkle: New instead of effective? The evolving framework of economic governance

I. Introduction

The economic and monetary union in Europe is a grand laboratory for new approaches to economic governance. The Lisbon Strategy and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) are show cases for these new approaches. It is true that the Community Method plays hardly any role in the integration of the monetary union with its core institutions, an independent central bank and the Stability Pact. Governance is best characterised by self-regulation, observed and monitored by expert audiences. But this raises issues of opportunism and regulatory capture. Have the innovations achieved their declared goals? The Lisbon Strategy and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were both reformed in early 2005. Those changes were deemed necessary indicates that not all was well with these new approaches. Outcome indicators, on employment and fiscal deficits respectively, admittedly improved since then but the causality is unclear. As long as we do not understand why and how these reformed processes should have

more impact on policymakers now, it is problematic to argue that the changes really made a difference.

II. What makes for “effectiveness”?

Following Abbott et al (2000), we can see that obligation is only one dimension of binding agreements in international law; delegation and precision being at least two others. *Obligation* refers to the commitment arising under the rules, procedures and discourse of international agreements. As already indicated, the new modes of governance under consideration here create only moral obligation, even though the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) was meant to back up the Pact rules by pecuniary sanctions. *Delegation* refers to the possibility of empowering a third party to monitor the agreement (operative delegation) and resolve conflicts (adjudicative delegation). In the case of new modes of governance, delegation was originally analogous to diplomacy among equals, ie sovereign governments, but the Commission, Eurostat and various committees have gained in status over time, both in the Lisbon Process and in fiscal surveillance. Finally, the dimension of *precision* refers to the rules that specify what is expected from the parties under what circumstances, both in terms of goals and means to achieve these goals. New modes of governance tend to address a complex set of goals and are therefore less precise. However, detailed benchmarking and the search for best practice, if successful, makes them more specific and thus precise as regards the means to achieve or to balance various goals.

	Lisbon Strategy	Stability Pact
Obligation	--	↓
Precision	↑ goals ↓ means	↓ goals ↑ means
Delegation	(↑)	↑ adjudicative ↑ operational

III. In conclusion: New instead of Effective?

So how have the changes affected the three dimensions of bindingness? In terms of obligation, the Lisbon re-launch did not bring any significant changes. This is what the proponents of structural reform noted and deplored. In terms of delegation, the ‘streamlining’ of the Lisbon Strategy has elevated the role of the ECOFIN Council, which contributes to making it more binding. Economics and Finance ministers can be expected to be hard-nosed monitors of social policy, with an orientation towards fiscal and economic surveillance. Similarly the DG for Economic and Financial Affairs has given itself more of a role and DG Employment has been sidelined. The Pact has been considerably strengthened in this respect, and now has a high degree of delegation in monitoring and medium in conflict resolution. In terms of precision, the re-launch of Lisbon brought hardly any changes. The focus on employment goals (‘more and better’) should have meant somewhat more precision in goals. But this was undermined by the Integrated Guidelines due to the streamlining with the BEPG. The annual joint report on governments’ national reform programmes still comments on everything, from fiscal and ecological sustainability to employment quantity and quality. As regards the means, the medium degree of precision that originally manifested itself in the search for best practices has been replaced by four priority areas that are in place for a whole policy cycle of three years (and will not be changed for 2008-10). The revised Pact, by contrast, has become less precise as regards its fiscal goals, by providing room for structural reforms, yet has gone from a low to a high degree of precision in the application of the means to achieve goals.

In short, self-regulation monitored by expert audiences is inherently weak on delegation but is, for the time being, without alternative in the governance of EMU. The Stability Pact may be more effective now, because instrumental precision and delegation to expert audiences were strengthened. The Lisbon Strategy is, meanwhile, unlikely to gain from its focus on economic goals, largely because this focus has alienated expert audiences.

II.5 Paolo Ponzano: Implementation of the Commission's White Paper - State of Play

I. Preliminary Remarks

Some scholars and political analysts have criticised the 2001 White Paper on European governance on the grounds that Commission would have neglected basic principles of democratic legitimacy in favour of the concept of an output legitimacy based only on the efficiency of the decision-making process. In fact, the European Commission has presented its proposals for the reform of European governance within the existing framework of the Treaties. Therefore, it would have been very difficult for the Commission to increase the democratic legitimacy of the Union without bringing any changes in the current Treaties, like the ones provided by the Lisbon Treaty (such as, for instance, the citizens' right of legislative initiative and the election of the Commission's President by the European Parliament).

II. Main Achievements

Following publication of the White Paper, the Commission has implemented its main ideas through the “Better Law Making Action plan” of June 2002; the Framework for Action “Updating and simplifying the Community *acquis*” of March 2003; and the “Communication of May 2002” on impact assessment and follow-up measures. These packages have led to some significant achievements. Firstly, a consolidation of best practices for the consultations of the stakeholders occurred. External stakeholder and expert input is now embedded practice from the beginning of the policy process. Secondly, the Commission's impact assessment system became the bedrock for the exercise of the Commission's right of initiative. Impact assessments have consistently accompanied the Commission's main proposals since 2006. Overall, more than 300 impact assessments (IA) were completed and published since 2003. In 2008, the Commission will carry out approximately 200 impact assessments compared to 130 in 2007, these assessments are public.

Furthermore, the Commission's Impact Assessment Guidelines were published in the JO and progressively improved from June 2005. In 2006 a *Common Approach to Impact Assessment* was agreed with other institutions; an external evaluation of its impact assessment system was carried out by the Commission in 2007. At the end of 2006, the Commission reinforced its impact assessment system significantly by creating the *Impact Assessment Board* (IAB). This is an independent body under the authority of the President of the Commission, composed of high-level Commission officials operating independently of the departments they come from. It provides advice and control on methodology and quality, and draws on external expertise when necessary. The board's opinions are used when the Commission is making its final decision, and are made public once the initiative has been adopted. Improved implementation of the “subsidiarity and proportionality principles” was meanwhile secured through new mechanisms (namely the IAB).

Also, a strategy for better Law-Making throughout the EU legislative process has been applied since the conclusion of the Inter-institutional Agreement on the “Better Law-Making” between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in 2003. Finally, an ambitious strategy for simplification of Community legislation was adopted by the Commission in 2005, which beyond merely reducing the size of the Community *acquis*, aims to provide European companies and citizens with a regulatory environment that meets the highest stan-

dards of law making. The related Simplification Rolling Programme has been yearly reviewed and updated. An Action Programme was launched by the Commission in January 2007 setting the ambitious objective of cutting the administrative burdens stemming from EU legislation by 25% by 2012. The Commission regularly screens all legislative proposals pending before the legislature to ensure they remain relevant and meet required quality standards. Since 2005, 108 pending proposals have been withdrawn this way. The Commission is also routinely repealing obsolete acts that no longer have real effect, but which are still on the statute book. Up to now, this work has involved about 2500 legal acts

III. Other Proposals

On the opposite side, a package of measures for “Better implementation” presented in December 2002 has received less support and produced few results. For instance, the Council gave no follow-up to the draft Agreement for the adoption of a common framework and rationalisation of “Regulatory Agencies”. In these circumstances, the Commission recently decided to withdraw its draft and to maintain a “*moratoire*” for the establishment of new Agencies by end 2009. The Member States gave meanwhile no support to the conclusion of *tripartite agreements* between the Commission, national and regional or local authorities. Only the reform of Comitology has been successful. The European Parliament has obtained a right to veto on the *quasi-legislative* measures proposed by the Commission and has been placed on an equal footing with the Council. Another innovative side of the White Paper's proposals (for instance the partnership agreements with the civil society, already watered down within the Commission internal process) has not been pursued by the Commission, mainly due to the reluctance of the European Parliament to a strengthening participatory democracy against the representative one and to the difficulties in identifying the civil society's organisations more representative at the European level. However, the Lisbon Treaty has integrated some proposals of the White Paper for a strengthening of participative democracy.

IV. Conclusion

The European Commission has taken a very large number of initiatives in order to reinforce the efficiency of the European Union decision-making process and, therefore, the output legitimacy of the Union. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty – once ratified – will increase to some extent the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. If the improvement of the European governance has not been achieved yet, we are on the right track!

III. Round Table Discussion on Large Research Projects

In the afternoon, participants were invited to join a round table discussion on “Gains and disadvantages of large research projects / EU Research Policy and the Experience of NEWGOV and CONNEX”. The round table was chaired by Jean-Michel Baer (Commission, DG-Research). Stefano Bartolini for NEWGOV and Beate Kohler-Koch and Fabrice Larat for CONNEX reported about their experiences in implementing their respective projects/networks and evaluated the pros and cons of large as opposed to small and medium-sized research projects. Representatives from other Integrated Projects and Network of Excellences were asked to comment on the experience of the two Consortia. Issues addressed in the debate were, among others: the composition of the consortia and the rationale behind it; the decision-making procedures in and the organisation of large research projects; internal and external communication strategies; incentives for and obstacles to cooperation; sustainability issues; the integration of the research community on governance issues in Western and Central and Eastern Europe; as well as the overall achievement of initial goals and objectives.

The issues of this round table discussion will be followed-up by CONNEX. CONNEX will prepare a questionnaire to be sent out to a large number FP6 IPs and NoEs in the field of Social Science and Humanities and, based on the feed-back, will organise a conference to discuss the results. The conference “How does research integration work?” will take place on 17 June 2008, in cooperation with DG Research (cf. <http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/index.php?id=663>).

IV. Programme

08:45	Welcome: Jean-Michel Baer (European Commission, DG Research)
08:50–09:15	<p>Opening Session: “Why research on governance and democracy matters?”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Beate Kohler-Koch (University of Mannheim): “Connecting excellence on European governance” - Adrienne Héritier (European University Institute, Florence): “The ‘New Modes of Governance’ project”
09:15–10:00	<p>Session 1: “Electoral representation: Does it function in the EU?”</p> <p>Chair: Beate Kohler-Koch (Coordinator of CONNEX, University of Mannheim)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Statement: Cees van der Eijk (University of Nottingham): “Realistic and unrealistic expectations about electoral democracy in the EU” - Discussant: Monica Frassoni (Member of the European Parliament, Committee on legal affairs)
10:00-10:10	<p>General comments</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Jérôme Vignon (European Commission, DG EMPL): “Democratic governance in the EU: Some reflections”
10:10–10:45	<p>Session 2: “Governance and Accession”</p> <p>Chair: Adrienne Héritier (NEWGOV Scientific Director, European University Institute, Florence)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Statement: Tanja A. Börzel (Free University Berlin): “Mission impossible? New Modes of Governance in the Member States” - Discussant: Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (Hertie School of Governance, Berlin and Romanian Academic Society)
11:00–11:15	Coffee Break

11:15–12:00	<p>Session 3: “Does multi-level governance call for multiple forms of accountability?”</p> <p>Chair: Sonja Puntsher Riekman (University of Salzburg)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Statement: Yannis Papadopoulos (University of Lausanne) “Multi-Level Governance: More Accountability, Less Democracy?” - Discussant 1: Nikiforos Diamandouros (European Ombudsman) - Discussant 2: Bruno Kaufmann (The Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe, Brussels/Marburg)
12:00–12:45	<p>Session 4: The effectiveness of governance modes</p> <p>Chair: Wolfgang Wessels (University of Cologne)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Statement: Waltraud Schelkle (London School of Economics): “New instead of effective? The evolving framework of economic governance” - Discussant : Peter Wierts (De Nederlandsche Bank)
12:45–13:30	<p>Concluding statement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Paolo Ponzano (European Commission, General Secretary): “The implementation of the Commission's White Paper on Governance in perspective” <p>Wrapping-up discussion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Chairs: Beate Kohler-Koch (CONNEX Coordinator) and Stefano Bartolini (NEWGOV Coordinator)
13:30–14:30	Lunch
14:30–16:00	<p>Round table: Gains and disadvantages of large research projects / EU Research Policy and the Experience of NEWGOV and CONNEX</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Chair: Jean-Michel Baer (Commission, DG-Research) - Speakers: Stefano Bartolini (NEWGOV), Beate Kohler-Koch & Fabrice Larat (CONNEX) - Discussants: Sergio Carrera (CHALLENGE); Eleni Tsingou (GARNET)

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